I think the war will be relatively easy but think easy and war shouldn't be used in the same sentence.
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cicerone imposter
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Thu 2 Jan, 2003 04:51 pm
Hi Craven, How about "it's easy to go to war" under Bush? ci
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Craven de Kere
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Thu 2 Jan, 2003 05:16 pm
Seems that way but I'll hold off that judgement until I see whether we go to war or not.
Right now I'm at: "It's easy to campaign on war themes"
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timberlandko
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Thu 2 Jan, 2003 06:33 pm
CDK, you nailed it fer shur. A popular, successful war is an excellent campaign tool. As The Campaign For The Whitehouse does not really "Hot Up" for about another year or so, and imagining Bush the Younger learned something from the '92 surprise suffered by his father, I doubt domestic political motive is a significant, directing factor. There is influence, of course, but I doubt Thuh War on Turrism is a central Election Campaign Strategy focus point. I expect to see major Republican attention given to Economic Recovery over the next few months. Bush would like to go into the election victorious in War and vindicated in Economic Pollicy. Tax reform, investment incentives, and a more business-freindly ecologic stance will be the keys to Republican Economic Agenda.
A peaceful resolution to The Iraq question would be a proud feather for Bush the Younger's hat, but I don't think he should plan his outfit around the wearing of that feather. Hostillities yet may be avoided, but there is ominous potential and undeniable precedent for violent unpleasantness.
Should hostillities prove necessary, I rather imagine a larger, more stable coalition than many now suppose. As the deadline approaches, agreements will be reached, concessions made, and press conferences will be held. The US will again "Participate in a United Nations Emergency Intervention"
Militarily, The US has learned a great deal since Desert Storm, and from Somalia and The Balkans as well. Afghanistan was, in terms of example of US Air/Sea/Land Warfare Capability not much more than a "Live Fire Excercize". A US-led-and-orchestrated attack on Iraq likely will be even more incredibly brief and cheaply successful than was the '91 Gulf War. It will be even more "Gee Whiz, woodja lookit that!" than was the '91 War.
There remains the question of "What then?". I have some reservations as to whether that may have been thought out quite as thoroughly as as been "What If". I in fact would be most surprised to discover that to be the case. I have my wishes, but I know that our involvement with, and likely irritation from, Post Saddam Iraq will be characterized by diplomatic bungling among many parties for the foreseeable future. Simply maintaining a single Iraqi State will itself prove a monumental challenge.
I fear we may be far less successful at "The Peace" than "The War".
timber
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Craven de Kere
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Thu 2 Jan, 2003 07:07 pm
timber,
I agree very strongly on the following points:
The coalition will broaden once war is inevitable. Many are trying to sound as unspuuprtive as possible because they don't want the war, once the war is a sure thing they'll help just to stay on our good side and possible to share in the post war benefits. This is one reason why I wish the drums of war weren't beating so loudly. For many who don't follow the geopolitical meanderings it will still look like a " US war" because the administration was loud about it and the coalition members will probably join quietly. Of course it can be argued that the drums of war needed to beat to get the support but I disagree. I think the administration's tough line might have helped get the resolution passed in the UN but it was not needed domestically (as this will be a popular war on the American street).
I also agree that it's likely (I don't like watertight predictions abour war, economy or weather) that it will be a very simple war as far as logistics go (once again I add the disclaimer that war isn't easy for those at the wrong end of the guns).
I'm not too worried about the post war Iraq, it will be hard but my real worry lies in what will happen if the support for the war on the street around the world (not just of heads of state) is not broad enough. If we still come across as too eager when the day comes (e.g. making the casus belli something that isn't widely accepted as such) it will be a bad precedent regardless of who jumps on the bandwagon.
In short I hope the administration continues to improve in the way they nuance, I hope there is no silly rhetoric and I hope the world forgets what happened quickly before "regime change" becomes an option that pops up too easily.
I also hope Isreal doesn't expel Arafat as soon as the war is over. That type of move would complicate our PR efforts greatly.
Basically I'm hoping that we leave a small footprint if war takes place.
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Lash Goth
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Thu 2 Jan, 2003 07:18 pm
Craven--
Your post is very cool-headed and even.
I never considered you 'hot-headed' or 'uneven', but it appears your political or military ideas have gone through some transformation since we last posted (months ago.)
Has any political or military event occurred to change your views?
Thought you would be firmly in the anti-war-at-all-costs camp.
At any rate, wanted to share my agreement with your post.
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Craven de Kere
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Thu 2 Jan, 2003 07:32 pm
Lash,
I think the war is a bad idea, I think Iraq is not anywhere near the threat it's made out to be and I think our rhetoric has been equivocal, but I'm not a dove. What has changed is the situation, if it's inevitable (it's looking that way but there's a chance it isn't) I'm not going to waste my time wishing it weren't so. I'd rather that it's done with as little fallout as possible.
I don't adhere to any positions that I consider non-negotiable. I don't believe in moral absolutes in politics and the need to nuance is very real.
