Understanding Kant

Whose reason, and how?

wandeljw wrote:

Kant made a distinction between “hypothetical” imperatives and “categorical” imperatives. It seems that a utilitarian approach would only lead to hypothetical imperatives.

I don't see how that follows from the quote you cite.

Kant wrote:

If now the action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical;

... so how is it inconsistent with reason to claim that "tell the truth" is a hypothetical imperative, not a categorical imperative?

Kant wrote:

if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical .

... so how is it inconsistent with reason to claim that "increase happiness, decrease suffering" is a categorical imperative, not a hypothetical imperative?

One can agree with Kant that there is a categorical imperative involved in the choice to tell the truth, while disagreeing that it's "don't lie, ever."

such as these where it is evident that one side needs to do quite a bit more homework in order to catch up to the other. That time is now. If you have to ask that question, then you clearly need to re-read the Critique of Practical Reason.

I will. Meanwhile, perhaps you can show me how any of the following two claims a priori conflicts with reason:

• "Tell the truth" is a conditional imperative, not a categorical imperative.
• "Increase happiness, decrease suffering" is a categorical imperative, not a conditional imperative

Note: I am aware it conflicts with what Kant thought are the relevant categorical and conditional imperatives. But to say "because Kant said so" is not the same argument as to say "because reason itself requires it".

Thomas wrote:

I will. Meanwhile, perhaps you can show me how any of the following two claims a priori conflicts with reason:

• "Tell the truth" is a conditional imperative, not a categorical imperative.
• "Increase happiness, decrease suffering" is a categorical imperative, not a conditional imperative

Note: I am aware it conflicts with what Kant thought are the relevant categorical and conditional imperatives. But to say "because Kant said so" is not the same argument as to say "because reason itself requires it".

I don't understand your questions. Are you asking how Kant could argue that "tell the truth" is a hypothetical imperative and "increase happiness, decrease suffering" is a categorical imperative? Or how I can argue those things? Or how those things can be argued by anybody?

joefromchicago wrote:

Thomas wrote:

I will. Meanwhile, perhaps you can show me how any of the following two claims a priori conflicts with reason:

• "Tell the truth" is a conditional imperative, not a categorical imperative.
• "Increase happiness, decrease suffering" is a categorical imperative, not a conditional imperative

Note: I am aware it conflicts with what Kant thought are the relevant categorical and conditional imperatives. But to say "because Kant said so" is not the same argument as to say "because reason itself requires it".

I don't understand your questions. Are you asking how Kant could argue that "tell the truth" is a hypothetical imperative and "increase happiness, decrease suffering" is a categorical imperative? Or how I can argue those things? Or how those things can be argued by anybody?

Okay, let's step back for a moment. WandelJW cited Kant's distinction between categorical imperatives and conditional imperatives. I agree with Kant that this is a useful distinction in talking about ethics. But I disagree with Kant about the status of particular imperatives. In particular, I claim that the imperative "don't lie" is conditional, and that the imperative "increase happiness, decrease suffering" is categorical. (At least I claim this for purposes of this thread.)

So here's my question: Given what you know about Kant, what evidence and logic would Kant use to persuade me that my claims are wrong?

I am especially unclear on this because Kant seems to use all kinds of reasoning in the 5-page article you cited earlier. Among other things, he repeatedly argues from the alleged consequences of easing up on liars to prospective murderers. For one, he says on page that doing so "vitilates the very source of right"---whatever that means. I didn't find the word "vitilate" in a dictionary, but Kant is clearly talking about a consequence. Moreover, he says that "truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded as the basis of all duties founded on contract, and the laws of such duties would be rendered uncertain and useless if even the lightest exception to them were admitted." That's clearly an argument from consequences, and a false one at that: The society we live in approves of preventing murder by lying, and where contract law is still useful. I strongly suspect the same was true of the society Kant lived in.

On the face of it, then, Kant quite happily appealed to consequences in defending what he regarded as a categorical imperative.

I agree with Kant that this is a useful distinction in talking about ethics. But I disagree with Kant about the status of particular imperatives. In particular, I claim that the imperative "don't lie" is conditional, and that the imperative "increase happiness, decrease suffering" is categorical. (At least I claim this for purposes of this thread.)

So here's my question: Given what you know about Kant, what evidence and logic would Kant use to persuade me that my claims are wrong?

I am especially unclear on this because, in the 5-page article you cited earlier, Kant repeatedly appeals to consequences of lying to a prospective murderer. For one, he says on page that doing so "vitilates the very source of right"---whatever that means. I didn't find the word "vitilate" in a dictionary, but Kant is clearly talking about a consequence.

