US Pushing for a Coup d'Etat
by Maximilien Arvelaiz & Temir Porras Ponceleon
CovertAction Quarterly, Spring 2002
President Bush's statement in the wake of 911 that "either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" is clear: From now on, those who are not "100% with the USA" may be branded as terrorists. Until recently, only the so-called rogue states had been threatened by the Bush administration, but now, a traditional ally, with a democratically elected government, has also become a target.
On February 5, Secretary of State Colin Powell, questioned by Senator Jesse Helms, expressed unhappiness with Hugo Chavez. He was distressed by the fact that the Venezuelan president was being less than fully supportive of the anti-terrorism campaign. Powell also questioned, without elaborating, Chavez's "understanding of what the democratic system is all about.''
The following day, George Tenet, director of the CIA, followed up on Powell's statement, commenting on "the growing internal opposition to President Chavez," and predicted that, due to the fall of oil prices, oil being Venezuela's main source of income, the "crisis atmosphere is likely to worsen." Needless to say, this sort of comment could hardly ease the "crisis atmosphere." At no other time since the beginning of the Bolivarian Revolution in 1998, had US officials intervened so abruptly in Venezuelan affairs. Yet they did so at a time when the political situation in Venezuela was particularly tense. Washington's warnings took on the appearance of self-fulfilling prophecies: During the following week, the massive flight of capital (US $100 million per day) forced the Venezuelan government to take emergency economic measures.
Following a period of steady deterioration, US-Venezuelan bilateral relations seem to have reached a point of no return. Back in the Clinton days, the US government had adopted a "wait and see" policy toward President Chavez, and tolerated some uncolonial behavior from the former paratrooper (e.g, visiting Iraq, establishing close links with Cuba). They didn't really have much choice. When Chavez took office, he found a country exhausted by ten years of social unrest and permanent political crisis. After several decades of ruthless corruption and the political class's inability to respond to basic social needs, the Venezuelan population unanimously rejected a regime that was once considered a model of democracy. Given that Venezuela is one of the US's main oil providers, and that it contains among the world's largest proven oil reserves outside of the Middle East, the Chavez solution, as long as it could bring stability to the country, was not considered by Washington to be the worst possible scenario.
Additionally, from the beginning of the 1990s, Latin America had ceased to be a priority for the USA. The historical hegemonic influence of the US in Latin America took on a new form: the promotion of Bill Clinton's "market democracy," i.e., elected governments as long as they guarantee that markets remain open to free trade, and that US interests remain untouched. Thanks to the retreat of traditional opponents, this policy was not difficult to implement. After the fall of the Berlin wall, most of the left-wing parties in Latin America were easily co-opted to neoliberal ideas. Meanwhile, the guerrilla movements, with the notable exception of the FARC and the ELN in Colombia, seemed to have run into a dead end.
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/South_America/Pushing_For_Coup.html
