United States vs Deborah Davis

I think I remember reading a case a while ago, I think it was in Arizona, where state law required production of i/d without cause. I'm pretty sure that the defendant lost. This will be interesting.

0 Replies

This case has a lot of differences goodfielder! In the case you are referring to, a cop was invsetigating a complaint and the person was in control of a motor vehicle on a public road (which requires a license).

In this case there doesn't appear to be any justification for the demand for identification and it isn't a situation where there is any legal requirement to have an ID.

IMO, Ms. Davis should prevail in this one.

0 Replies

Interesting case, Reyn.

I reviewed the link you provided.

Ms. Davis was riding a Denver City Bus as her chosen mode of transportation to work in the morning. The bus route runs through the "Denver Federal Center" managed by the U.S. General Services Administration. The bus must pass through Gate 4. The security officers at the gate routinely request the passengers on the city bus to produce identification.

The first time Ms. Davis was asked for identification, she complied. However, she thought about it afterward and was offended that her rights were violated.

For the next couple of weeks, Ms. Davis did not bring identification. Even so, since she was not getting off the bus on federal property, she was allowed to continue riding the bus.

On September 26th, Ms. Davis was again asked for her identification. This time, she replied that she did have identification, but she declined to show it and she declined to get off the bus and give up her ride to work on the city bus. Ms. Davis did not believe the security officer when he told her that the Supreme Court had ruled that it was constitutional for them to require her to produce her identification.

The officers placed Ms. Davis under arrest. At the law enforcement center, the officers had a difficult time trying to figure out what to charge. From the charging documents and security officer reports on Ms. Davis's website, she has been charged with two counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 111 (a) (1) for impeding a government security officer in the performance of his duties by refusing to show proper identification when requested as required by 41 CFR 102-74.375(c) and by refusing to follow directions of security personnel as required by 41 CRF 102-74.385.

Ms. Davis faces a maximum penalty of 8 years imprisonment on each count.

Here is the relevant information concerning the "Denver Federal Center" provided by the U.S. General Services Administration:

Quote:

Denver Federal Center Information

Click here to view a printable map of the Denver Federal Center

Hours of Operation:
The Denver Federal Center is open to the public from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., Monday through Friday, except federal holidays. After-hours admittance must be authorized prior to required date. Please call the Denver Federal Center Service Center for further information at 303-236-7511, ext. 5037.

Visitor Access:
Gate 1
Kipling and Alameda
Employee/visitor/bus/delivery
6 a.m. to 6 p.m., Monday through Friday
After hours accessibility with prior authorization

Gate 4
Union and 6th Avenue
Employee/visitor/bus
6 a.m to 6 p.m., Monday through Friday

Parking
Parking throughout the Denver Federal Center (DFC) is open to visitors unless specifically designated. Visitor spaces are located near entrances to the buildings. Parking spaces are designated as 30 minute, one hour or two hour spaces.

Credit Unions
Credit Union of Denver is located on the lower level of Building 67. GSA Credit Union is located in Building 41. Hours of operation for both offices are Monday, Tuesday, Thursday and Friday - 8 a.m. to 3 p.m., and Wednesday from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.

Public Transportation
Public bus transportation is available on the DFC through the Regional Transit District (RTD). For information on routes and schedules, please call 303-299-6000 or visit the RTD Web site at http://www.rtd-denver.com.

Safe & Secure
In order to make this facility safe for you and those who work here, we request that you comply with the following guidelines:

Please be prepared to present a valid drivers license and current vehicle registration at the gate.
For your safety, seat belts are required to be worn at all times.
Only service animals used to assist handicapped persons are permitted.
Firearms/explosives are not permitted on the DFC (carried or possessed), except for official purposes.
Narcotics are prohibited on the facility.
Alcoholic beverages are prohibited from all areas of the facility with the exception of the softball fields, and only canned beverages are permitted.
Smoking is prohibited in all buildings. Designated smoking areas are provided.
Private or commercial solicitation is not allowed on the facility.
Please secure bicycles only to racks at building entrances.
Vehicles may be subject to inspection upon entrance.
For your protection, closed circuit television cameras monitor the DFC at all times.

Please drive in a careful and safe manner at all times and comply with signals and directions of the Federal Protective Officers.

For emergencies on the facility, please call (303) 236-2911.

For additional information about the facility, please call 1-888-999-4777.

