Craven de Kere wrote:
Craven joefromchicago wrote:
But you have suggested that the driver has some kind of obligation to choose, in that you've stated that the "right act" for the driver is to switch the trolley.
Incorrect. I did nothing of the sort.
, here's what you wrote: "I don't think the driver has a moral obligation to act. But I think that not acting would be the wrong choice. As in, I think the "right" choice is to act
" (emphasis added) I leave it to you to explain how, in your previous statement, you "said nothing of the sort."
Easy, I never said he had an obligation
to choose what I consider to be the "right" choice.
For example, there are "right" lottery numbers and "wrong" ones. There is no moral obligation I know of to pick the "right" ones. Even though there is tremendous financial incentive to do so.
Now to cut this short let's be rid of the two logomachies.
There are two prevailing logomachies in our exchange. Number one is that "right" is a moral word vs. a word illustrating preference (perhaps individual) in an individual criteria. The other is the difference between something being justified and being justified.
That is, being just or being justified to others.
There should be justification for a preference, as you note, but there's no need for justification to others on such a thing as personal preference.
Craven de Kere wrote:
I have already told you why I have that preference. You are still looking for "justifications" for this preference. <shrugs>
Yes, your preference is for "the least suffering for the most people," and a decision by the trolley driver is justified by reference to that criterion. But then that criterion is, itself, not
justified -- or, at least, you refuse to provide any justification for it. It would be somewhat like saying "the driver should make his choice based on what most pleases God," without then explaining what exactly it is that is pleasing to God or why God-pleasing is relevant to the choice to be made.
Well Joe, it could go on forever. I have reasons for preferring that criteria but ultimately there has to be an axiom.
Ultimately there has to be a criteria. That's my axiomatic criteria.
I can explain why but will only do so for as long as it's not tedious.
For example, I do not like to suffer. This is typical of humans. This is also one reason the avoidance of suffering is in my criteria.
Now if you were to ask why
I think suffering is a bad thing it could just go on forever.
So do you really not see that criteria as an acceptable axiom? If not let me know if you accept axioms at all. If not, there's no point in peeling away axioms. Ultimately there has to be an axiom.
Now, Craven, if you steadfastly refuse to justify your "least suffering" criterion any further, that's fine. I have no problem with that. Just be aware that, by doing so, your argument ultimately rests on a logically insupportable ipse dixit -- a "sez me."
And as I expressed earlier, I am perfectly fine with my preference being a "sez me".
Similar in nature to the fact that I don't mind that my taste for strawberry flavor and my opinion that it is better than chocolate is a "sez me".
Now if this were not a personal preference and I tried to characterize it as a moral obligation then I think you'd have good reason to seek validation outside of "sez me".
But since it's just a personal preference in criteria that I expressed it can really easily lie on a sez me.
Me sez that's my personal preference in criteria.