In effect, you're saying that Kant's system of ethics doesn't account for its real-world consequences, but that's just imposing a consequentialist mindset onto Kant's idealism. In other words, you're thinking like a utilitarian and criticizing Kant for not thinking the same way. That's just a form of question-begging.
It would be, if that had been what I did.
But it hasn't, and I didn't. On re-reading this allegation of yours, I'm noticing that you've been mixing up two things throughout this thread. You are confusing my being a consequentialist with my being an empiricist. Although I happen to be both, you still need to distinguish: Empiricism is about epistemology (positive claims). Consequentialism, by contrast, is about ethics (normative claims). The two are emphatically distinct.
This difference is important for our discussion of Kant: Kant had a problem with normative
claims turning on empirical facts. But he never had a problem with positive
claims turning on empirical facts. Using empirical data to test positive truth-claims was perfectly fine with him. Hence, if it's factually true that in some situations, moral agents cannot obey both a categorical truth-telling imperative and a categorical life-saving imperative, that's a perfectly good, positive
contradiction, causing the Categorical Imperative to rule them out as permissible maxims. If Kant disagrees, he errs in the way he applies the principle he discovered.
For purposes of this thread, I am an empiricist, but not a consequentialist. I make no normative
claims based on the consequences of anyone's actions. In particular, I advocate utility-maximizing, not
as an end in itself, but as a means
of implementing the categorical imperative. The Utilitarians' maxim, "increase happiness, decrease suffering", can be universalized and involves no contradiction. That's all the Categorical Imperative demands of the maxims that moral agents act upon.