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blatham
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Thu 2 Jan, 2003 07:59 pm
Walter and Steve
It was december 11or 12...so I think not archived still. Besides, it isn't like I'm Moon Unit Zappa or a business friend of Ms Blair.
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blatham
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Thu 2 Jan, 2003 08:07 pm
Craven said:
Quote:
I don't adhere to any positions that I consider non-negotiable. I don't believe in moral absolutes in politics and the need to nuance is very real.
huzzah huzzah! Nice couple of sentences, young fellow.
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perception
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Fri 3 Jan, 2003 01:15 pm
Setanta
I will take the bait and attempt to engage you in a discussian such as you propose---the actual mechanics involved in war with Iraq and the consequences.
First of all I want to make it clear that due to the fact that we must secure as much of the Iraqi infrastructure as possible to be used during the occupation our casualties could be much higher that they would be if the war were waged without regard for the preservation of facilities We may as well get it up front about the oil fields---they must be secured and protected in the first few minutes of the war. It is due to this requirement that this war will not be easy.
Regarding the use of airfields in surrounding countries---I think you have forgotten the assets we have in Qatar and the agreement already secured to use those facilities.
Regarding the big base in Turkey--Incirlik--if Turkey refused use of any of their facilities it will make operation in Northern Iraq very difficult but not impossible- If that turns out to be the case I believe the Turks are smart enough to realize that they will be severely punished in any future negotiations between our two countries. When confronted with that reality they may change their minds at the last minute.
If in fact we cannot use facilities in Turkey, it could cause many more casualties due to the requirement to secure the areas in Northern Iraq in the first few minutes of the
war because we must overfly heavily defended areas of Iraq in order to get to the north. If it is not obvious to all, we must use ground forces to secure those areas---we cannot allow Saddam to torch the wells on his way out--there is the possiblity we may not be able to stop this tragedy from happening. It is during this operation that the greatest danger exists for our troops--- we must expect Saddam to unleash everything he has to prevent us taking his oil wells---he could use chemical agents(biological agents will not prevent action for several days but it will probably still be used)this could cause the loss of thousands of our troops.
I will pause here for discussion by you before covering things like the occupation
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Setanta
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Fri 3 Jan, 2003 01:56 pm
Thanks for yer reply, Perception. My point about air bases is the we likely could not have the same amount of facilities available to us, which could greatly hamper our air war. Unless we have a great many facilities, we would not see the "round the clock" hammering which was delivered to Iraq in '90-'91. I do not agree with those who claim allies will come on board as soon as we go to war, we still need a casus belli which will, at the very least, provide a political fig leaf to cover the nakedness of Gulf regimes. They all walk a fine line to avoid fundamentalist unrest in their countries. The exact details of the conditions in which we go in will determine if we can attract allies among the Gulf states. Pray proceed, Perception.
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roger
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Fri 3 Jan, 2003 02:00 pm
Good thought on the wells, but I want to toss in a mitigating factor. If Saddam attempts to torch them in the opening stages of an invasion, would he not be admitting defeat to his own generals and troops. I doubt they are going to abandon the war effort on this account, but it doesn't sound like a strong motivator, either.
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Setanta
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Fri 3 Jan, 2003 02:04 pm
A point worth considering Roger, certainly. I've never thought, nor written, that i believe the Iraqis believe they have a shot at winning. That does not, however, mean that they wouldn't fight. And i've pointed out all along that a great many of those with connections to Saddam's regime may well go down fighting, inasmuchas they are going to go down and go down hard if ever Saddam is removed. I believe that Perception has written what he has starting from an assumption that the Iraqis will put up a fight. They might not, but sound military planning should never be based upon such an assumption. One should always plan to deal with the worst case, and, as Jackson said to young officers more than once, never take counsel of your fears.
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perception
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Fri 3 Jan, 2003 05:11 pm
Quite right Setanta---we must plan for the worst and hope for something better. Something else that I forgot to mention, those oil fields are probably heavily mined because he knows that if we attack, his forces will quickly be overcome but he will want to cause as much difficulty as possible.
I also believe that anyone who has money and or power within his regime already have their escape plans ready and money outside the country. The have already seen what we can do and since they are not stupid will have contingency plans.
I would launch the attack with just enough time before dawn for the airborne assault to secure their locations---I would simultaneously launch half of our inventory of cruise missiles at every palace and any military installation housing troops. B-2 stealth bombers would hit every suspected hard target that could possibly harbor any military equipment. As this is occuring other aircraft would be hitting every radar site and communications facility known before the attack. The Abrahams tanks and other mechanized forces would have been launched from Kuwait and they would be provided with constant air cover.
Our airborne command post(AWACS) aircraft will have complete radar coverage of the entire battlefield and any Iraqi aircraft that becomes airborne will immediately be shot down---hopefully Saddam will be in one of them but most likely he will have already escaped. If any part of the war could be considered easy this will be it and will probably last not more than a week. Probably not more that three days.
Now comes the hard part---every person in the entire bloody country must be disarmed and the various ethnic groups contained in their particular areas to prevent reprisals and civil war which could quickly flame out of control.
