Language independent reality

This question pretty much answers the post I just made on the other thread about the independence of reality. I believe--at this moment at least--that there are at least three levels of Reality: (1)That which IS (the so-called "objective" World) whether or not I can be aware of it*, (2) the constructed world which is CONSTRUCTED perceived/conceived by me (and "by me" is a conditioned object of perception not a given) because of the grammar of my thought** and (3) that which we can conjure with the hygienic assistance of Wittgensteinxx--or remain silent.

* It is not Kant's Noumena because it is possible to experience it--i.e., the "object" of "mystical experience".
**This is, of course, the conditioned "subjective/intersubjective" world of culture.

You also ask if there is a reality independent of our language and concepts. If there is we would know it to the extent that we ARE it--but not separate from "it"--we would Know it immediately and mystically. This is why it would always be ineffable "knowledge."

A lack of conceptual discernment and accompanying description would be like the pure intuitions of the Sensibility never being merged with the categories of the Understanding (the reality-generating faculties in Kant's critique). There would possibly be a sense of space and broad unorganized change exhibited, but no narrower distinctions, identifications, and meanings for the events. Perhaps something like the inner states of Leibniz's most primitive class of monad, which was missing the logical equipment for distinguishing its internal, unfolding presentation of the universe (think of a rock's level of apprehending the world, or just above). Leibniz referenced the nearest approximation of a certain human condition to describe it:

"When, however, there are a great number of weak perceptions where nothing stands out distinctively, we are stunned; as when one turns around and around in the same direction, a dizziness comes on, which makes him swoon and makes him able to distinguish nothing." --The Monadology

And vice versa, a "reality independent of our senses" would be like Kant's categories (of the Understanding) being left on their own, without content provided by the pure intuitions of the Sensibility (space and time). In effect, empty concepts that could yield nothing positive -- the same problem that speculative reason faced when trying to apprehend the intelligible objects of the ancients or later metaphysicians. Only in this case, not even engendering experiences of a phenomenal / natural world.

I should add to my last post that I am talking about a kind of PRIVATE knowledge. We can't share it and as such it does not appear to be "knowledge" to others. We tend to think that all true knowledge is PUBLIC knowledge, replicable and communicable. Private knowledge is generally seen as hallucination, insanity and illusion. Mystics tend to think of the shared "knowledge" of the unenlightened as conventionally delusional. Moreover, at least in the lore of zen buddhism, private realizations can be shared with another who already has them, that is to say the realization of one person can be affirmed by another similarly realized person.
Do insane people ever share their "hallucinations" with fellow inmates?

Wouldn't that also be true of a "sense independent" reality?
To say that reality is unknowable to us would also imply that we ourselves are either unknowable to us, or real in some other way than everything else.

Yes, on both counts. In the first case, I think, we would be one with sense independent reality and we could potentially "know" it in the mystical but not, by definition, in a sensory sense. And in the sensory sense we are also in part unknowable to ourselves: I have no sensory awareness of much of what my organs are doing right now--although I might have direct sensory awareness of any lapses in their performance.

Yes, on both counts. In the first case, I think, we would be one with sense independent reality and we could potentially "know" it in the mystical but not, by definition, in a sensory sense. And in the sensory sense we are also in part unknowable to ourselves: I have no sensory awareness of much of what my organs are doing right now--although I might have direct sensory awareness of any lapses in their performance.

Okay...let's see where we're at !

Firstly, those advocating an "independent reality" do nor require any observer to evoke it whether they are language users or otherwise. This point stands irrespective of whether we have access to such a "reality" or otherwise.
Then we have those who claim that "thought" including "thought about reality" is predicated on language, in which case concepts of "independence" or otherwise require language as axiomatic.
And thirdly, we have those who argue that "language" is merely another form of "behavior" and that all behavior is instrumental in bringing forth a reality specific (i.e non-independent) to a living organism. This third point implies that "reality" is species-,culture-,and person specific.

I suggest all points to be made fall under one of these three categories.

Fresco your typology stimulates the following effort to acknowledge all three types:
I appreciate why some people insist on an independent reality, one that does not require"evocation" by observing minds. Such an "independent" reality is like Kant's noumena, having nothing to do with human experience. That does not deny its possible existence. But if it exists we have nothing to do with it (i.e, we can say nothing about it and for that reason it can have no active role in our behavior). It's only "reality" is its hypothetical existence.
However, I do make "religious" generalizations about the nature of the Cosmos, and in order to do so (as a non-mathematicial non-astrophysicist) I use quasi-anthropomorphic metaphors, like "Brahman". This is, I think, your culture and person specific version.

It also falls under the second category as an "antithesis" thereof, since some of us might argue that "transcendental consciousness" is the origin of "thought" (as opposed to language) and is in essence ineffable.

I know that we can perceive forms pre-linguistically as well as linguistically (Whorf and Sapir were only partly right). Is that what you meant by "'transcendental consciousness [may be an] origin of 'thought'...and is in essence ineffable"? I used to think that consciousness and linguistically shaped thought were completely interdependent but now--after looking at my consciousness more closely--I conclude that they are only sometimes so. Sometimes there is ineffability. I'm not sure we are on the same track.

What I am alluding to is the spiritual holistic quality of transcendental consciousness. If there is no separation of "self" from "things" or "others", then there is no requirement for communication about things to others using language, That is the essence of ineffability. Now if we can conceive of that as the "nirvana" of consciousness, then linguistically attached thought could be the "samsara".

Interesting formulation. To me the essence of "ineffability" may be phrased as the fact that true experience or transcendental consciousness is qualitatively different from symbolizations about it. Reality IS me, and there is no way to communicate this "existentially." The "nirvana of consciousness" ( ) is given. We already have it. The attempt to get it results in--or is--samsara.

Well expressed indeed.

Having spent some time in psyche wards I can say from experience that people do try and share their understanding and beliefs of delusions with others. But I have to say it is their own private experience of these delusions that cannot be shared. Languange merely tries to bridge their experience into ones own understanding. The experiential knowledge and reality of these hallucinations are lost to the observer.

Yes, Procrustes, it seems the experiential, immediate, concrete knowledge that is our reality can only be approximated as we encode it in our attempt to connect with others (and hope they will decode it accurately). We always remain with some privacy even when we want complete intimacy. Paradoxically, this separatness is an intrinsic characteristic of our very oneness with others. Someone once commented to me on the space that separates us. My response was that the space between us actually connects us. I guess we can interpret that space both ways.

Interestingly, one of the diagnostic tests for the label "schizophrenia" was (and may still be) the the inability of the "normal person" to identify with the "logic" of the patient.

I never agreed with the term "normal" but I understand what you mean. Although, the test you speak of isn't a great indicator of schizophrenia. Sometimes people speak obscurely while using dense language but it doesn't follow that they are mentally ill just because we cannot follow their logic.

I guess so. Perhaps the space between us is a "thing in itself" which also, like you say, connects us. But I would still maintain that our private experiences could never be shared experientially. When we attempt to connect it is merely a reflection of the intention itself.