@Jebediah,
Ah. Well, I wouldn't want people to get in a moral rut such as that, I agree.
My model isn't as much between the intrinsic value of rules and the effects of actions, I think. Maybe this is the disconnect in communication.
I often view ethics as a set of teleological principals (virtues) with rules and an understanding of a general content which binds those rules together (the meaning behind the name of a virtue, where the rules are explicit examples of said virtue). I agree that moral extremism needs balancing in our reasoning, but I think this can be accomplished by adopting multiple virtues (As metaphor: think of a system of differential equations. Events outside the moral reasoner discontinuously vary the initial conditions. Like that, but presently with more uncertainty). Further, I acknowledge that ends are important, but I think that ends are motivators, not justifiers. Rather, the value of an action is found in the conjunction of the action itself and the motivation. It's a virtue-theory deontology (I state this mostly because I emphasize consistency in moral reasoning, adherence to your moral law out of a respect for it, and because one should acknowledge that others are moral reasoners as well). What's more, I'll acknowledge that it's not perfect. It's just a model.
So, I'm not striking out consequentialism, as if we should just ignore the possible effects of our actions. I do put less emphasis on it, however, than other parts of moral reasoning. I do so in particular because I don't think it answers many moral questions, but that's just on the basis of trying to utilize it in my own life. I know others that do, and seem to get along fine. I don't discount it entirely, I just don't use it as much.
Quote:Also, one other thing about this debate. As an analogy, imagine you are cooking noodles. But the only thing you acknowledge is that it's "bad to not cook them long enough". I then argue that it's possible to overcook noodles. If you say that we don't need to think about overcooking noodles because we can follow the instructions on the box exactly, or have some deus ex machina device that tells exactly when they are cooked you are actually agreeing with me 100%. Because any such method or device would be utterly pointless if it was impossible to overcook noodles. I think that's very much comparable to the objections made to these hypotheticals...they acknowledge the value of consequentialism.
Hmm? I think that one goes both ways. Suppose, in cooking noodles, one states that the only thing that matters is that the noodles need to be good, in the end. But to do that, you need to understand what makes them good. In this scenario one would act such that they can periodically check the pasta to a standard of taste.
In the above you answer "Push the button". This is because of a rule you have formulated for moral reasoning: namely, to take into account number in choosing the moral action. As such, in consequentialism one acknowledges the value of deontology. (and I would say vice-versa, as you point out. I don't think I've advocated for one in exclusion to the other, though I certainly emphasize one more than the other in my moral reasoning -- as I would expect most people to do)
