More than 150,000 people rallied on 12 August at the parliament in Tbilisi to express support for President Mikhail Saakashvili. The gathering was addressed by Saakashvili and presidents of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
[..] Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus said an international force would be the only way to stop violence and ensure Georgia's territorial integrity.
"Let the world finally wake up and take the action and provide the real security for the region," Adamkus said. [..]
Estonian President Toomas Ilves, who spoke at the news conference with Saakashvili, said Russia's actions threatened the independence of former Soviet nations.
"This is the first time that we've actually seen an invasion, a unilateral invasion of a country," Ilves said. "I think we have to think about this long and hard and deeply in the EU [and] in NATO." [..]
We have just (5 minutes ago) heard that the Upper Kodor Valley has been liberated
First time since when?
Chechnya?
You have been knocking the US with some justification but the EU should be involved also.
dlowan wrote:First time since when?
Chechnya?
Chechnya was never a sovereign nation, and its independence wasn't recognized by any state. Georgia is an internationally recognized independent country, and has been for 17 years, so there's a substantive difference there. (Not to rationalise the carnage in Chechnya!)
The last time a country was invaded by a neighbouring country in Europe was ... 1968, Czechoslovakia? Well, more recently, but more complicatedly, there was Yugoslavia in 1991.. Slovenia declared independence, and within days rump-Yugoslavia moved in the army (but gave up after a few days). I guess that at that time Slovenia's independence wouldnt have been recognized by anyone yet, though, so it was more sort of midway between break-away province and independent nation. I suppose that's what Ilves is referring to -- that this is the first time since the end of the Cold War that there was a unilateral invasion of an established independent country. Then again, the Serbs might point out that it all depends on how you define "unilateral", what with the NATO bombings of Belgrade in 2000 in mind..
rabel22 wrote:You have been knocking the US with some justification but the EU should be involved also.
Yes of course.
old europe wrote:I also think that it's important for the West not to take sides - and by that I mean Saakashvili's or, alternatively, Medvedev's/Putin's side - in this conflict. At least not based on the propaganda spread by both sides.
Aren't you afraid that, in terms of the position of the West in this, you end up with Bosnia mk II?
There too, it was easy to find plenty of wrongdoing, outright war crimes too, on all sides, and a lot of observers used that as a reason to not get involved at all, and "leave them at it", so to say. The results of this passivity were devastating, as we now know.
Isn't it the job of the US President, the EU Commission, to cut through the very real complexities and ambiguities to still recognise what the greater danger or the greater crime is? In short, is it really fair to equate the violence with which Georgia tried to repossess South-Ossetia with the Russian army invading Georgia, an independent country? I mean, even aside from the spectre of precedent regarding resurgent Russia's eyes on its near abroad, which should be a real concern to Europe?
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
With the dispute between Georgia and Russia in a new, dangerously confrontational phase, the risk of war in the South Caucasus is growing. Concerned by NATO's plans for further extension to former Soviet republics and Kosovo's unilateral but Western-orchestrated independence, Russia has stepped up manipulation of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts. Georgia remains determined to restore its territorial integrity, and hawks in Tbilisi are seriously considering a military option. Both sides need to recognise the risks in current policies, cool their rhetoric and cease military preparations. Russia should cease undermining its peacekeeper and mediator roles and be open to a change of negotiating formats. Georgia should adopt a new approach to the Abkhaz, encouraging their links to the outside world to lessen dependence on Russia and emphasising incremental confidence building to establish the mutual trust needed for successful negotiations. The U.S. and European Union (EU) should be firm and united in cautioning both Moscow and Tbilisi against military adventures.
Moscow deployed additional troops and military hardware, allegedly in furtherance of its peacekeeping mandate, to Georgia's breakaway territory of Abkhazia in April 2008, thus continuing a pattern of escalating tensions. This includes former President Vladimir Putin's announcement that Russia would formalise ties with Abkhazia and statements by Kremlin officials that Moscow was prepared to use military force to protect its citizens in Abkhazia and South Ossetia if hostilities resumed. How close to that kind of conflict the region may be is suggested by a series of incidents in which unmanned Georgian aircraft have been shot down over Abkhazia, at least once by a Russian jet.