Moreover, he says that "truthfulness is a duty that must be regarded as the basis of all duties founded on contract, and the laws of such duties would be rendered uncertain and useless if even the lightest exception to them were admitted." That's clearly an argument from consequences, and a false one at that: The society we live in approves of preventing murder by lying, and where contract law is still useful. I strongly suspect the same was true of the society Kant lived in.

On the face of it, then, Kant quite happily appealed to consequences in defending what he regarded as a categorical imperative.

I don't understand the basis for your statement that you disagree with Kant "about the status of particular imperatives." Are you saying that Kant is wrong on his terms or on your terms?

So here's my question: Given what you know about Kant, what evidence and logic would Kant use to persuade me that my claims are wrong?

Kant says that the imperative against lying is categorical. He explains it quite succinctly in the article "On the Supposed Right to Lie" that I linked earlier. If you lie, you destroy the basis of all agreements, all contracts, all promises.

"Vitilates" should clearly be "vitiates."

He's talking about creating a logical contradiction, not about any kind of practical or utilitarian consequences. Since a rule that permits lying would yield a contradiction, it is contrary to reason.

It's about his terms. At the very least, I'm saying that his general terms permit for the don't-lie imperative to be conditional and for the decrease-suffering-increase-happiness imperative to be categorical. There's no conflict in that with reason, or with his general formulation of the categorical imperative.

So, what if I provided Kant with empirical evidence that this is false? That you can in fact have it both ways---save the victim's life with a lie and preserve the basis of all agreements (...)---by applying a different categorical imperative? Would evidence like that change his mind about the ethics of lying?

Continuing to use you as a Kant-simulator: How does Kant resolve conflicts between categorical imperatives?

For example, I'm pretty sure Kant would disapprove of a rule that permits assisting murderers. He would find that it, too, yields a contradiction and vitiates the source of right. Accordingly, he would conclude that there is a categorical imperative not to help murderers kill their victims. Now, when the murderer asks me if his victim is in the house, and if I don't have the option to be silent, I cannot help but disobey one of the two categorical imperatives at stake. How would Kant choose which one? In your article, he avoids the problem by ignoring any other categorical imperatives that might apply to the case. But that strikes me as intellectual cheating, and Kant isn't generally known as a cheat. So what gives, and why?

You think that empirical evidence would contradict a logical argument? It doesn't work that way.

There can't be a conflict between categorical imperatives. There's only one. Even Kant's different formulations of the categorical imperative were, according to Kant, just variations on a single imperative. We can, for shorthand purposes, refer to the rule against lying as a "categorical imperative," but it's actually just an application of the categorical imperative to a particular act.

It does when the logical argument leads to conclusions about the real world, and when those conclusions turn out to be empirically false.

Okay, now I have to ask: Does this make sense to you? I mean, does it make sense to you in the strong version where the only possible application is "don't lie ever", and not, for example, "tell lies if they're narrowly tailored to protect a compelling public interest. Otherwise tell the truth."?

Thomas wrote:

It does when the logical argument leads to conclusions about the real world, and when those conclusions turn out to be empirically false.

That's not Kant. That's Thomas.

Okay, now I have to ask: Does this make sense to you? [...]

It makes sense according to Kant's system of ethics.

That's neither Kant nor Thomas. It's standard, Boolean logic.

• Kant claims: 'A-->B';
• B is false, as proven by empirical facts;
• therefore, it must be the case that either Kant's premise A is false, or Kant's inference 'A-->B' is false, or both.

In this particular case, A is the Categorical Imperative and B is Kant's conclusion that 'contract law would become useless if people could ethically save prospective murder victims by lying to their wannabe murderers.' But my refutation is logically valid whatever A and B are---and whichever way Kant came up with 'A' and 'A-->B'.

Let me rephrase: Does Kant's system of ethics make sense to you?

All unicorns are white.
This is a unicorn.
Therefore, it is white.

That is a valid syllogism, even though there are no such things as unicorns.

But if there are no unicorns, the line "this is a unicorn" must be false.

The analogy in my syllogism would be that the line "the categorical imperative says that you cannot lie ever" is false. That's good enough to make my point.

This implies that the ethics of lying to a murderer depend on my reason for doing so---just as the ethics of following the Scout Law, or asking what Jesus would do, or asking not what my country can do for me but what I can do for my country. If I end up lying to a specific murderer in a specific case because my intention is to lie, I'm committing a wrong. But if I turn out to lie because the Categorical Imperative entails a duty to save savable lives, because I freely choose to serve that duty, and because sometimes the only way to save a life is to lie, I should be fine. After all, the lying in this case is merely a consequence of heeding the Categorical Imperative to save lives, and Kant doesn't care about consequences.

Correct?

To say that Kant's logic doesn't work because it's contrary to the way things work in the real world is to miss the point entirely.

It would be empirically false.