Statement versus proposition

The purpose of this thread is to explore the difference between statements and propositions.


One observation I'd like to make is that people make and give statements. I know people make statements because I've heard them do it, and I know people give statements, for I heard on television where cops have said, "the witnesses have already given their statements." Never have I heard where we make or give propositions, so because the terms aren't used as if they are universally exchangeable, I'm of the opinion that there is at least some difference between statements and propositions.

A proposition is what is expressed by a sentence, and people use sentences to make statements, and what else is a statement if not the proposition expressed by the sentence? If there is a distinction between statements and propositions, I suspect that it's subtle, but be that as it may, the purpose of this thread is to explore the subtle differences so that we can successfully tell them apart.


I suspect that getting at the difference between statements and propositions will be difficult-just as it was when I was trying to get at the difference between definitions and meaning.

Never have I heard where we make or give propositions

The distinction between statement and proposition may be important depending upon how each has been defined by individual philosophers or upon how one wishes to define it in an attempt to clarify one's one thinking.

Declarative sentences (statements) are a subset of sentences.
Propositions are a subset of statements.
That is to say, propositions are a subset of sentences.

The dictionary is only the starting point. The role of the philosopher isn't over until the problem has been successfully addressed.

Philosophy (just like many other disciplines) make use of technical terms, but philosophers are expected to be able to readily explain their technical terms in plain language. Often times, there are not plain ole layman terms available to convey in ease a particular concept a philosopher may have, so technical terms are used to aid the philosopher in the many distinctions she uses.

I think maybe you have highlighted something for me I didn't see before. I am trying to compare "proposition" to "statement" (but of course, not as Ughaibu has recently used "proposition"), but I may very well be comparing a technical term ("proposition")to an non-technical term (statement).

Doesn't philosophers commonly use the term, "statement" (but in a technical way)?

The purpose of this thread is to explore the difference between statements and propositions.

One observation I'd like to make is that people make and give statements. I know people make statements because I've heard them do it, and I know people give statements, for I heard on television where cops have said, "the witnesses have already given their statements." Never have I heard where we make or give propositions, so because the terms aren't used as if they are universally exchangeable, I'm of the opinion that there is at least some difference between statements and propositions.

A proposition is what is expressed by a sentence, and people use sentences to make statements, and what else is a statement if not the proposition expressed by the sentence? If there is a distinction between statements and propositions, I suspect that it's subtle, but be that as it may, the purpose of this thread is to explore the subtle differences so that we can successfully tell them apart.

I suspect that getting at the difference between statements and propositions will be difficult-just as it was when I was trying to get at the difference between definitions and meaning.

I didn't think I was doing that. The word "proposition" may have several meanings (technical and otherwise), but the meaning I'm mostly interested in is the technical meaning often used in philosophical discussions. In those discussions, we also use the word "statement." If there is a technical use of the word "statement," I'd like to know what it is and how it's different than the technical meaning of the word, "proposition." Otherwise, I'd be happy simply knowing the difference between "proposition" (the technical sense) and "statement" (the non-technical sense-since there isn't any other).

What is conveyed by a declarative sentence used to make a statement or assertion. Each proposition is either true or false, though in a particular instance we may not know which it is.

I think the first is skewed and the second extremely narrow.

Why would you think that a proposition is a subset (a subset?) of sentences? By the way, and without using the word "proposition", what exactly do you think is expressed by sentences anyway? I think it may be meaning (what is meant by what is said), but I might be in error.

A sentence is certainly more than a collection of words. By the way, we're not talking about sentences--although if need be, we can. I'm interested in statements as contrasted with propositions.

I've heard you say similar things in the past, and I feel you shouldn't avoid words that can be legitimately used just because people can become confused by them. Wanting to avoid confusion is a good thing, but still, not everyone is so easily confused, and if you venture upon someone that is confused by what you say, then your recourse could be to explain the confusion-which wouldn't be of your own making but instead their misunderstanding.

If that doesn't work, then if you like, temporarily suspend your use of the word in that single conversation, but don't self impose hard and fast rules about not using words, especially if their use is legitimate. Just sayin'.

