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America... Spying on Americans II

 
 
revel
 
  1  
Reply Wed 17 May, 2006 09:59 am
New Presidential Memorandum Permits Intelligence Director To Authorize Telcos To Lie Without Violating Securities Law

Quote:
In recent days, AT&T, Bell South and Verizon have all issued statements denying that they've handed over phone records to the NSA, as reported by USA today.

There are three possibilities:

1) The USA Today story is inaccurate;

2) The telcos left enough wiggle room in the statements that both the USA Today story and their statements are accurate; or

3) The statements from the telcos are inaccurate.

Ordinarily, a company that conceals their transactions and activities from the public would violate securities law. But an presidential memorandum signed by the President on May 5 allows the Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, to authorize a company to conceal activities related to national security. (See 15 U.S.C. 78m(b)(3)(A))

There is no evidence that this executive order has been used by John Negroponte with respect to the telcos. Of course, if it was used, we wouldn't know about it.
0 Replies
 
BumbleBeeBoogie
 
  1  
Reply Wed 17 May, 2006 10:25 am
White House agrees to tell more lawmakers about NSA program
Posted on Tue, May. 16, 2006
White House agrees to tell more lawmakers about NSA program
By James Kuhnhenn
Knight Ridder Newspapers

WASHINGTON - In a move that could help defuse a potentially contentious confirmation hearing for CIA director, the White House agreed Tuesday to provide details of its warrantless wiretapping and phone-record collection program to all members of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees.

Until Tuesday, the White House had insisted on keeping details of the program secret from all but a handful of lawmakers. A closed-door classified briefing for the Senate committee is scheduled for Wednesday, a day before the committee hears testimony from Air Force Gen. Michael Hayden, President Bush's nominee for director of the CIA.

"It's something we should have done five years ago ... at the inception of the program," said Sen. Pat Roberts, R-Kan., the chairman of the intelligence committee. "We have reached an accommodation (with the White House). I think it's a good accommodation."

Rep. Peter Hoekstra, R-Mich., the chairman of the House Intelligence Committee, said a time hadn't been set to brief the 21 members of his panel.

Both Roberts and Hoekstra said they hoped the expanded access to information would stop the partisan sniping over how to conduct congressional oversight of the program.

Democrats welcomed the decision and said it likely would take the edge off of the public portion of Hayden's confirmation hearing Thursday.

"I suspect that there is concern that if the committee doesn't really know the details of the NSA program, the Hayden nomination is in jeopardy," said Sen. Dianne Feinstein, D-Calif., who has supported Hayden for the CIA post. "I'm delighted to hear this. It is the right thing to do."

At issue is Bush's decision shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks to authorize the super-secret National Security Agency to eavesdrop on conversations in and out of the United States involving callers suspected of having al-Qaida ties. Though the calls involved at least one party within the United States, Bush's authorization permitted eavesdropping without court-approved warrants.

The New York Times revealed the existence of the program in December, causing an outcry from civil libertarians and attempts to curtail the program in Congress.

Last week, USA Today reported that the NSA also was collecting domestic telephone records from phone companies to trace when, where and to whom phone calls were placed. Since then, two of the companies, Verizon and BellSouth, have denied turning customer phone data over to the NSA.

National security adviser Stephen Hadley said Sunday that the USA Today story described "business records that have been held by the courts not to be protected by a right of privacy."

"There are a variety of ways in which those records lawfully can be provided to the government," Hadley said.

Bush reiterated Tuesday that "we do not listen to domestic phone calls without court approval."

Hayden had been the head of the NSA when the eavesdropping and data collection programs started. Democrats and Republicans immediately vowed to confront him with questions about the legality and the breadth of the wiretaps and the record-gathering during his confirmation hearing before the Senate Intelligence Committee.

But under a deal that Roberts struck with the White House in March, only seven of the Senate committee's 15 members have been given details of the NSA program. They visited the NSA and gathered in a secure room in the White House where they were briefed by Hayden, Vice President Dick Cheney, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and John Negroponte, the director of national intelligence.

With the Hayden hearings looming, Roberts said it would have been especially awkward for some committee members to have access to classified information and not others.

"Why bifurcate a committee - seven being briefed and eight not - and then ask questions of somebody who has been nominated for the CIA," he said. "I don't see how that works."

Still, Sen. Carl Levin, D-Mich., a member of the committee, said he intended to press Hayden on aspects of the program that are already public.

"It's not going to prevent an effort to explore the program in public," he said.
0 Replies
 
Cycloptichorn
 
  1  
Reply Wed 17 May, 2006 10:47 am
Did Pat Roberts hold the WH feet to the fire on this one? It would seem so.

Cycloptichorn
0 Replies
 
blueflame1
 
  1  
Reply Wed 17 May, 2006 11:11 am
Jesse Jackson | Time to Call Bush on Lawbreaking
http://www.truthout.org/docs_2006/051706J.shtml
"The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution protects the privacy and liberty of Americans. It says the government can't search or seize you without a warrant issued on probable cause to believe you are involved in a crime. This right," writes Jesse Jackson, "is the line between a democracy and a police state, where the state can search or seize at will. That is the line that the NSA program erased."
0 Replies
 
revel
 
  1  
Reply Wed 17 May, 2006 11:19 am
I think all this between the congress and the white house is just so much talk. In the end I bet nothing will be decided (or if it does it will be something like a law added to make it right) and the Bush administration will just go on its merry way until the next thing comes along and we then go through the same thing all over again.

I am not really a fan of Jessie Jackson, be he calls it right on this one.
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Wed 17 May, 2006 11:25 am
revel, I agree with you; another reason why the republican congress gets such low marks. If they really wanted to protect the American People and the Constitution, they would have impeached Bush for lying about "...to protect the Constitution..." during his swearing in ceremony. A promise to uphold the Constitution is part and parcel of our democracy, and they have all failed in that responsibility.
0 Replies
 
Cycloptichorn
 
  1  
Reply Thu 18 May, 2006 11:26 am
Here are some more traitorous reporters daring to expose national security secrets.

Baltimore Sun

Quote:
NSA killed system that sifted phone data legally
Sources say project was shelved in part because of bureaucratic infighting




By Siobhan Gorman
Sun Reporter

May 17, 2006, 10:27 PM EDT

WASHINGTON -- The National Security Agency developed a pilot program in the late 1990s that would have enabled it to gather and analyze massive amounts of communications data without running afoul of privacy laws. But after the Sept. 11 attacks, it shelved the project -- not because it failed to work -- but because of bureaucratic infighting and a sudden White House expansion of the agency's surveillance powers, according to several intelligence officials.