Tbilisi has responded with a diplomatic offensive, enlisting high-level Western political support, while repeating that it wants to resolve the frozen conflicts peacefully. It shares blame for the escalation, however. It has quietly been making military preparations, particularly in western Georgia and Upper Kodori. A number of powerful advisers and structures around President Mikheil Saakashvili appear increasingly convinced a military operation in Abkhazia is feasible and necessary. The option they seem to favour would aim at regaining control of the southern part of the territory so as to establish at least a temporary partition. The Georgians have been warned by their Western partners against attempting a military solution. But there are strong feelings in Tbilisi that something must be done to change a status quo in which Russia challenges the country's sovereignty with virtual impunity. The risk of miscalculation by either side leading to unintended fighting is also serious.
The Abkhaz themselves fear that they will be the biggest losers in the Moscow-Tbilisi dispute. Russia has been their sole support as they have sought to break away from Georgian rule, but there is little likelihood Moscow would ever formally recognise their independence. Instead, the Abkhaz find themselves being used for purposes having little to do with their own cause and in danger of being absorbed as a small minority into the giant Russian Federation. That realisation is sinking in and could provide the basis for new, more promising Tbilisi-Sukhumi talks.
The Georgian government says it wants to move in that direction, but there has been too little realism and too many mixed messages in its language to date. President Saakashvili offered a new peace plan for Abkhazia in March, with extensive autonomy, a jointly controlled economic zone and gradual merger of law enforcement and customs agencies. If this initiative is not to be stillborn, however, the Georgians will need to take steps to persuade the Abkhaz that it is not meant primarily to satisfy Western partners, and they are serious about restarting a meaningful negotiating process. This requires an immediate end to bellicose rhetoric, postponement of efforts to settle the ultimate status question and a newly consistent focus on confidence building. While Georgia's desire to change the negotiations format, currently mediated by Russia, is understandable, it should not make this a precondition for resuming talks.
The West must meanwhile use all its influence to press for peaceful resolution of the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Russian conflicts alike. Persuading Russia to withdraw any troops and equipment from Abkhazia which do not fit with its peacekeeping mandate from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) would improve the environment for diplomatic progress. The 5-6 June visit of foreign policy chief Javier Solana to Tbilisi and Sukhumi is an opportunity for the EU to show unity and resolve, as well as listen to the sides' grievances. The U.S. and EU should also be unequivocal about the negative impact that a conflict in Abkhazia would have on the 2014 Sochi Olympics. At the same time, they should show they are aware of Russia's legitimate interests in the Caucasus and concerns for the stability of its own southern regions, and should unmistakably communicate to Georgia that any rash moves would have negative consequences for its NATO ambitions as well as foreign investment.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Georgian, Abkhaz and Russian Sides:
1. Refrain from hostile actions and confrontational rhetoric, while respecting the 1994 Moscow Agreement and relevant UN Security Council Resolutions and CIS decisions regulating the ceasefire regime, separation of forces and deployment of peacekeeping troops in Abkhazia.
2.. Resume negotiations, focusing on confidence building first rather than status issues, and agree on changes to the negotiations format that emphasise direct Georgian-Abkhaz dialogue and give the EU a role on a par with Russia and the UN.
To the Georgian Side:
3. Halt any preparations for a military operation as well as belligerent rhetoric (including false press reports), and be transparent with regard to military and internal affairs ministry budgets and acquisitions.
4. Show respect for the Abkhaz self-determination aspirations and security fears, including by issuing a statement regretting past injustices.
5. Pursue and consistently implement without status preconditions measures designed to build confidence over time, such as a free trade zone along both sides of the ceasefire line and steps to allow the Abkhaz to develop ties beyond Russia, including the removal of sanctions and reopening of airport, railroad and seaport links.
6. Keep the Upper Kodori Gorge free of military presence and activity, provide full information on the security presence there and refrain from overflights of Abkhazia, including by unmanned aircraft.
7. Commit formally and without preconditions to non-resumption of hostilities.
To the Georgian and Abkhaz Sides:
8. Sukhumi [this is the capital and seat of the "Government of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia"] should carry out more measures to support sustainable returns, and both sides should cease harassment of Gali [this is a town in the UN security zone in Abkhazia] returnees and agree on a returns verification exercise for the Gali district by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).
To the Russian Side:
9. Refrain from all actions that undermine Georgia's sovereignty and Russia's role as an impartial mediator and peacekeeper, including unilateral upgrading of ties with de facto authorities in Abkhazia.
10. Withdraw troops and equipment introduced into Abkhazia on 29 April and 31 May 2008 and ensure that the number, equipment and activities of CIS peacekeepers deployed there is consistent with relevant CIS rules.