I would hate for someone to define "proposition" as something expressed by a sentence

I've heard of a few different stipulative definitions for the term "proposition", but being a stipulative definition isn't a sufficient condition of being a technical definition. I think given some time, I could come up with a good stipulative definition for the term, but it'll reflect my views on what it means, yet the slightest difference between my stipulative definition and the technical definition commonly used by fluent users of the technical term will render my use as incorrect if I try to pawn it off as how it's ordinarily used by fluent speakers of that technical term.

The term 'proposition' has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other "propositional attitudes" (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences.

Although I'll sometimes cite that definition, I do actually have a number of problems with it. First and foremost, I would absolutely scrap the use of the word "what." I think it's terribly uninformative.

Although I generally prefer negative theories - those which posit as few unempirical concepts* as possible - my own leanings in this
23 particular case are toward Realism. My attraction to the theory is bolstered by one further consideration: I can see no way to account for the existence of certain items, e.g. pieces of music, plays, and novels, other than by conceiving of them as abstract entities. Here I am considerably influenced by the arguments of C.E.M. Joad (1891-1953).
Joad argued ([105], 267-70) that the play Hamlet, for example, could not reasonably be identified with any particular in the world: neither 24 with an idea in Shakespeare 's mind, nor with any manuscript he wrote, nor with any printed edition of the text, nor with any particular production, nor with any audio or video recording of any particular production. F r Hamlet could exist even if any one or several of these were not to exist. While Joad, himself, rightly expressed some diffidence about his own arguments, I think that they add considerable impetus to a theory which would posit abstract entities.
Although I am a Realist, I am a reluctant Realist. F r, to be frank, there is something exceedingly peculiar about positing entities which exist (subsist) outside of space and time. I, personally, would prefer a theory which could dispense with such mysterious entities. But I find the problems inherent in the various anti-Realist theories even more troubling. Realism is simply the better, in my estimation, of the available theories. But, like many other Realists, I do not much care for Realism. Recently one of my colleagues professed his repudiation of Realism by saying that he found the positing of abstract entities " unintelligible ". I share his displeasure. But I find myself unable to adopt his own anti-Realist position because I cannot in turn believe that the anti-Realist theories provide any better answer or that they can be developed without themselves having to posit at least some abstract entities.

Secondly, when I say that a proposition is ..., I will be using the is of identity. Third, I'd work on the other problems one of which is the fact not all declarative sentences express propositions.

Another problem is the fact that some sentences that are not declarative sentences can actually express a proposition.

I think the fact propositions are true or false needs to be informatively incorporated into the definition. In addition, a much better grip needs to have been gotten on just what the heck "what" refers to.

Furthermore, there's something else going on that I can't quite put my finger on. There's an air of implied dependency, as if the sentence is somehow a requirement for the existence of propositions (this issue hasn't been settled, as far as I know). In analogy, yes, Jupiter is something that is viewed through a telescope (just as a proposition is something expressed by a sentence), but what Jupiter is is independent of telescopes, but it's not at all clear (given how the definition is worded) whether or not sentences are a necessary condition for propositions.

Abstract? I can see why you'd say they are without location (so possibly quasi abstract), but why do you think they are non-temporal (and thus abstract)?

I used the analogy before about how I would hate for someone to define "baseball" as something hit by a baseball bat; moreover, I would hate for someone to define "proposition" as something expressed by a sentence, since "something" (much like "what") isn't very helpful. Of course, it's not defined as something expressed by a sentence but instead what is expressed by a sentence (I'm just using the short version definition for brevity), but both are equally (and poorly) informative.

A proposition is a truth-bearer; it describes a truth or falsity about the world. I'm assuming this won't suffice, but there it is.

There are four kinds of sentences: 1) declarative, 2) interrogatory, 3) imperative, and 4) exclamatory. I do not think it's proper to label statements as imperative, but I might be mistaken.

This begs the question against gap-theories. See my post above to Fast as he proposed a definition with the same problem.

I read your response to fast, but I do not know how it is begging the question. I suppose I would have to do more research on "gap-theories".

No, a fact is a truth-bearer. A truth (aka a fact) (aka a truth-bearer) is what makes a proposition true. Notice I said a truth (as opposed to the truth). The truth (or just truth) is a true proposition.