The agency opted instead to adopt only one component of the program, which produced a far less capable and rigorous program. It remains the backbone of the NSA's warrantless surveillance efforts, tracking domestic and overseas communications from a vast databank of information, and monitoring selected calls.

Four intelligence officials knowledgeable about the program agreed to discuss it with The Sun only if granted anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject.

The program the NSA rejected, called ThinThread, was developed to handle greater volumes of information, partly in expectation of threats surrounding the millennium celebrations. Sources say it bundled together four cutting-edge surveillance tools. ThinThread would have:

* Used more sophisticated methods of sorting through massive phone and e-mail data to identify suspect communications.

* Identified U.S. phone numbers and other communications data and encrypted them to ensure caller privacy.

* Employed an automated auditing system to monitor how analysts handled the information, in order to prevent misuse and improve efficiency.

* Analyzed the data to identify relationships between callers and chronicle their contacts. Only when evidence of a potential threat had been developed would analysts be able to request decryption of the records.

An agency spokesman declined to discuss NSA operations.

"Given the nature of the work we do, it would be irresponsible to discuss actual or alleged operational issues as it would give those wishing to do harm to the U.S. insight and potentially place Americans in danger," said NSA spokesman Don Weber in a statement to The Sun

"However, it is important to note that NSA takes its legal responsibilities very seriously and operates within the law."

In what intelligence experts describe as rigorous testing of ThinThread in 1998, the project succeeded at each task with high marks. For example, its ability to sort through massive amounts of data to find threat-related communications far surpassed the existing system, sources said. It also was able to rapidly separate and encrypt U.S.-related communications to ensure privacy.

But the NSA, then headed by Air Force Gen. Michael V. Hayden, opted against both of those tools, as well as the feature that monitored potential abuse of the records. Only the data analysis facet of the program survived and became the basis for the warrantless surveillance program.

The decision, which one official attributed to "turf protection and empire building," has undermined the agency's ability to zero in on potential threats, sources say. In the wake of revelations about the agency's wide gathering of U.S. phone records, they add, ThinThread could have provided a simple solution to privacy concerns.

A number of independent studies, including a classified 2004 report from the Pentagon's inspector-general, in addition to the successful pilot tests, found that the program provided "superior processing, filtering and protection of U.S. citizens, and discovery of important and previously unknown targets," said an intelligence official familiar with the program who described the reports to The Sun. The Pentagon report concluded that ThinThread's ability to sort through data in 2001 was far superior to that of another NSA system in place in 2004, and that the program should be launched and enhanced.

Hayden, the president's nominee to lead the CIA, is to appear Thursday before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and is expected to face tough questioning about the warrantless surveillance program, the collection of domestic phone records and other NSA programs.

While the furor over warrantless surveillance, particularly collection of domestic phone records, has raised questions about the legality of the program, there has been little or no discussion about how it might be altered to eliminate such concerns.

ThinThread was designed to address two key challenges: The NSA had more information than it could digest, and, increasingly, its targets were in contact with people in the United States whose calls the agency was prohibited from monitoring.

With the explosion of digital communications, especially phone calls over the Internet and the use of devices such as BlackBerries, the NSA was struggling to sort key nuggets of information from the huge volume of data it took in.

By 1999, as some NSA officials grew increasingly concerned about millennium-related security, ThinThread seemed in position to become an important tool with which the NSA could prevent terrorist attacks. But it was never launched. Neither was it put into effect after the attacks in 2001. Despite its success in tests, ThinThread's information-sorting system was viewed by some in the agency as a competitor to Trailblazer, a $1.2 billion program that was being developed with similar goals. The NSA was committed to Trailblazer, which later ran into trouble and has been essentially abandoned.

Both programs aimed to better sort through the sea of data to find key tips to the next terrorist attack, but Trailblazer had more political support internally because it was initiated by Hayden when he first arrived at the NSA, sources said.

NSA managers did not want to adopt the data-sifting component of ThinThread out of fear that the Trailblazer program would be outperformed and "humiliated," an intelligence official said.

Without ThinThread's data-sifting assets, the warrantless surveillance program was left with a sub-par tool for sniffing out information, and that has diminished the quality of its analysis, according to intelligence officials.

Sources say the NSA's existing system for data-sorting has produced a database clogged with corrupted and useless information.

The mass collection of relatively unsorted data, combined with system flaws that sources say erroneously flag people as suspect, has produced numerous false leads, draining analyst resources, according to two intelligence officials. FBI agents have complained in published reports in The New York Times that NSA leads have resulted in numerous dead ends.

The privacy protections offered by ThinThread were also abandoned in the post-Sept. 11 push by the president for a faster response to terrorism.

Once President Bush gave the go-ahead for the NSA to secretly gather and analyze domestic phone records -- an authorization that carried no stipulations about identity protection -- agency officials regarded the encryption as an unnecessary step and rejected it, according to two intelligence officials knowledgeable about ThinThread and the warrantless surveillance programs.

"They basically just disabled the [privacy] safeguards," said one intelligence official.

Another, a former top intelligence official, said that without a privacy requirement, "there was no reason to go back to something that was perhaps more difficult to implement."

However two officials familiar with the program said the encryption feature would have been simple to implement. One said the time required would have involved minutes, not hours.

Encryption would have required analysts to be more disciplined in their investigations, however, by forcing them to gather what a court would consider sufficient information to indicate possible terrorist activity before decryption could be authorized.

While it is unclear why the agency dropped the component that monitored for abuse of records, one intelligence official noted that the feature was not popular with analysts. It not only tracked the use of the database, but hunted for the most effective analysis techniques, and some analysts thought it would be used to judge their performance.

Within the NSA, the primary advocate for the ThinThread program was Richard Taylor, who headed the agency's operations division. Taylor who has retired from the NSA, did not return calls seeking comment.

Officials say that after the successful tests of ThinThread in 1998, Taylor argued that the NSA should implement the full program. He later told the 9/11 Commission that ThinThread could have identified the hijackers had it been in place before the attacks, according to an intelligence expert close to the commission.

