I'm always saying that we only tolerate views that are compatible with our own.
For example, those that profess tolerance seem to be highly intolerant of intolerance in others. (I know I am.)
Bear with me here, because i will get to the point about intolerance.
It is all too common that people erect as moral idols standards of behavior and thought which they are themselves unable to attain. Sometimes this is because they have unrealistic goals of moral attainment, and sometimes it is because they are not self-reflective, and their "morality" represents a critical examination of others, and of others only.
For that reason, i'm chary of the use of the term morality. For whatever the strict definition of morality is, the overwhelming usage of morality is that it represents an absolute standard, an absolute truth, to which we must strive--and, as often as not, or even more often than not, it is referred to someone's imaginary friend superstition.
I don't consider superstition to be a plausible system upon which a community should base it's decisions about what it will "tolerate" in the way of behavior. Therefore, i prefer a reference to ethics. The ethos of a community is that body of values by which the community defines, and if necessary, punishes, that which the community considers to be wrong; to a more limited extent, it also represents what the community defines as, and sometimes rewards as, being right. As human experience demonstrates the value of community over unrestrained individuality, i subscribe to the idea of a social contract, in which a community defines its ethos, and enforces adherence to the ethos.
To arrogate is to assume rights or privileges to which those who are described as arrogant have no title. For me to condemn behavior in others which is legal within the community is arrogant, because i have no right to condemn that which the community will allow. Therefore, i cannot consider tolerance to be arrogant, because the community acknowledges the right of members of the community to act in certain ways, and acknowledges no right of any member of the community to deny that right.
It so happens that the community of which i am a member has erected a standard of tolerance of the expression of ideas which may be repugnant to members of the community. The standard begins and ends with criminal activity. You may rant in the public forum in a manner which others would consider conducive to racism, but so long as you do not advocate or incite criminality, the community of which i am a part has a standard of tolerance which allows you to so behave. I am only arrogant in response to you if i condemn your behavior (condemning the idea is not the same as condemning the behavior), and only become "illegally" and arrogantly intolerant if i attempt to curtail your right to behave in a manner which the community condones.
To dismiss the claim about absolute moral standards, i would point out that we have no evidence for anyone's imaginary friend, and that this is not a plausible basis for a community ethos. Furthermore, we have no basis upon which to claim an irrefutable and demonstrable knowledge of absolute truth, and therefore have no plausible basis to condemn that which the community will condone. All "morality" is subjective. The difference between me and the religious fanatics is that i am willing to acknowledge that my "values" are subjective, but that i prefer them, whereas the religious fanatic will claim that the "morality" to which he or she subscribes is carved in stone by the action of the divine finger.
To such a position, the religious loonies will often respond that i am a moral relativist. This is false on two bases. The first is that moral relativism means to accept values in another community (another in the sense of a community elsewhere, or "elsewhen"), despite the fact that those values may contradict the values of one's own community. I don't. I consider that the values of my community are sensible--in the main; i would work to change the laws of society within society's framework for such change if i believed them to be founded in error--and therefore, have no reason to accept in another community that which is condemned in my own. The second reason to dismiss charges of moral relativism is that the term is so often erroneously applied by the religiously fanatic to what actually ought to be called "situational ethics." I don't accept a concept of "situational ethics," either. The community of which i am a part condemns murder; i agree with that condemnation, and would not act to change what i consider a salutary value. I see no situation in which murder could be justified. The society of which i am a member has precisely the same attitude. Were you to kill someone in the erroneous belief that your life or the lives of others were in danger, the society might charge you with manslaughter, which is not murder, and is not punished as murder, and which refers to a failure or fault of judgment. If you killed someone in the mistaken belief that your action would prevent their violence without killing them, the society might charge you with involuntary manslaughter, which is not murder, and which refers to a failure or fault of judgment. There are no circumstances in which the society condones or tolerates murder, and those who would object otherwise are simply disagreeing with the community's definition of murder.
So, i reject the concept of morality, i reject the concept of moral relativism, and i reject the concept of situational ethics.
Finally: i do not agree either that tolerance constitutes arrogance, because the community accepts and in specific cases enjoins tolerance; nor am i intolerant of intolerance--i am only opposed to criminal actions which arise from intolerance, and therefore agree with society's decision to punish acts arising from intolerance, but not the mere expression of intolerance.