Source:
U.S. General Services Administration website

Did you notice that the "Denver Federal Center" is officially OPEN TO THE PUBLIC between the hours of 6 a.m. and 6 p.m.? That's important when you read the applicable federal regulations. But first, let's look at the relevant criminal statute:

Quote:

TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 7
CHAPTER 7—ASSAULT
Release date: 2005-08-03 § 111. Assaulting, resisting, or impeding certain officers or employees

(a) In General.— Whoever—

(1) forcibly assaults, resists, opposes, impedes, intimidates, or interferes with any person designated in section 1114 of this title while engaged in or on account of the performance of official duties; . . .

shall, where the acts in violation of this section constitute only simple assault, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both, and in all other cases, be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both.

Ms. Davis allegedly impeded the security officers in the performance of their official duties established pursuant to 41 CFR 102-74.375(c) and to 41 CFR 102-74.385 set forth below:

Quote:

Title 41: Public Contracts and Property Management
PART 102–74—FACILITY MANAGEMENT
Subpart C—Conduct on Federal Property
Admission to Property

§ 102-74.375 What is the policy on admitting persons to Government property?

Federal agencies must—

(a) Except as otherwise permitted, close property to the public during other than normal working hours. In those instances where a Federal agency has approved the after-normal-working-hours use of buildings or portions thereof for activities authorized by subpart D of this part, Federal agencies must not close the property (or affected portions thereof) to the public;

(b) Close property to the public during working hours only when situations require this action to provide for the orderly conduct of Government business. The designated official under the Occupant Emergency Program may make such decision only after consultation with the buildings manager and the highest ranking representative of the law enforcement organization responsible for protection of the property or the area. The designated official is defined in §102–71.20 of this chapter as the highest ranking official of the primary occupant agency, or the alternate highest ranking official or designee selected by mutual agreement by other occupant agency officials; and

(c) When property or a portion thereof is closed to the public, restrict admission to the property, or the affected portion, to authorized persons who must register upon entry to the property and must, when requested, display Government or other identifying credentials to Federal police officers or other authorized individuals when entering, leaving or while on the property. Failure to comply with any of the applicable provisions is a violation of these regulations.

Title 41: Public Contracts and Property Management
PART 102–74—FACILITY MANAGEMENT
Subpart C—Conduct on Federal Property
Conformity With Signs and Directions

§ 102-74.385 What is the policy concerning conformity with official signs and directions?

Persons in and on property must at all times comply with official signs of a prohibitory, regulatory or directory nature and with the lawful direction of Federal police officers and other authorized individuals.

OKAY: From what I understand, according to the government website, the "Denver Federal Center" is OPEN TO THE PUBLIC during the hours of 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m., Monday through Friday. Since the facility was not closed, Ms. Davis was not required to by federal regulation to obtain authorization to enter the facilty, nor register to enter the facility, nor show identification to enter the facility.

Additionally, Ms. Davis was not IN or ON the federal facility when she refused to show her identification. She was at the gate; sitting on a public bus on its regular route passing through a federal facility that was indeed OPEN TO THE PUBLIC. She was a paying passenger on the public transportation system that was traveling on a road open to the public. If the security officers believed her presence on the a city bus constituted a threat to the facility security, they had no lawful right to arrest Ms. Davis--they merely could have denied access to the City Bus and the City Bus driver would be required to take an alternate route around the facility. It was not necessary to arrest a city bus passenger who was neither on or in the facility and I don't think it's within the lawful authority of a federal security officer to determine who may or may not ride on a public bus that is part of the public city transportation system.

0 Replies

The Department of Homeland Security Offense/Incident Report is here:

http://www.papersplease.org/davis/_dl/Incident_Report.pdf

". . . the individual was refusing to show identification or leave the bus."

"I boarded the bus and spoke to the individual . . . asking why she was refusing. she explained that she did not have to give up her rights and present her identification. I informed her she was entering a federal facility and that the regulations for entrance, did require her to present identification, before being allowed access. But if she did not wish to do this she could leave the bus before it entered . . . ."

[NOTE: The federal officer was not truthful. As set forth above, the regulation the federal officers cited does NOT require the presentation of identification when the facility is OPEN to the public--it requires authorization, registration, and presentation of identifying credentials WHEN the facility is CLOSED to the public. Also NOTE, the bus was NOT in or on the property--it had not yet entered.]