But at the time, NSA lawyers viewed the program as too aggressive. At that point, the NSA's authority was limited strictly to overseas communications, with the FBI responsible for analyzing domestic calls. The lawyers feared that expanding NSA data collection to include communications in the United States could violate civil liberties, even with the encryption function.

Taylor had an intense meeting with Hayden and NSA lawyers. "It was a very emotional debate," recalled a former intelligence official. "Eventually it was rejected by [NSA] lawyers."

After the 2001 attacks, the NSA lawyers who had blocked the program reversed their position and approved the use of the program without the enhanced technology to sift out terrorist communications and without the encryption protections.

The NSA's new legal analysis was based on the commander in chief's powers during war, said former officials familiar with the program. The Bush administration's defense has rested largely on that argument since the warrantless surveillance program became public in December.

The strength of ThinThread's approach is that by encrypting information on Americans, it is legal regardless of whether the country is at war, according to one intelligence official.

Officials familiar with Thin Thread say some within NSA were stunned by the legal flip-flop. ThinThread "was designed very carefully from a legal point of view, so that even in non-wartime, you could have done it legitimately," the official said.

In a speech in January, Hayden said the warrantless surveillance program was not only limited to al-Qaida communications, but carefully implemented with an eye toward preserving the Constitution and rights of Americans.

"As the director, I was the one responsible to ensure that this program was limited in its scope and disciplined in its application," he said.

[email protected]


The administration has shown over and over again that they simply are not interested in following the laws of this country. It isn't even a case of them being unable to do so, and still protect us; it is a symptom of their belief that they are not bound by said laws. This is far more dangerous to the integrity of America than every terrorist, combined.

Cycloptichorn
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Thu 18 May, 2006 02:59 pm
Quote:
The administration has shown over and over again that they simply are not interested in following the laws of this country. It isn't even a case of them being unable to do so, and still protect us; it is a symptom of their belief that they are not bound by said laws. This is far more dangerous to the integrity of America than every terrorist, combined.

Cycloptichorn


It's unfortunate for the rest of Americans that so many believe this administration is "protecting us" while they destroy the tenets of what makes America.
0 Replies
 
revel
 
  1  
Reply Sun 21 May, 2006 11:02 am
When the Bush administration said that terrorist hate our freedoms they must of thought the way to combat that is to take our freedoms away from us in the name of "security."

Quote:


http://thinkprogress.org/2006/05/21/ross-surveillance/
0 Replies
 
Cycloptichorn
 
  1  
Reply Mon 22 May, 2006 12:30 pm
http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/05/imprisoning-journalists.html

Quote:
Monday, May 22, 2006
Imprisoning journalists

Other than the fact that the President believes that he has the power to break the law and has been continuously exercising that power, the issue about which I've written most on this blog is the sweeping and dangerous attacks by this administration on investigative journalism. Those two issues are quite related, as the latter is intended to conceal and thus enable the former.

The administration's assault on a free and vital press took a huge leap forward this weekend, when Attorney General Alberto Gonazles announced on national television that the Bush administration has the power to imprison journalists who publish stories revealing conduct by the President which the administration wants to conceal (such as the warrantless NSA eavesdropping program, which he specifically cited). Gonazles went further and made clear that the administration is actively considering prosecution against journalists who publish such stories. The video is here.

It really is hard to imagine any measures which pose a greater and more direct danger to our freedoms than the issuance of threats like this by the administration against the press. If the President has the power to keep secret any information he wants simply by classifying it -- including information regarding illegal or otherwise improper actions he has taken -- then the President, by definition, has complete control over the flow of information which Americans receive about their Government.

An aggressive and adversarial press in our country was intended by the founders to be one of the most critical checks on abuses of presidential power, every bit as much as Congress and the courts were created as checks. Jefferson said: "If I had to choose between government without newspapers, and newspapers without government, I wouldn't hesitate to choose the latter." The only reason the Founders bothered to guarantee a free press in First Amendment is because the press was intended to serve as a check against Government power.

And the only reason, in turn, that the press is a check against the Government is because it searches for and then discloses information which the Government wants to keep secret. That is what investigative journalism, by definition, does. The Government always wants to conceal its wrongdoing from the public, and the principal safeguard in this country against that behavior is an adversarial press, which is devoted to uncovering such conduct and disclosing it to the country.

Virtually every issue of political controversy during the Bush administration has been the result of the disclosure to a journalist by a concerned Government source that the administration is engaging in illegal, improper and/or highly controversial conduct. Whatever criticisms one wants to make of the American press -- and such criticisms are numerous -- it is still the case that what we do know about this Administration's conduct is the result of the press. Literally, if George Bush had his way -- if government sources were sufficiently intimidated out of disclosing classified information and journalists were sufficiently intimidated out of writing about it -- we would not know about any of these matters:


* Abu Ghraib

* The Bybee Torture Memorandum

* The use of torture as an interrogation tool

* The illegal eavesdropping on Americans without warrants

* The creation of secret gulags in Eastern Europe

* The existence of abundant pre-war information undermining and even negating the administration's WMD claims

* Policies of rendering prisoners to the worst human rights-abusing countries


Our Government would be engaging in all of this conduct, and worse. But we would not know about any of it. We would just be going merrily along our way, completely ignorant of the fact that the Bush administration has undertaken the most unimaginably radical and disturbing conduct in the name of the United States. We would all be Hugh Hewitt and John Hinderaker -- incapable of doing anything other than obediently praising the Commander-in-Chief and reciting the view of the world which the administration wants us to have because we would not know any better.

If this world were implemented, the only information about the Government which we would have is the information which the Bush administration wants us to have -- i.e., information which reflects well on it and which enhances the Glory of the president. Any information which reflects poorly on the president or which reveals any of his controversial and improper behavior would be concealed.

The only "leaked" information which we would ever hear is information which bolsters the administration's views (such as pre-war claims by Ahmed Chalabi about the existence of Iraqi chemical weapons) or which depicts the President as Our Hero and Protector (like the time he saved the "Liberty Tower" from destruction, or the way he ordered an innovative high-tech scheme to detect unusual levels of radiation in our neighborhood mosques). But leaks which the administration doesn't want us to know because they politically harm the president would never happen because those who are privy to such information (government employees and journalists alike) would be too fearful of criminal prosecution to inform us about it.

