Wed 7 Dec, 2011 06:27 am
In his article on the Sokal hoax, Paul Boghossian states (http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/philo/faculty/boghossian/papers/bog_tls.html) :
‘….[in describing] the game of baseball as we have it…`strike' and `ball' are socially constructed concepts…. However, once these concepts have been defined -- once the strike zone has been specified -- there are then perfectly objective facts about what counts as a strike and what counts as a ball.
Similarly, our choice of one conceptual scheme rather than another, for the purposes of doing science, probably reflects various contingent facts about our capacities and limitations, so that a thinker with different capacities and limitations, a Martian for example, might find it natural to employ a different scheme. This does nothing to show that our conceptual scheme is incapable of expressing objective truths. Realism is not committed to there being only one vocabulary in which objective truths might be expressed; all it's committed to is the weaker claim that, once a vocabulary is specified, it will then be an objective matter whether or not assertions couched in that vocabulary are true or false.’
Is this what Kant means when he says that the objects of our perceptions and thoughts can be 'empirically real' even though they are 'transcendentally ideal'?