Absolute control of the entire country must be gained, complete with curfews and a military governor installed. This must be our very best military administrator and disciplinarian. I would further urge complete control of all Islamic mullahs/clerics and any of those that preach extremist hatred must be removed(forcibly if necessary) and replaced with moderate thinkers. Every Christian missionary must be kept out of the country ----period. As soon as possible the infrastructure must be put back into operation and those responsible and capable of operating it must be identified and installed quickly but must be supervised closely until their loyalty can be reasonably assured. This will require a very large staff of interpreters and civilian gov't specialists.
The military governor would operate the country until such time as provisionary leaders can be identified and their motives and records checked and double checked. This provisionary gov't would be allowed to slowly relace the officials of the military gov't as performance allows. All potential gov't leaders would be identified and allowed to promote themselves to the public and a date for free elections would be announced.
We must not allow any exiled official to lay claim to any part of a new gov't.
Our military governor would stay for as long as necessary to ensure that complete stability has been established. They would not be allowed to reform any sort of military organization until such time as it appeared likely that an elected gov't could effectively control the country. That might be 3 years--5years or even 10 years.
We will be there for as long as it takes and not one minute longer.
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Walter Hinteler
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Fri 3 Jan, 2003 05:19 pm
You certainly know about the minor problem re. AWACS, perception, namely the multi-national crew? (e.g.: it is still not clear, if the German will take part.)
"... any of those that preach extremist hatred ..." You certainly mean only the Muslims, not other religions, like Christians, I think.
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perception
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Fri 3 Jan, 2003 05:32 pm
Walter
Although Iraq has Christian minority they probably wouldn't cause a problem but it they do remove their leaders also---I think you were probably being humorous about this but you noticed I said every Christian missionary, especially from this country would be kept out.
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Craven de Kere
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Fri 3 Jan, 2003 05:43 pm
perception,
Your "easy part" leaves out the logistics (constant air cover is a good idea but would this be naval or in this plan do we get Turkish support?)
And your post war plan is a bit farfetched (disarm every man, subdue religion and stay as long as we'd like).
Disarming everyone is impossible, our own missionaries would not obey the orders abour religion (and they could get support for their actions stateside. But most of all staying for too long is a bad idea and would give rise to accusations about colonialism etc.
I'd prefer a military presence for some time but a tranfer of power to an Iraqi leader (even if he is a puppet) ASAP.
Basically, I'd like a Karzai (sp?) not a McArthur if possible.
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perception
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Fri 3 Jan, 2003 06:00 pm
Craven
We have plenty of aircraft in Kuwait and Qatar when combined with the aircraft from 3 carrier battle groups.
This is my opinion of how we should proceed with the occupation effort -----you have your opinion.
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timberlandko
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Fri 3 Jan, 2003 06:00 pm
I suspect it may be taken as a given the oilfields will be at least damaged, if not "Kuwaited", in the opening minutes of an attack. I further suspect the oilfields will have been liberally seeded with anti-personnel munitions intended to hinder damage-control efforts.
Some Iraqis will certainly offer stiff resistance, but acheive negligible effect. Thugs and bullies, however, tend to flee or otherwise avoid overwhelming counter force. A few of Saddam's closest cronies may be expected to die or to attempt to flee with him, but ongoing, large-scale organized resistance simply is not in the cards. Those Upper-Crusters with ability to do so will seek to quietly and unostentatiously re-join their previously tucked-away money in less disapproving nations. Operational and Field Commanders of Combat-Capable Military units will likely wish to be at least circumspect, and avoid unnecessarilly irritating hopelessly superior forces. Some senior military may seek "Seperate Arrangement" with their immediate attackers. Mass surrenders of Rank-and-File troops are to be expected. Saddam will have as little effective control of his forces, and influence over his and his Nation's fate, as did Hitler in his final days.
A continued massive US presence will be required to inhibit the inevitable brigandry, partisanship, and reprisal activities that will result from toppling Saddam, The Ba'ath Party, and the the associated particular Islamic minority sect which has forced its control on the country for the last generation or so. With Afghanistan as recent example, we can expect limited success in such endeavor, with attendant media attention to shocking details of savagery. The matter of autonomous Iraqi Government will remain problematic at best for some time, if not rendered moot by the fracturing of already tenuous "National Identity" along ethnic and religio-ideologic lines.
Perception posits "We will be there for as long as it takes and not one minute longer". I fear we may be there very much longer than we might wish to be, and yet not as long as may be required to truly resolve all the issues.
timber
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Craven de Kere
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Fri 3 Jan, 2003 06:15 pm
Perception,
I think we'd have enough staging groud as well, I just wanted clarification on what you had in mind.
Yup, we'll have to agree to disagree about the occupation. I think timber made a good point, "we may be there very much longer than we might wish to be, and yet not as long as may be required to truly resolve all the issues".
I hope we can get a coalition umbrella to work that under. I'd rather have the coalition for the post war than for the war itself.