That is what this is all about. There is not a single instance -- not one -- which reflects any harm to our national security as a result of any of these disclosures. The press goes out of its way to avoid disclosing information which could harm national security -- the Times concealed all operational details of the NSA program when it disclosed that the President was eavesdropping without warrants and the Post concealed the location of the secret gulags in Eastern Europe when reporting that they existed. These disclosures trigger public debate over highly controversial matters and, as a result, often harm the President politically. But none of them is an example of gratuitous disclosure of secret information intended to harm national security.

That is how our country has operated for at least the last century, through two world wars and scores of other military conflicts. The press reports classified information to the extent that doing so brings to the public's attention legitimate matters of political debate, and it exercises self-restraint by concealing information which could harm national security and which is unnecessary for the debate to be had. And unlike many other countries whom we have never (until now) aspired to copy, we do not threaten journalists with prison or prosecute them for publishing such stories, precisely because that conduct is a critical and necessary component of the checks and balances which preserve liberty in our country.

It ought to go without saying that the press cannot serve as a check against the Executive branch if the only information it publishes is information which the President wants it to publish. Then the press becomes Pravda, existing solely to pass along information to citizens which the Government wants it to convey. That's the world where the administration wants Americans to believe that we have to wage war against Iraq to rid it of its WMDs, and so selectively "leaks" to Judith Miller the information which bolsters that claim while concealing the information which undermines it. And the Government's claims then are printed on the front page of The New York Times under the guise of independent reporting, without any contrary information being disclosed.

When the Government can control which information is disclosed and which information is concealed, newspapers become a government propaganda venue -- an arm of the Government -- rather than any meaningful check on it. I've cited this Jefferson warning several times before, and included it in my book, because it is so prescient and so self-evidently applicable to the Bush administration:

"Our first object should therefore be, to leave open to him all the avenues of truth. The most effectual hitherto found, is freedom of the press. It is therefore, the first shut up by those who fear the investigation of their actions."

There simply is no American president, at least in the last century, who has waged war against a free press the way George Bush has. Not even close. Not even Richard Nixon, who hated the press with a consuming passion, tried to imprison journalists. And there is a reason why the Bush administration has as its highest priority these attacks on the press. And Jefferson told us the reason why: because the press is the "first shut up by those who fear the investigation of their actions."

Even during World War I, the Congress refused to include in the Espionage Act of 1917 a provision which Woodrow Wilson wanted to allow criminal prosecution against any journalists who -- in a time of war -- disclosed information which the President deemed to be "of such character that it is or might be useful to the enemy." (h/t Cynic Librarian). The debate regarding that amendment makes abundantly clear that it was rejected because the grave dangers from stifling an aggressive and free press -- even during war -- far outweigh the "benefits" of eliminating one of the sole checks on the Government's ability to control the flow of information.

Why were we able to defend our national security throughout the 20th Century without imprisoning journalists? Why have we suddenly reached a point where our Government is too weak to defend our country without trying to stifle a free press by threatening journalists with imprisonment? Why can't George Bush defend the country without destroying almost every traditional institution and practice in our country to which presidential administrations of both parties have, for decades if not longer, managed to adhere?

A prohibition on imprisoning journalists for fulfilling the function which the Founders intended is just another defining tradition and principle of our country which the Bush administration is attempting to dismantle. Whether they actually prosecute journalists or not, the threat to do so -- combined with the knowledge that they possess the means to investigate their telephone calls -- by itself has a highly damaging deterrent effect on vigorous investigative journalism. This administration is obsessed with eliminating the few remaining checks on their ability to operate in secret, and there is nothing which can advance that goal more than official threats of imprisonment of journalists -- which, as amazing as it is, is exactly what happened this weekend.

UPDATE: One of the most striking aspects of these escalating attacks on the press is just how silent the major media outlets are about any of this. The Attorney General threatened journalists with prison this weekend on national television. Shouldn't the Times and the Post be editorializing against those threats, at the very least? And yet, from what I've seen today, no newspaper has published an editorial response to the administration. Just silence.


That is what this is all about. There is not a single instance -- not one -- which reflects any harm to our national security as a result of any of these disclosures.

Greenwald knocks 'em dead today, as usual. The assualt by the Bush administration on the freedoms our country has enjoyed for a long time is widespread. This truly does smack of a dictatorial situation, and needs to be dealt with immediately.

Cycloptichorn
0 Replies
 
cjhsa
 
  1  
Reply Mon 22 May, 2006 12:38 pm
It's Halloween and the Bush's are getting dressed up for a party. Laura is all dolled up in a southern belle's outfit with a $500 hairdo and $1000 shoes.

George comes out of the bathroom, and to her horror, he is bare naked except for a potato stuck on his erect penis.

"What kind of costume is that?", Laura screams.

"I'm going as a dick-tater", replies W.
0 Replies
 
BumbleBeeBoogie
 
  1  
Reply Tue 23 May, 2006 07:36 am
Why We Published the AT&T Docs
Why We Published the AT&T Docs
By Evan Hansen
Wired
Monday 22 May 2006

A file detailing aspects of AT&T's alleged participation in the National Security Agency's warrantless domestic wiretap operation is sitting in a San Francisco courthouse. But the public cannot see it because, at AT&T's insistence, it remains under seal in court records.

The judge in the case has so far denied requests from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, or EFF, and several news organizations to unseal the documents and make them public.

AT&T claims information in the file is proprietary and that it would suffer severe harm if it were released.

Based on what we've seen, Wired News disagrees. In addition, we believe the public's right to know the full facts in this case outweighs AT&T's claims to secrecy.

As a result, we are publishing the complete text of a set of documents from the EFF's primary witness in the case, former AT&T employee and whistle-blower Mark Klein - information obtained by investigative reporter Ryan Singel through an anonymous source close to the litigation. The documents, available on Wired News as of Monday, consist of 30 pages, with an affidavit attributed to Klein, eight pages of AT&T documents marked "proprietary," and several pages of news clippings and other public information related to government-surveillance issues.

The AT&T documents appear to be excerpted from material that was later filed in the lawsuit under seal. But we can't be entirely sure, because the protective order prevents us from comparing the two sets of documents.

This week, we are joining in efforts to bring this evidence to light in its entirety.

We are filing a motion to intervene in the case in order to request that the court unseal the evidence, joining other news and civil rights organizations that have already done so, including the EFF, the San Francisco Chronicle, the Los Angeles Times, the San Jose Mercury News, the Associated Press and Bloomberg.