". . . I then re-entered the bus and informed her she was now being asked to present identification to a law enforcement official in the capacity of my job, for identification purposes. She stated she did not have to do this and refused to exit [public transportation bus] after once again being told she could leave or identify herself. I also informed her that the U.S. Supreme Court had found this type of request to be legitimate. She stated she did not believe me. I also explained the regulations for facility entrance required, either showing identification or being denied entrance. She refused once again."

* * *

What Supreme Court decision is he talking about? Is he referring to Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District?

http://laws.findlaw.com/us/000/03-5554.html

The Supreme Court wrote the following:

Quote:

The petitioner was arrested and convicted for refusing to identify himself during a stop allowed by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968)
. . . .

. . . The sheriff's department in Humboldt County, Nevada, received an afternoon telephone call reporting an assault. The caller reported seeing a man assault a woman in a red and silver GMC truck on Grass Valley Road. Deputy Sheriff Lee Dove was dispatched to investigate. When the officer arrived at the scene, he found the truck parked on the side of the road. A man was standing by the truck, and a young woman was sitting inside it. The officer observed skid marks in the gravel behind the vehicle, leading him to believe it had come to a sudden stop.

The officer approached the man and explained that he was investigating a report of a fight. The man appeared to be intoxicated. The officer asked him if he had "any identification on [him]," which we understand as a request to produce a driver's license or some other form of written identification. The man refused and asked why the officer wanted to see identification. The officer responded that he was conducting an investigation and needed to see some identification. The unidentified man became agitated and insisted he had done nothing wrong. The officer explained that he wanted to find out who the man was and what he was doing there. After continued refusals to comply with the officer's request for identification, the man began to taunt the officer by placing his hands behind his back and telling the officer to arrest him and take him to jail. This routine kept up for several minutes: the officer asked for identification 11 times and was refused each time. After warning the man that he would be arrested if he continued to refuse to comply, the officer placed him under arrest.

We now know that the man arrested on Grass Valley Road is Larry Dudley Hiibel. Hiibel was charged with "willfully resist[ing], delay[ing], or obstruct[ing] a public officer in discharging or attempting to discharge any legal duty of his office" in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. (NRS) §199.280 (2003). The government reasoned that Hiibel had obstructed the officer in carrying out his duties under §171.123, a Nevada statute that defines the legal rights and duties of a police officer in the context of an investigative stop. Section 171.123 provides in relevant part:

"1. Any peace officer may detain any person whom the officer encounters under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a crime.

. . .

Stop and identify statutes often combine elements of traditional vagrancy laws with provisions intended to regulate police behavior in the course of investigatory stops. The statutes vary from State to State, but all permit an officer to ask or require a suspect to disclose his identity. A few States model their statutes on the Uniform Arrest Act, a model code that permits an officer to stop a person reasonably suspected of committing a crime and "demand of him his name, address, business abroad and whither he is going." Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 Va. L. Rev. 315, 344 (1942). Other statutes are based on the text proposed by the American Law Institute as part of the Institute's Model Penal Code. See ALI, Model Penal Code, §250.6, Comment 4, pp. 392-393 (1980). The provision, originally designated §250.12, provides that a person who is loitering "under circumstances which justify suspicion that he may be engaged or about to engage in crime commits a violation if he refuses the request of a peace officer that he identify himself and give a reasonably credible account of the lawfulness of his conduct and purposes." §250.12 (Tentative Draft No. 13) (1961). In some States, a suspect's refusal to identify himself is a misdemeanor offense or civil violation; in others, it is a factor to be considered in whether the suspect has violated loitering laws. In other States, a suspect may decline to identify himself without penalty.

Stop and identify statutes have their roots in early English vagrancy laws that required suspected vagrants to face arrest unless they gave "a good Account of themselves," 15 Geo. 2, ch. 5, §2 (1744), a power that itself reflected common-law rights of private persons to "arrest any suspicious night-walker, and detain him till he give a good account of himself ... ." 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, ch. 13, §6, p. 130. (6th ed. 1787). In recent decades, the Court has found constitutional infirmity in traditional vagrancy laws. In Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156 (1972), the Court held that a traditional vagrancy law was void for vagueness. Its broad scope and imprecise terms denied proper notice to potential offenders and permitted police officers to exercise unfettered discretion in the enforcement of the law. See id., at 167-171.