To NATO:
11. Make more effective use of the NATO-Russia Council, especially as a forum to discuss NATO enlargement to Georgia and Ukraine, including Russian concerns.
To the EU, U.S. and Wider International Community:
12. Call on all sides to refrain from hostilities and return to negotiations, while emphasising the negative consequences if conflict erupts, including for Georgia's integration into Euro-Atlantic structures and for Russia's plans to host successful Winter Olympics in 2014.
13. The EU should promptly implement European Commission confidence-building measures, including speeding up the opening of EU information centres in the conflict regions.
See, I'd like to see the EU Presidency or the EU Commission act, at least in the red hot phase of this kind of conflict, as a policeman. Stopping the violence. Putting a foot down.
Cutting through complexities and concluding what the greater danger or the greater crime is - that's acting as a judge. Maybe necessary at one point (it's what we have the ICC or the ICJ for), but in the chaotic frenzy of an armed conflict, when you don't even have reliable information about the situation on the ground? I don't know.
old europe wrote:See, I'd like to see the EU Presidency or the EU Commission act, at least in the red hot phase of this kind of conflict, as a policeman. Stopping the violence. Putting a foot down.
Cutting through complexities and concluding what the greater danger or the greater crime is - that's acting as a judge. Maybe necessary at one point (it's what we have the ICC or the ICJ for), but in the chaotic frenzy of an armed conflict, when you don't even have reliable information about the situation on the ground? I don't know.
But a judge can only act afterwards. Find someone guilty once the crime has been completed. The ICC is useless in identifying, right now, which lines should be drawn, and can't help us identify the hierarchy of dangers unfolding before us. When the violence is going on, whether it's in Bosnia or Kosovo or Georgia, it's up to the European Commission, the US, EU government leaders to make such a judgement call.
I mean, in Bosnia they hesitated for two years, wrestling with the concept of identifying a main agressor and victim amidst violence perpetrated by all sides. And by the time it came to its senses, Srebrenica and the Sarajevo siege were history. Maybe I'm going too much on trauma, it's possible. But that makes me uneasy about talk of how we should not take sides now and how things are too ambiguous to take a stand.
Mind you, I guess we're not all that far apart, considering you also say that what we failed to do with Bosnia was "drawing a line in the sand." What we differ in, I think, is whether drawing this line involves assigning a kind of hierarchy of dangers or transgressions. I dont care about blame per se, but I think it's important for the EC or US to recognize, well, let's put it in ordinary words - "OK, whoa - what party A did was stupid and wrong, but what party B is doing now is completely off the track, and setting a dangerous precedent at that. This is where we can't just stay neutral."
I know you're not arguing for passivity either... But playing policemen in the sense I hear you saying - moving in, like a stern mother kind of?, and saying "look here kids, I dont care who's more to blame, save it for the judge, you all just stop right now" - well, first off we dont have that kind of leverage. So you have to consider what you do have to work with. All you can do is send a message, so should that message be "ok all you guys - quit it", or "ok wait - if Russia is going to invade a sovereign country, our ally, then we will stand by it, regardless of what else happened"?
My argument is that if you're dealing with a substantively more existential threat from one side, the policeman role can work completely counterproductive. That's what we did in Bosnia for two years, basically concluding that well, all of them are to blame to some extent, so let's just take a neutral position and try our best to stop the shooting and push on negotiations. In the meantime, thanks to our impartial arms embargo the Bosniaks were hardly able to defend themselves, and our policeman's role turned into a caricature when we declared "safe havens" which we then surrendered overnight.
Russia invaded an independent country. That's your line in the sand right there, IMO. Saakashvili provoked it, but it's still a line that the EU should draw and stand by.
My apologies if you already said this...but what do you think the EU should do? What would the line in the sand look like?
I don't see any real move to limit it happening, as there have been few moves to limit the US or any other major power
But a judge can only act afterwards. Find someone guilty once the crime has been completed. The ICC is useless in identifying, right now, which lines should be drawn, and can't help us identify the hierarchy of dangers unfolding before us. When the violence is going on, whether it's in Bosnia or Kosovo or Georgia, it's up to the European Commission, the US, EU government leaders to make such a judgement call.
I mean, in Bosnia they hesitated for two years, wrestling with the concept of identifying a main agressor and victim amidst violence perpetrated by all sides. And by the time it came to its senses, Srebrenica and the Sarajevo siege were history. Maybe I'm going too much on trauma, it's possible. But that makes me uneasy about talk of how we should not take sides now and how things are too ambiguous to take a stand.