Before publishing these documents we showed them to independent security experts, who agreed they pose no danger to AT&T. For example, they do not reveal sensitive information that hackers might use to attack the company's systems.

The court's gag order is very specific in barring only the EFF, its representatives and its technical experts from discussing and disseminating this information. The court explicitly rejected AT&T's motion to include Klein in the gag order and declined AT&T's request to force the EFF to return the documents.
0 Replies
 
BumbleBeeBoogie
 
  1  
Reply Tue 23 May, 2006 07:51 am
National Security Department: Listening In
National Security Department: Listening In
By Seymour M. Hersh
The New Yorker
29 May 2006 Issue

A few days before the start of the confirmation hearings for General Michael Hayden, who has been nominated by President Bush to be the head of the C.I.A., I spoke to an official of the National Security Agency who recently retired. The official joined the N.S.A. in the mid-nineteen-seventies, soon after contentious congressional hearings that redefined the relationship between national security and the public's right to privacy. The hearings, which revealed that, among other abuses, the N.S.A. had illegally intercepted telegrams to and from the United States, led to the passage of the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, or FISA, to protect citizens from unlawful surveillance. "When I first came in, I heard from all my elders that 'we'll never be able to collect intelligence again,'" the former official said. "They'd whine, 'Why do we have to report to oversight committees?' " But, over the next few years, he told me, the agency did find a way to operate within the law. "We built a system that protected national security and left people able to go home at night without worrying whether what they did that day was appropriate or legal."

After the attacks of September 11, 2001, it was clear that the intelligence community needed to get more aggressive and improve its performance. The Administration, deciding on a quick fix, returned to the tactic that got intelligence agencies in trouble thirty years ago: intercepting large numbers of electronic communications made by Americans. The N.S.A.'s carefully constructed rules were set aside.

Last December, the Times reported that the N.S.A. was listening in on calls between people in the United States and people in other countries, and a few weeks ago USA Today reported that the agency was collecting information on millions of private domestic calls. A security consultant working with a major telecommunications carrier told me that his client set up a top-secret high-speed circuit between its main computer complex and Quantico, Virginia, the site of a government-intelligence computer center. This link provided direct access to the carrier's network core - the critical area of its system, where all its data are stored. "What the companies are doing is worse than turning over records," the consultant said. "They're providing total access to all the data."

"This is not about getting a cardboard box of monthly phone bills in alphabetical order," a former senior intelligence official said. The Administration's goal after September 11th was to find suspected terrorists and target them for capture or, in some cases, air strikes. "The N.S.A. is getting real-time actionable intelligence," the former official said.

The N.S.A. also programmed computers to map the connections between telephone numbers in the United States and suspect numbers abroad, sometimes focussing on a geographic area, rather than on a specific person-for example, a region of Pakistan. Such calls often triggered a process, known as "chaining," in which subsequent calls to and from the American number were monitored and linked. The way it worked, one high-level Bush Administration intelligence official told me, was for the agency "to take the first number out to two, three, or more levels of separation, and see if one of them comes back"-if, say, someone down the chain was also calling the original, suspect number. As the chain grew longer, more and more Americans inevitably were drawn in.

FISA requires the government to get a warrant from a special court if it wants to eavesdrop on calls made or received by Americans. (It is generally legal for the government to wiretap a call if it is purely foreign.) The legal implications of chaining are less clear. Two people who worked on the N.S.A. call-tracking program told me they believed that, in its early stages, it did not violate the law. "We were not listening to an individual's conversation," a defense contractor said. "We were gathering data on the incidence of calls made to and from his phone by people associated with him and others." Similarly, the Administration intelligence official said that no warrant was needed, because "there's no personal identifier involved, other than the metadata from a call being placed."

But the point, obviously, was to identify terrorists. "After you hit something, you have to figure out what to do with it," the Administration intelligence official told me. The next step, theoretically, could have been to get a suspect's name and go to the fisa court for a warrant to listen in. One problem, however, was the volume and the ambiguity of the data that had already been generated. ("There's too many calls and not enough judges in the world," the former senior intelligence official said.) The agency would also have had to reveal how far it had gone, and how many Americans were involved. And there was a risk that the court could shut down the program.

Instead, the N.S.A. began, in some cases, to eavesdrop on callers (often using computers to listen for key words) or to investigate them using traditional police methods. A government consultant told me that tens of thousands of Americans had had their calls monitored in one way or the other. "In the old days, you needed probable cause to listen in," the consultant explained. "But you could not listen in to generate probable cause. What they're doing is a violation of the spirit of the law." One C.I.A. officer told me that the Administration, by not approaching the FISA court early on, had made it much harder to go to the court later.

The Administration intelligence official acknowledged that the implications of the program had not been fully thought out. "There's a lot that needs to be looked at," he said. "We are in a technology age. We need to tweak fisa, and we need to reconsider how we handle privacy issues."

Marc Rotenberg, the executive director of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, believes that if the White House had gone to Congress after September 11th and asked for the necessary changes in FISA "it would have got them." He told me, "The N.S.A. had a lot of latitude under FISA to get the data it needed. I think the White House purposefully ignored the law, because the President did not want to do the monitoring under FISA. There is a strong commitment inside the intelligence community to obey the law, and the community is getting dragged into the mud on this."

General Hayden, who as the head of the N.S.A. supervised the intercept program, is seen by many as a competent professional who was too quick to follow orders without asking enough questions. As one senior congressional staff aide said, "The concern is that the Administration says, 'We're going to do this,' and he does it - even if he knows better." Former Democratic Senator Bob Kerrey, who was a member of the 9/11 Commission, had a harsher assessment. Kerrey criticized Hayden for his suggestion, after the Times exposÂŽ, that the N.S.A.'s wiretap program could have prevented the attacks of 9/11. "That's patently false and an indication that he's willing to politicize intelligence and use false information to help the President," Kerrey said.

Hayden's public confirmation hearing last week before the Senate Intelligence Committee was unlike the tough-minded House and Senate investigations of three decades ago, and added little to what is known about the wiretap program. One unexamined issue was the effectiveness of the N.S.A. program. "The vast majority of what we did with the intelligence was ill-focussed and not productive," a Pentagon consultant told me. "It's intelligence in real time, but you have to know where you're looking and what you're after."