The Court has recognized similar constitutional limitations on the scope and operation of stop and identify statutes. In Brown v. Texas, 443 U. S. 47, 52 (1979), the Court invalidated a conviction for violating a Texas stop and identify statute on Fourth Amendment grounds. The Court ruled that the initial stop was not based on specific, objective facts establishing reasonable suspicion to believe the suspect was involved in criminal activity. See id., at 51-52. Absent that factual basis for detaining the defendant, the Court held, the risk of "arbitrary and abusive police practices" was too great and the stop was impermissible. Id., at 52. Four Terms later, the Court invalidated a modified stop and identify statute on vagueness grounds. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U. S. 352 (1983). The California law in Kolender required a suspect to give an officer " 'credible and reliable' " identification when asked to identify himself. Id., at 360. The Court held that the statute was void because it provided no standard for determining what a suspect must do to comply with it, resulting in " 'virtually unrestrained power to arrest and charge persons with a violation.' " Id., at 360 (quoting Lewis v. New Orleans, 415 U. S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring in result)).

The present case begins where our prior cases left off. Here there is no question that the initial stop was based on reasonable suspicion, satisfying the Fourth Amendment requirements noted in Brown. Further, the petitioner has not alleged that the statute is unconstitutionally vague, as in Kolender. Here the Nevada statute is narrower and more precise. The statute in Kolender had been interpreted to require a suspect to give the officer "credible and reliable" identification. In contrast, the Nevada Supreme Court has interpreted NRS §171.123(3) to require only that a suspect disclose his name. See 118 Nev., at ___, 59 P. 3d, at 1206 (opinion of Young, C. J.) ("The suspect is not required to provide private details about his background, but merely to state his name to an officer when reasonable suspicion exists"). As we understand it, the statute does not require a suspect to give the officer a driver's license or any other document. Provided that the suspect either states his name or communicates it to the officer by other means--a choice, we assume, that the suspect may make--the statute is satisfied and no violation occurs. See id., at ___, 59 P. 3d, at 1206-1207. . . .

. . . Beginning with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), the Court has recognized that a law enforcement officer's reasonable suspicion that a person may be involved in criminal activity permits the officer to stop the person for a brief time and take additional steps to investigate further. Delgado, supra, at 216; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S. 873, 881 (1975). To ensure that the resulting seizure is constitutionally reasonable, a Terry stop must be limited. The officer's action must be " 'justified at its inception, and ... reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.' " United States v. Sharpe, 470 U. S. 675, 682 (1985) (quoting Terry, supra, at 20). For example, the seizure cannot continue for an excessive period of time, see United States v. Place, 462 U. S. 696, 709 (1983), or resemble a traditional arrest, see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S. 200, 212 (1979). . . .

The principles of Terry permit a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry stop. . . .

See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District

In his official report, the officer said, "I then re-entered the bus and informed her she was now being asked to present identification to a law enforcement official in the capacity of my job, for identification purposes." He did not suspect Ms. Davis of criminal activity, accordingly, this was not a Terry Stop and Ms. Davis was not required to identify herself or risk arrest for impeding a federal officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111 (a) (1). Under no circumstances was Ms. Davis required to present documentary identification credentials.

I cannot find a case that substantiates the federal officer's statement, "that the U.S. Supreme Court had found this type of request to be legitimate." Hiibel doesn't allow the government to establish identification check points where persons are required to "show their papers" before being allowed entry to a government facility that is OPEN TO THE PUBLIC.

0 Replies

A citizen in or passing through places open to the public should never be required to show identification without probable cause to believe that he may be committing a crime.

This is an important case and Ie certainly hope that the courts appreciate the immense implications. This would certainly be step one on the road to 1984.

0 Replies

http://www.rtd-denver.com/routemaps/r0_100.gif

The route map for Ms. Davis's bus definitely shows an alternative route for the bus to take when access through the federal center is denied.

In order to avoid violating Ms. Davis's right to ride the bus the same as the rest of the paying patrons, the bus driver should have taken the alternative route. The federal officers did not have authority to determine who could and could not ride on the city bus. The federal officers did not have authority to require Ms. Davis to exit the bus. If the federal officers believed Ms. Davis's presence on the bus constituted a threat to the federal center, the federal officers should have denied the BUS entry to the facility and the bus driver would have been required to take the alternate route.

If it had been the city bus driver who demanded that Ms. Davis exit the bus after she paid her fare rather than take the alternate route, then the City would be liable to Ms. Davis under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of her civil rights. The City is not required to service the federal center; the City does not have authority to require its public transportation patrons to waive their constitutional rights as a condition to riding the city bus.

