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Wed 21 May, 2008 08:24 am
Have you guys heard the paradox of material constitution?
Consider a lump of clay stitting on a table at T1. Call it Lumpy. Suppose I apply some force to Lumpy and make it acquire a statue-shape at T2. It would seem there is a statue on the table at T2. Call it Statue. What's the relationship between Lumpy and Statue? It seems that Lumpy still exists at T2. Merely changing the shape of a lump of clay surely does not destroy it. And there is some reason to think Statue and Lump are the same. They are made of all the same parts, for example. But it also seems that Lumpy and Statue are not identical. It does not seem that Statue existed at T1. Yet, Lumpy existed then. And suppose we flatten our lump-statue. It would seem Lumpy would survive such a procedure, but not Statue. Therefore, again it would seem that Lumpy is not Statue.
One premise that would justify this line of reasoning is the thesis that being a statue is a substantial kind. Being F is a substantial kind when if something is ever F, it's always F. In other words, if F is a substantial kind, then when something ceases to be F it ceases to be, period. I doubt whether artifactual kinds - being a statue, being a car, being a toaster - are substantial. The argument is also supposed to apply natural kinds - being a tree, being a cat. I have some doubts about that, too. It seems true to say looking at an acorn, this will be an oak tree. Maybe it seems true to say of a clump of cells that is not a human being that it will be a human being.
Just to clairfy -- are you saying a fetus is "lumpy"?
boomerang wrote:Just to clairfy -- are you saying a fetus is "lumpy"?
I thought that might distract.
Seriously, I'm just trying to follow along and get an idea of where you're coming from.
Let's take the acorn (the clay doesn't work for me because it isn't a living thing), you might look at it and say "tree".
I might look at the tree and say "firewood".
My husband might look at the firewood and say "ashes".
So, are the acorn and the ashes the same thing?
Or, let's say I'm Lumpy. When I die am I still Lumpy or am I something else?
boomerang wrote:Seriously, I'm just trying to follow along and get an idea of where you're coming from.
Let's take the acorn (the clay doesn't work for me because it isn't a living thing), you might look at it and say "tree".
I might look at the tree and say "firewood".
My husband might look at the firewood and say "ashes".
So, are the acorn and the ashes the same thing?
Or, let's say I'm Lumpy. When I die am I still Lumpy or am I something else?
You look at the acorn and say "That
will be a tree."
I don't think something that is a tree wil be firewood. I don't think a log of firewood will be ashes. You can do things to a tree that produce some firewood out of the stuff that makes up the tree. Ditto for the firewood and ashes.
The basic issue arises with respect to people and their bodies, too.
No. An acorn might be a tree, not will be a tree.
And even if the acorn does become a tree the tree will most likely end up as something else.
boomerang wrote:No. An acorn might be a tree, not will be a tree.
I'd be happy if I could convince people that an acorn "might" be a tree. The people I'm arguing against appear to think being a tree is an essential property of something. If something is ever a tree then it's always a tree. An acorn, therefore, cannot become a tree. Maybe the thesis is more plausible for statue: once a statue always a statue.
What I mean by "might be" is that an acorn might become a tree or it might be lunch for a squirrel or it might land on a rock and rot. Tree is only one thing that might happen to it. Certain conditions need to be met for an acorn to become a tree. At best, an acorn has the potential to become a tree.
Assuming the arguement is really about abortion.....
The same is true for a fetus -- it has the potential to become a baby. A fetus can spontaneously abort (miscarry) or it can die in utero (stillborn). These things happen a lot more than people realize. Miscarriage and stillbirth cannot happen to a baby. A fetus has the potential to become a baby.
Where the clay argument gets complicated is that it requires outside intervention -- sculpting and smashing.
boomerang wrote:Assuming the arguement is really about abortion.....
Nah. Nothing that exciting. Just matter and objects.
Could "water" and "ice" be substituted for "lumpy" and "statue"? Water and ice seem to present the same situation, unless there is a finer distinction I'm overlooking, and they have the advantage of demonstrating that the "paradox" is not really all that puzzling. It can be "solved" by reminding ourselves of the unremarkable fact that something can change in a way that retains some properties but not others. Is that really such a philosophical dilemma?
Shapeless wrote:Could "water" and "ice" be substituted for "lumpy" and "statue"? Water and ice seem to present the same situation, unless there is a finer distinction I'm overlooking, and they have the advantage of demonstrating that the "paradox" is not really all that puzzling. It can be "solved" by reminding ourselves of the unremarkable fact that something can change in a way that retains some properties but not others. Is that really such a philosophical dilemma?
Interesting question. Say I've got a sample of water, which I put in the freezer. Is the ice that emerges at the end of the process the sample of water I started with? Not sure. One might say, "Yes, that sample of water has become this cube of ice." Or one might say, "No, that sample of water is not identical to, but it
makes up this cube of ice."
The philosophical dilemma is supposed to be that in the case of Lumpy and Statue, Lumpy is still around after the manipulation, but it's not identical with Statue. Thus two objects in the same place at the same time, and made out of all the same parts, to boot.
esmagalhaes wrote:The philosophical dilemma is supposed to be that in the case of Lumpy and Statue, Lumpy is still around after the manipulation, but it's not identical with Statue. Thus two objects[/u] in the same place at the same time, and made out of all the same parts, to boot.
The dilemma seems to stem from the use of the word "object." The first sentence in the above passage notes that
Lumpy is still around after the manipulation into Statue, but then the next sentence seems to take an unwarranted leap in saying that
the physical object to which the name "Lumpy" referred is still around. The two concepts are not interchangeable in this context. It seems to me that the philosophical dilemma is easily resolved if we keep in mind that the words "Lumpy" and "water" are, in the above examples, names we're giving to the matter comprising them rather than their exact physical appearance. There's a paradox only if we assume that "matter reconstituted into another form" is the same thing as "two objects in the same place at the same time," which it plainly is not.
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