On May 11th, President Bush, responding to the USA Today story, said, "If Al Qaeda or their associates are making calls into the United States, or out of the United States, we want to know what they are saying." That is valid, and a well-conceived, properly supervised intercept program would be an important asset. "Nobody disputes the value of the tool," the former senior intelligence official told me. "It's the unresolved tension between the operators saying, 'Here's what we can build,' and the legal people saying, 'Just because you can build it doesn't mean you can use it.' " It's a tension that the President and his advisers have not even begun to come to terms with.
0 Replies
 
BumbleBeeBoogie
 
  1  
Reply Tue 23 May, 2006 07:54 am
What Is the Real Purpose of Bush's NSA Surveillance?
What Is the Real Purpose of Bush's NSA Surveillance?
Patriot Daily | Editorial
Thursday 18 May 2006

The Baltimore Sun reported today that Bush rejected President Clinton's effective, legal surveillance program that did not invade privacy to adopt the current NSA spying program, which is ineffective, illegal and invasive of citizens' privacy rights. So, the question jumping off the page may be: Why would Bush use a program that does not actually assist the finding of terrorists, yet also has the disadvantage of invading Americans' privacy rights?

The Clinton surveillance program, called ThinThread, was created during the late 1990s to "gather and analyze massive amounts of communications data without running afoul of privacy laws." Several bloggers provide excellent posts on the components and nature of the program.

The key to evaluating Bush's true motive for his NSA program is that testing of ThinThread showed it was far better in finding potential threats and protecting privacy than the current NSA program that Bush chose in its stead. "For example, its ability to sort through massive amounts of data to find threat-related communications far surpassed the existing system, sources said. It also was able to rapidly separate and encrypt U.S.-related communications to ensure privacy." But, Gen. Hayden of NSA decided not to use these two tools or the monitoring feature to prevent abuse of the records. The problem is that not using the ThinThread program has "undermined the agency's ability to zero in on potential threats." Moreover, "ThinThread could have provided a simple solution to privacy concerns."

Incredibly, the ThinThread program was far superior to the NSA program in place in 2004:

A number of independent studies, including a classified 2004 report from the Pentagon's inspector-general, in addition to the successful pilot tests, found that the program provided 'superior processing, filtering and protection of U.S. citizens, and discovery of important and previously unknown targets,' said an intelligence official familiar with the program who described the reports to The Sun. The Pentagon report concluded that ThinThread's ability to sort through data in 2001 was far superior to that of another NSA system in place in 2004, and that the program should be launched and enhanced.
The upshot is that the NSA's warrantless surveillance program is ineffective at finding terrorists:

Without ThinThread's data-sifting assets, the warrantless surveillance program was left with a sub-par tool for sniffing out information, and that has diminished the quality of its analysis, according to intelligence officials. Sources say the NSA's existing system for data-sorting has produced a database clogged with corrupted and useless information. The mass collection of relatively unsorted data, combined with system flaws that sources say erroneously flag people as suspect, has produced numerous false leads, draining analyst resources, according to two intelligence officials. FBI agents have complained in published reports in The New York Times that NSA leads have resulted in numerous dead ends."
And, Bush did not adopt ThinThread's privacy protections even though the "encryption feature would have been simple to implement" in minutes. One explanation may be that "encryption would have required analysts to be more disciplined in their investigations, however, by forcing them to gather what a court would consider sufficient information to indicate possible terrorist activity before decryption could be authorized.
So, using ThinThread would have required compliance with legal search standards, something that the Decider says is just not technically feasible with his program. Sounds like a convenient method for chipping away at constitutional safeguards.

While Bush proclaims that his NSA program is for the purpose of finding terrorists, this article says it is not effective for that purpose. On the other hand, the former head of NSA operations division told the 9/11 Commission that "ThinThread could have identified the hijackers had it been in place before the attacks." Is that why Bush team often states that NSA surveillance would have permitted the identification and capture of the 9/11 hijackers had it been in place prior to 9/11? That is, the general statements made by Bush are true for ThinThread, which is a NSA surveillance program, just not the program that Bush is using. So, in accordance with Bush's parsing practice, his statements would be technically true, just misleadingly false.

Finally, the article points out that ThinThread was rejected partially because it too aggressive and could violate civil rights. After 9/11, NSA lawyers reversed position by adopting Bush's theory of his war powers. However, one intelligence official stated that ThinThread is legal regardless of whether the US is at war. So, did Bush reject ThinThread partially because he could not then use the terror card as a pretext to expand presidential powers?

Given that a perfectly legal program which could actually accomplish the stated objective of capturing terrorists before attacking Americans exists, but was rejected by Bush, would could be the real underlying purpose for Bush's NSA surveillance program that has a minor, if any, impact on anti-terror objectives?

Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that if Bush is to actually succeed in finding terrorists with the program he is using, this program requires more data about Americans. That is, phone records are not sufficient for this objective, so more data would be required. Like the camel who first sticks its head in the tent, Bush may have wanted pretextual grounds to keep expanding the nature and amount of information about Americans that he collected and deposited in databases.

As noted by one expert, the NSA program Bush is using is apparently not effective at finding terrorists, not unless more data is obtained by the government in addition to phone records. Public reports indicate the NSA is using social network analysis to find terrorists, which is not effective without more data. If the NSA wants to use mathematics to root out terrorists, it would have to use a different type of profiling technique called formal concept analysis, which requires more than phone records: "For instance, you might group together people based on what cafes, bookstores and mosques they visit, and then find out that all the people who go to a certain cafe also attend the same mosque (but maybe not vice versa)."

Additional information indicates Bush wanted more than phone records. Statements by telecom company officials indicate that Bush wanted long-distance carriers, not local telecoms, which expands the nature and amount of information the NSA can obtain. Technical experts say long-distance calling records may provide information not only on long-distance customers but also "traffic that the carriers connect on behalf of others, including some calls placed on cellphones or on Internet voice connections."

Finally, the equipment that AT&T whistleblower Mark Klein says was installed by NSA in AT&T's secret switching room is apparently Narus, which has the capacity to be the "best internet spy tool:"

Anything that comes through (an internet protocol network), we can record," says Steve Bannerman, marketing vice president of Narus, a Mountain View, California, company. "We can reconstruct all of their e-mails along with attachments, see what web pages they clicked on, we can reconstruct their (voice over internet protocol) calls.
* * *
The combination can keep track of, analyze and record nearly every form of internet communication, whether e-mail, instant message, video streams or VOIP phone calls that cross the network.
So, what is the real purpose of Bush's NSA spying program? Is terrorism being used as a cover to collect reams of information about Americans to establish a central database? Could there be political motives?

