IN THE FREEMARKET WHY DID THE GOVERNMENT GIVE 12 TRILLION OF OUR MONEY TO FAILED BANKERS AGAINST OUR

Vice President Joseph Biden, who devoted much of his time last year to helping to oversee the $787 billion stimulus program that Obama signed into law last February.

For heaven's sake - don't you know to right-click on a graph to find its source?! This is the last time I'm teaching elementary web surfing to you:

I was of the understanding that these banks had to repay monies given by your government.

The White House estimates that TARP losses will amount to $117-billion dollars. The fees would raise about $90-billion over 10 years. The fees could be extended if all losses are not covered...The auto companies that received bailouts would not be subject to the fees, nor would Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.

....Could you kindly highlight the calculation in the story you linked to?...

PGDN

If harmony on a bail-out fund is elusive, ministers have found something on which they can all agree: the dastardly role played in Greece’s recent troubles by “speculators”. They are accused of buying credit-default swaps (CDSs), a form of insurance against default, in order to drive up Greece’s borrowing costs and then to profit from the ensuing panic. France and Germany have echoed calls for a ban on the so-called “naked” trading of sovereign CDSs, where investors do not hold the bonds they have bought insurance on, and asked the European Commission to look into the matter. The possibility that gyrations in Greek bond yields could be explained by uncertainty about its public finances is, oddly, ignored.

The rating-agency issue is more grounded in reality. From next year bonds will again only be eligible as collateral at the European Central Bank if they are rated A- or above by at least one of the three big rating firms. If Greece loses its remaining A rating from Moody’s, its bonds will be less prized by banks, raising its borrowing costs. But as Mr Weber says, the ECB could choose to lend against lower-rated bonds on more punitive terms. This at least is a real problem with a sensible solution.

But Repo 105 took advantage of an accounting rule called SFAS 140, which enabled Lehman to reclassify such borrowing as a sale. Lehman would give collateral to its counterparty and receive cash in return. Because the deal was being recorded as a sale, the collateral disappeared from Lehman’s balance-sheet and the bank used the cash it generated to pay down debt. To outsiders, it looked as though Lehman had reduced its leverage. In fact, the obligation to buy back the collateral remained. Once the quarter-end had come and gone, Lehman borrowed money to repay the cash and buy back the collateral, and its leverage spiked back up again.

parados wrote:

....Could you kindly highlight the calculation in the story you linked to?...

Sorry - anyone incapable of figuring out the meaning of

Quote:

PGDN

on his keyboard is beyond help by any human agency.