The City of Denver may still be liable to Ms. Davis for violating her civil rights because, rather than evicting the passenger or allowing the passenger to be arrested, the bus driver should have taken the alternative route. Why should the City service a route through the federal center if the civil rights of all passengers on board the bus are violated in order to do so? The City should not tolerate this injustice to its public transportation customers.

0 Replies

book mark

0 Replies

Wow, Debra! You've really done some very detailed research on this! I will read in more detail when I have time later today. Very impressive.

I have a feeling that you, and many others, will be watching this case closely. :wink:

0 Replies

Note: The city bus route maps (including the map showing the alternate route around the Denver Federal Center) are located on the Denver RTD (Regional Transportation District) website:

http://www.rtd-denver.com./

Click on "how to ride" in the right hand menu.

Scroll down and click on the link entitled, "Steps for riding the Bus."

Scroll down, and under the heading "On the Internet," click on the link entitled, "schedule information."

Scroll down and find Local Route 100, Kipling Crosstown, (the route that Ms. Davis was riding). Click on "map" and you will find the official map (including the alternate route around the DFC) on the Denver RTD website.

0 Replies

Debra_Law wrote:

The federal officers did not have authority to determine who could and could not ride on the city bus. The federal officers did not have authority to require Ms. Davis to exit the bus. If the federal officers believed Ms. Davis's presence on the bus constituted a threat to the federal center, the federal officers should have denied the BUS entry to the facility and the bus driver would have been required to take the alternate route.

Quote:

The City of Denver may still be liable to Ms. Davis for violating her civil rights because, rather than evicting the passenger or allowing the passenger to be arrested, the bus driver should have taken the alternative route. Why should the City service a route through the federal center if the civil rights of all passengers on board the bus are violated in order to do so?

Let us hope that the court will rule the same way as you have stated. It would seem a miscarrage of justice if they do not.

I will look for updates on this story. Thanks again for your analysis!

0 Replies

reading along, fascinating...

Debra, could you send your review to the judge as a 'friend of the court', or whatever it's called?

0 Replies

bookmark

0 Replies

fishin' wrote:

This case has a lot of differences goodfielder! In the case you are referring to, a cop was invsetigating a complaint and the person was in control of a motor vehicle on a public road (which requires a license).

In this case there doesn't appear to be any justification for the demand for identification and it isn't a situation where there is any legal requirement to have an ID.

IMO, Ms. Davis should prevail in this one.

That's the one fishin', thanks for that, yes there are some differences indeed.

0 Replies

J_B wrote:

reading along, fascinating...

Debra, could you send your review to the judge as a 'friend of the court', or whatever it's called?

See Use of an Amicus Brief.

I have no direct or indirect interest in the outcome of this criminal case other than my "generalized" interest as a citizen of the United States who is appalled and offended by the government's tyrannical and oppressive violation of Ms. Davis's civil rights. Ms. Davis appears to be represented by highly capable and competent counsel who will most likely evaluate every facet of the case in consultation with their client and determine an appropriate strategy for meeting the client's goals and defending against the criminal charges.

Personally, I do not think the government is capable of proving the essential elements of crimes charged.

The first charge requires the government to prove that the federal facility was CLOSED to the public. The regulation cited only applies when the facility is CLOSED. Only then does the regulation require a visitor to obtain pre-authorization to enter, to register at the gate, and to produce identification upon request. Since there is absolutely no question that the facility was OPEN to the public between the hours of 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., Monday through Friday (except on holidays), and Ms. Davis was intending to pass through the facility while sitting on public transportation bus during normal working hours when the facility was open to the public, she was not required to obtain pre-authorization to enter, to register at the gate, and to present identifying credentials upon request.

The first regulation simply doesn't apply. The regulation applies to the FEDERAL AGENCY's MANAGEMENT of the federal facility. If you note the introductory clause of the regulation it states: "Federal agencies must—"

What must a FEDERAL AGENCY do? Well, when it is managing a facility that is CLOSED to the public, it must restrict admission. How does the agency restrict admission? It does so by requiring AUTHORIZED persons (persons who are pre-authorized to enter the CLOSED facility) to REGISTER upon entry and by requiring these authorized persons to display Government or other identifying credentials upon request.

Accordingly, the regulation is NOT even directed at the obligations of the individual attempting to enter the closed facility--on the contrary, it is directed at the obligations of a federal agency (Federal agencies must . . .)for the administration of property that is CLOSED to the public.

The second regulation is also inapplicable. It requires "persons in and on property must at all times comply with official signs of a prohibitory, regulatory or directory nature and with the lawful direction of Federal police officers and other authorized individuals."