Given this history, is it such a stretch to think the White House might find this information useful in helping Republican candidates hold on to national power in 2008? You really think it would never occur to Bush or Karl Rove that private knowledge of which Democratic supporters were contributing to which candidates, or which campaign advisers were leaking to which reporters, would be an advantage in a tough campaign? Or that a little listen-in to their conversations might produce a few votes? We don't know that this thought ever crossed their minds, but there's so much we don't know about what they are thinking. So we just have to trust the integrity of the administration's public statements. Oh, goodie. Do you feel safer now?

Given that Bush rejected the ThinThread program that is reported to be both effective at finding terrorists and provide protection to privacy rights, one just has to wonder at the real reason for the NSA program.
0 Replies
 
BumbleBeeBoogie
 
  1  
Reply Tue 23 May, 2006 07:56 am
NSA Killed System That Sifted Phone Data Legally
NSA Killed System That Sifted Phone Data Legally
By Siobhan Gorman
The Baltimore Sun
Wednesday 17 May 2006

Sources say project was shelved in part because of bureaucratic infighting.
Washington - The National Security Agency developed a pilot program in the late 1990s that would have enabled it to gather and analyze massive amounts of communications data without running afoul of privacy laws. But after the Sept. 11 attacks, it shelved the project - not because it failed to work - but because of bureaucratic infighting and a sudden White House expansion of the agency's surveillance powers, according to several intelligence officials.

The agency opted instead to adopt only one component of the program, which produced a far less capable and rigorous program. It remains the backbone of the NSA's warrantless surveillance efforts, tracking domestic and overseas communications from a vast databank of information, and monitoring selected calls.

Four intelligence officials knowledgeable about the program agreed to discuss it with The Sun only if granted anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject.

The program the NSA rejected, called ThinThread, was developed to handle greater volumes of information, partly in expectation of threats surrounding the millennium celebrations. Sources say it bundled together four cutting-edge surveillance tools. ThinThread would have:

Used more sophisticated methods of sorting through massive phone and e-mail data to identify suspect communications.

Identified U.S. phone numbers and other communications data and encrypted them to ensure caller privacy.

Employed an automated auditing system to monitor how analysts handled the information, in order to prevent misuse and improve efficiency.

Analyzed the data to identify relationships between callers and chronicle their contacts. Only when evidence of a potential threat had been developed would analysts be able to request decryption of the records.
An agency spokesman declined to discuss NSA operations.

"Given the nature of the work we do, it would be irresponsible to discuss actual or alleged operational issues as it would give those wishing to do harm to the U.S. insight and potentially place Americans in danger," said NSA spokesman Don Weber in a statement to The Sun

"However, it is important to note that NSA takes its legal responsibilities very seriously and operates within the law."

In what intelligence experts describe as rigorous testing of ThinThread in 1998, the project succeeded at each task with high marks. For example, its ability to sort through massive amounts of data to find threat-related communications far surpassed the existing system, sources said. It also was able to rapidly separate and encrypt U.S.-related communications to ensure privacy.

But the NSA, then headed by Air Force Gen. Michael V. Hayden, opted against both of those tools, as well as the feature that monitored potential abuse of the records. Only the data analysis facet of the program survived and became the basis for the warrantless surveillance program.

The decision, which one official attributed to "turf protection and empire building," has undermined the agency's ability to zero in on potential threats, sources say. In the wake of revelations about the agency's wide gathering of U.S. phone records, they add, ThinThread could have provided a simple solution to privacy concerns.

A number of independent studies, including a classified 2004 report from the Pentagon's inspector-general, in addition to the successful pilot tests, found that the program provided "superior processing, filtering and protection of U.S. citizens, and discovery of important and previously unknown targets," said an intelligence official familiar with the program who described the reports to The Sun. The Pentagon report concluded that ThinThread's ability to sort through data in 2001 was far superior to that of another NSA system in place in 2004, and that the program should be launched and enhanced.

Hayden, the president's nominee to lead the CIA, is to appear Thursday before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and is expected to face tough questioning about the warrantless surveillance program, the collection of domestic phone records and other NSA programs.

While the furor over warrantless surveillance, particularly collection of domestic phone records, has raised questions about the legality of the program, there has been little or no discussion about how it might be altered to eliminate such concerns.

ThinThread was designed to address two key challenges: The NSA had more information than it could digest, and, increasingly, its targets were in contact with people in the United States whose calls the agency was prohibited from monitoring.

With the explosion of digital communications, especially phone calls over the Internet and the use of devices such as BlackBerries, the NSA was struggling to sort key nuggets of information from the huge volume of data it took in.

By 1999, as some NSA officials grew increasingly concerned about millennium-related security, ThinThread seemed in position to become an important tool with which the NSA could prevent terrorist attacks. But it was never launched. Neither was it put into effect after the attacks in 2001. Despite its success in tests, ThinThread's information-sorting system was viewed by some in the agency as a competitor to Trailblazer, a $1.2 billion program that was being developed with similar goals. The NSA was committed to Trailblazer, which later ran into trouble and has been essentially abandoned.

Both programs aimed to better sort through the sea of data to find key tips to the next terrorist attack, but Trailblazer had more political support internally because it was initiated by Hayden when he first arrived at the NSA, sources said.

NSA managers did not want to adopt the data-sifting component of ThinThread out of fear that the Trailblazer program would be outperformed and "humiliated," an intelligence official said.

Without ThinThread's data-sifting assets, the warrantless surveillance program was left with a sub-par tool for sniffing out information, and that has diminished the quality of its analysis, according to intelligence officials.

Sources say the NSA's existing system for data-sorting has produced a database clogged with corrupted and useless information.

The mass collection of relatively unsorted data, combined with system flaws that sources say erroneously flag people as suspect, has produced numerous false leads, draining analyst resources, according to two intelligence officials. FBI agents have complained in published reports in The New York Times that NSA leads have resulted in numerous dead ends.

The privacy protections offered by ThinThread were also abandoned in the post-Sept. 11 push by the president for a faster response to terrorism.