Mind you, I guess we're not all that far apart, considering you also say that what we failed to do with Bosnia was "drawing a line in the sand." What we differ in, I think, is whether drawing this line involves assigning a kind of hierarchy of dangers or transgressions. I dont care about blame per se, but I think it's important for the EC or US to recognize, well, let's put it in ordinary words - "OK, whoa - what party A did was stupid and wrong, but what party B is doing now is completely off the track, and setting a dangerous precedent at that. This is where we can't just stay neutral."
I know you're not arguing for passivity either... But playing policemen in the sense I hear you saying - moving in, like a stern mother kind of?, and saying "look here kids, I dont care who's more to blame, save it for the judge, you all just stop right now" - well, first off we dont have that kind of leverage. So you have to consider what you do have to work with. All you can do is send a message, so should that message be "ok all you guys - quit it", or "ok wait - if Russia is going to invade a sovereign country, our ally, then we will stand by it, regardless of what else happened"?
My argument is that if you're dealing with a substantively more existential threat from one side, the policeman role can work completely counterproductive. That's what we did in Bosnia for two years, basically concluding that well, all of them are to blame to some extent, so let's just take a neutral position and try our best to stop the shooting and push on negotiations.
In the meantime, thanks to our impartial arms embargo the Bosniaks were hardly able to defend themselves, and our policeman's role turned into a caricature when we declared "safe havens" which we then surrendered overnight.
Russia invaded an independent country. That's your line in the sand right there, IMO. Saakashvili provoked it, but it's still a line that the EU should draw and stand by.
Russia must stand down
By Joseph Biden
August 12 2008
[..] By acting disproportionately with a full scale attack on Georgia and seeking the ouster of Georgia's democratically elected President Mikheil Saakashvili, Moscow is jeopardising its standing in Europe and the broader international community - and risking very real practical and political consequences. [..]
For years, Russian leaders have had a constant refrain with their American counterparts. Russia, we were told, wanted two things: international respect and to be treated as an equal by the United States. However, its leaders have evidenced few qualms about denying such treatment to nearby countries. The world has watched with concern as Russia has unleashed punitive economic and political measures against Estonia, Moldova, Ukraine, the Czech Republic, and Georgia when those countries' actions deviated from the Kremlin's wishes. Indeed, the single greatest obstacle to Russia's full acceptance into the international system has been the Kremlin's pattern of aggressive actions toward its neighbours.
Many international leaders have spoken out against these moves, but their concerns have been tempered by hope that Russia would eventually realise its extraordinary potential on the global stage. [..] have shared this ambition and in the past two months I sponsored two legislative measures intended to nudge Russia toward a closer, more constructive relationship with the United States, including action to allow for increased collaboration with Russia on nuclear energy production. Russia has also lobbied to repeal an old trade provision - the Jackson-Vanik Amendment - which currently blocks the country's integration into the World Trade Organisation. The fighting in Georgia has erased the possibility of advancing those and other legislative efforts to promote US-Russian partnership in the current Congress. It may derail them permanently if Russia does not reverse course. [..]
Russia may face other costly consequences for the violence. Vladimir Putin's plans to make Moscow an international financial centre may evaporate as the prospect of sanctions on the country rears its head. Western financial institutions, which have done little to expose evidence of official Russian corruption, may start pursuing the issue much more publicly.
Georgia has made remarkable political and economic progress since the country's transition to democracy. The fighting will inevitably slow that progress, and exact a heavy toll in lives and treasure. But, however severe the damage, Georgia will rebuild - and the United States and Europe must help. The stakes in this conflict are as high as the peaks of the Caucasus.
The only hope for preventing this crisis from becoming a calamity for Russia's relationship with the west is for Moscow to immediately ceasefire, pull back its forces and agree to negotiations brokered by the international community - all steps that the Georgian government has agreed to. If the fighting continues, this moment could emerge as a turning point in the west's relationship with Moscow, and deny Russia the international standing it seeks. That is not the future the United States or Europe want - but it is the future Russia may get if it does not stand down and live up to its responsibilities as a force for progress.
No doubt. I think this could go either way for Saakashvili. It could very well mean that NATO will now go ahead with Georgian membership faster than originally intended.
However, NATO membership comes with some responsibility. Saakashvili must have known that there was no way that Russia would just stand by and allow an attack on South Ossetia - not to mention an attack on Russian troops. He started a quite possibly unnecessary military conflict, drawing the West right into a confrontation with Russia.
why should we do those things? Defending Georgia is not a priority of our nation