First, Ms. Davis was NOT "in and on" the property. She was at the entrance of the property but had not yet entered. The federal officers ostensibly could have constitutionally or unconstitutionally denied her entry to a facility that was open to the public, but the federal officers had NO LAWFUL authority over the Denver area public transportation system. They had no lawful authority to determine who may and may not ride on a public bus. The federal officers could ostensibly constitutionally or unconstitutionally deny the BUS entry into the facility so long as Ms. Davis was riding on the bus--but that was the STATE/CITY's problem which could have been easily resolved for the time being if the bus driver had taken the alternate route around the facility. The federal officers had no lawful authority to arrest Ms. Davis because she refused to get off a public bus for which she paid the fare and expected to be transported to her destination.

It is NOT within the lawful authority of a federal officer to demand that any person who is traveling on public transportation on roads open to the public to present identification. Case law firmly establishes that law enforcement authorities have no authority whatsoever to temporarily stop (sieze) a person and request that the person verbally identify herself unless the authorities have a reasonable suspicion (based on articulable facts) that the person has committed a crime or is about to commit a crime. Merely riding a public bus on its designated route is not a circumstance that gives rise to a reasonable suspicion that the person committed a crime or is about to commit a crime.

Accordingly, it does not appear even remotely possible that the government can prove any elements of the crimes charged as a matter of law and the charges should be dismissed.

HOWEVER, once the charges are dismissed--as they should be--Ms. Davis should not allow the matter to drop. She was unconstitutionally arrested in violation of her right to free of unreasonable seizures and she ought to hold the government liable in a civil rights action, seek monetary damages, and seek an INJUNCTION against the federal agency managing the Denver Federal Center from requesting identification of persons visiting or traveling through the facility when it is OPEN to the public.

THEN and ONLY THEN--if an injunction is obtained--will the rest of us have cause to celebrate a victory in the name of freedom for ALL OF US.

0 Replies

Judging from the lack of opposing posts from the usual suspects, this would seem to be one of those rare topics when left and right agree on something. Good.

0 Replies

Couple of thoughts. If this is due to an over-zealous individual federal officer then he or she needs to get a little smack on the wrist and be told not to do it again because it's stupid.

But if it's part of government policy then that would seem to be much more serious and deserving of thorough public and judicial condemnation.

0 Replies

Quote:

COLORADO
Grandma wins fight on showing ID
DENVER -- Federal prosecutors have dropped charges against a Colorado grandmother who refused to show her identification to officers at a bus stop outside a federal office building.
Deborah Davis of Arvada was handcuffed and received two citations last month after she refused to produce identification for two Federal Protective Service officers who boarded her bus at its regular stop at the Federal Center in Denver.
"The U.S. Attorney's Office has chosen not to file charges in this matter based on a technicality regarding signage," said spokesman Jeff Dorschner.
Bill Scannell, a spokesman for Mrs. Davis, said her supporters would still push for a rule change that would exempt passengers at the stop from producing identification.
"Deborah Davis is special, but we don't want a special exemption just for her," he said.

0 Replies

Thank you for the update, Debra. It's good to see that this woman won in this case.

0 Replies

She still didn't win. The Denver Federal Center--even though it is open to the public--still requires everyone to present identification or be denied admission.

Another story:

Feds block bus protest

http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/local/article/0,1299,DRMN_15_4302924,00.html

Quote:

Federal officials today refused to let an RTD bus enter the Federal Center in Lakewood because passenger Deborah Davis wouldn't show her identification.

Davis, 50, of Arvada, had been ticketed in September for refusing to show her ID on the bus she was riding through the Federal Center to her job at a small business in Lakewood. The American Civil Liberties Union and private lawyers volunteered to represent her, contending that people shouldn't have to show identification to ride a public bus.

Federal prosecutors announced Wednesday that they would drop the case against Davis, citing a problem with signs at the Federal Center that were supposed to warn people that their IDs would be checked.

But Davis and her supporters staged a rally at the downtown Denver federal courthouse where she had been scheduled to be arraigned this morning. She then took a bus to the Federal Center, but guards blocked the bus from entering.

Five regular passengers on the bus who were willing to show their IDs were transferred to another RTD bus in order to travel into or through the Federal Center.

Davis said she will ride a bus to the Federal Center again on Monday and again refuse to show her ID.

0 Replies

United States vs Deborah Davis

Quick Links

My Account

able2know