Once President Bush gave the go-ahead for the NSA to secretly gather and analyze domestic phone records - an authorization that carried no stipulations about identity protection - agency officials regarded the encryption as an unnecessary step and rejected it, according to two intelligence officials knowledgeable about ThinThread and the warrantless surveillance programs.

"They basically just disabled the [privacy] safeguards," said one intelligence official.

Another, a former top intelligence official, said that without a privacy requirement, "there was no reason to go back to something that was perhaps more difficult to implement."

However two officials familiar with the program said the encryption feature would have been simple to implement. One said the time required would have involved minutes, not hours.

Encryption would have required analysts to be more disciplined in their investigations, however, by forcing them to gather what a court would consider sufficient information to indicate possible terrorist activity before decryption could be authorized.

While it is unclear why the agency dropped the component that monitored for abuse of records, one intelligence official noted that the feature was not popular with analysts. It not only tracked the use of the database, but hunted for the most effective analysis techniques, and some analysts thought it would be used to judge their performance.

Within the NSA, the primary advocate for the ThinThread program was Richard Taylor, who headed the agency's operations division. Taylor who has retired from the NSA, did not return calls seeking comment.

Officials say that after the successful tests of ThinThread in 1998, Taylor argued that the NSA should implement the full program. He later told the 9/11 Commission that ThinThread could have identified the hijackers had it been in place before the attacks, according to an intelligence expert close to the commission.

But at the time, NSA lawyers viewed the program as too aggressive. At that point, the NSA's authority was limited strictly to overseas communications, with the FBI responsible for analyzing domestic calls. The lawyers feared that expanding NSA data collection to include communications in the United States could violate civil liberties, even with the encryption function.

Taylor had an intense meeting with Hayden and NSA lawyers. "It was a very emotional debate," recalled a former intelligence official. "Eventually it was rejected by [NSA] lawyers."

After the 2001 attacks, the NSA lawyers who had blocked the program reversed their position and approved the use of the program without the enhanced technology to sift out terrorist communications and without the encryption protections.

The NSA's new legal analysis was based on the commander in chief's powers during war, said former officials familiar with the program. The Bush administration's defense has rested largely on that argument since the warrantless surveillance program became public in December.

The strength of ThinThread's approach is that by encrypting information on Americans, it is legal regardless of whether the country is at war, according to one intelligence official.

Officials familiar with Thin Thread say some within NSA were stunned by the legal flip-flop. ThinThread "was designed very carefully from a legal point of view, so that even in non-wartime, you could have done it legitimately," the official said.

In a speech in January, Hayden said the warrantless surveillance program was not only limited to al-Qaida communications, but carefully implemented with an eye toward preserving the Constitution and rights of Americans.

"As the director, I was the one responsible to ensure that this program was limited in its scope and disciplined in its application," he said.
0 Replies
 
Gelisgesti
 
  1  
Reply Tue 23 May, 2006 10:57 am
Eye in the sky

BBB, check this out .......
0 Replies
 
BumbleBeeBoogie
 
  1  
Reply Wed 24 May, 2006 07:51 am
Gelisgesti
Gelisgesti wrote:
Eye in the sky

BBB, check this out .......


such spying has occurred since the Pilgrims landed. It's is just that we've improved the technology.

It also makes it more laughable that the Bush administration would arrest reporters that published the expose based on it's accusation that it informed the terrorists of what was going on. As if they already didn't know as anyone with any knowledge of history would know.

A major goal of the phone number spying is to try to trace reporter calls to identify leakers. Of course the Bush adm can't admit that so it uses the cover of terrorists.

BBB
0 Replies
 
revel
 
  1  
Reply Wed 24 May, 2006 09:15 am
I just don't understand how we come to this point where nearly everything that comes out of the mouths of the government and in specific the administration is some kind of either direct or indirect deception. No wonder right wing news people are so threatened by think progress and media matters who keep up with all this stuff.


Quote:
Media Reports Gonzales' Misleading Legal Analysis on NSA Program, Ignores All Opposing Views
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales won't confirm that the federal government collected the phone records of millions of Americans, as reported on May 11 in USA Today. But yesterday, Gonzales claimed that doing so was perfectly legal. From the Washington Post:

Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales said yesterday that the government can obtain domestic telephone records without court approval under a 1979 Supreme Court ruling that authorized the collection of business recordsÂ…Gonzales told reporters that, under the Smith v. Maryland ruling, "those kinds of records do not enjoy Fourth Amendment protection. There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in those kinds of records."

This is a classic case of misdirection. The issue isn't simply whether or not collecting domestic phone records is constitutional. The issue is whether it's legal. If the USA Today story is accurate, the NSA program appears to be illegal, not because it violates the fourth amendment, but because it violates two statutes.

Significantly, Smith v. Maryland considers activities that occurred in 1976. Both of the statutes that prohibit the activity described by USA Today were enacted after that date:

1. The Stored Communications Act of 1986 (SCA). The law prohibits the telecommunications companies from handing over telephone records to the government without a court order. (18 USC 2702-3.) There are several exceptions, none of which apply in this circumstance. The SCA was enacted in response to Smith v. Maryland.

2. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA). The law allows this kind of domestic surveillance in two circumstances: 1) the government obtains a warrant from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, or 2) the government obtains a certification from the Attorney General that the program is legal under FISA. According to the USA Today article, neither action was taken.

The Washington Post story on Gonzales' comments, however, doesn't mention the Stored Communications Act or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. For that matter, it doesn't include any legal analysis from anyone other than Gonzales.


source
0 Replies
 
blueflame1
 
  1  
Reply Wed 24 May, 2006 09:22 am
revel, it's frustrating. A majority of Americans say Bushie should be impeached if he's running warrantless spying on America. And he is. It even started before 911. Yet the guy running the program was just given the thumbs for CIA Director by the Senate Committee. Neither the Dems or GOP give a damn what people think or want.
0 Replies
 
cicerone imposter
 
  1  
Reply Wed 24 May, 2006 10:33 am
Don't you know? Everything Americans do to reveal secrets of this administration are known spies and traitors of America. It's a small price to pay for media folks to be put in prison to protect secrets from the enemy.

That's the reason why Bush as president has the power to listen in on private conversations by Americans - to protect us from terrorists.

I'm just wondering though, Bush is a known terrorist; he killed tens of thousands of innocent Iraqis. I wonder who's tapping into his "private" conversations?
0 Replies
 
 

 
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