41 Censored Military History

2000-0101, UCMJ, Recruiting Company Commander Pleads Guilty of Stealing Identities.
A Recruiting Co Commander charged $48,000 (78,369-2022) on credit cards he received by stealing the IDs of people interested in joining the Army. CPT Michael F. Kimble, Sr., 35, ran 4 recruiting stations in Virginia.
His scheme unraveled when a potential recruit made a police report, the CPT had opened a credit account in his name with USAA. There were dozens of cards issued to Kimble using male, female, Army, recruits, and potential recruits Social Security Numbers.
2026-0612, UCMJ, Female Army Recruiter Steals Identities.
A New Jersey Army recruiter admitted to stealing the identities of seven potential recruits in a scheme to fraudulently take out hundreds of thousands of dollars in loans.
SFC Jane Crosby, 35, pleaded guilty to bank fraud and aggravated identity theft in federal court, after using the victims’ personal information to apply for $266,000 in loans and credit card accounts and to withdraw money and deposit fraudulent checks.

2000-0111, Poor Leadership in Army Aviation.
LTG Johnny Riggs states, "Aviation, branch is in a crisis that threatens its future,” he calls for a major review of Avn role in future wars. "If we continue on the same course that we're on right now, I'm very concerned whether or not we'll be able to fulfill the strategic & tactical missions in the next war.” He made the statement @ the Avn Conf. held in Falls Church, VA. In order to correct the systemic problems in Army Avn he recommends:
Improve individual & unit training.
Train Ldrs. to anticipate combat.
Modernize the fleet & maintain what we have better.
Completely overhaul flight school.
The concerns were brought to the front after a disastrous deployment to Albania for operation Task Force Hawk. The Apache proved less than capable during the operation. During the deployment, the Acft took an excessive amount of time to deploy during which two Acft crashed. The Pentagon, on advice of ACOS GEN Dennis Reimer did not allow Apaches into combat out of fear the Acft would be shot down. Riggs recommends the year 2000 equivalent of the GEN Hamilton Howze panel with no constraints on what it could recommend. "We have to think outside the box,” Riggs stated. Avn Branch Commander MG Tony Jones disagreed, "we know where we are & where we have to go & we know our capability.” Authors note: The Apache performed horribly in 2003 during the initial invasion of Iraq, the Army had 3-years from this conference to make changes but did nothing.
Author’s Note: Aviation NCOs are the worst in the Army because the best & brightest all go to Flight School & become warrant officers. Then there are civilian helicopter mechanics who work alongside Army Soldiers, the civilian mechanics coax the best Army Aviation mechanics to leave the army & work for them. One last drain is the 160th SOAR; the best helicopter mechanics left over try out for the 160th. That leaves the leftovers as Aviation NCO leaders.
Infantry has the same problem. Good infantrymen go to jump school & become paratroopers. Better NCOs go to Ranger School. The best & brightest Infantry NCOs go Special Forces. Now there are Infantry Special Forces warrant officers. This leaves a non Abn/Ranger/SF/WO with the same type of defective NCO leaders as Aviation.
The best branch in the Army is Armor. Armor Officers & NCOs are considered the most professional. There are no Warrant Officers or females in the Armor Corps. I recommend all young Soldiers enlist for the Armor Branch.
The USMC does not have any Abn/Ranger/SF Marines. This blends the best NCOs in all units.
The Navy is considered the most professional officers in the Military.
2000-0331, Aviators Get No Respect
Army Avn is in crises exacerbated by the lack of respect from Combat arms officers according to a panel of retired senior generals. It is up to the Aviators to fix the problem & make efforts to cooperate with their brothers in arms. The remarks were made @ the AAAA annual convention @ Ft Worth, TX. In response to an Army survey, combat arms officers had the following comments & terms associated with Army Aviation, Irrelevant, tactically nonconversant, technical, Cavaliers, disappointment, prima donnas, overpaid, taxi drivers, Indian but not warrior, one respondent said "dedicated & competent.” Asked if helicopters were worth the cost, 90 percent said no.
According to GEN William Richardson, former Commander of TRADOC, "There is a bias against Aviation, the Army has not accepted Avn as a maneuver arm, there has never been a gut feeling that Avn could be a decisive factor in destroying ground forces big or small.” GEN Crosbie Saint agreed saying, "often Avn trains apart from Armor & Infantry, they want to be the Army Air Corps, they have not proven their capability.” Authors note: It did not help Aviation’s reputation when in 2003 the officers of 4/3 ACR were given relaxed grooming standards on haircuts & mustaches by the Squadron Commander. The Armor officers looked @ the handle bar mustaches & mullet haircuts with distain & disbelief.
Note, Armor, Infantry & Field Artillery commanders spend most of their time on leadership & training for combat. Aviation, commanders spend most of their time on UCMJ.
Reason? Aviation has a high percentage of female Soldiers.
Author’s Note: The reason Aviation Commissioned Officers are looked down upon is their poor relationship with Aviation Warrant Officers. Before Avn was a branch, we got a mix of officers detailed to Avn & the WOs were the subject matter experts (SME). Now the Officers feel they are the smartest people in the room & often do not listen to Avn Warrant Officers. This causes conflict when the WOs have the power to flunk just about any Aviation officer on his proficiency check flights. A secret organization called the Warrant Officer Liberation Front (WOLF) was started to combat the Avn officer’s arrogance. Aviation was a better run organization when it fell under the Transportation Corps. In Army Aviation, the only cool people are the Warrant Officers.
2000-0404, Army Aviation, a New Plan
MG Tony Jones announces his new plan called "Objective Force 2010,” the Avn modernization plan. He makes assumptions based on funding stability that has not been the norm in the past. The 68-page document left many question unanswered. "Aviation, force needs drastic work, 45 percent of Army Acft cannot perform its wartime mission & would be @ high risk if called to do so.
Aviator proficiency & experience have taken a dramatic decline over the past 10-years," according to the plan. The Army must reorganize its battalions with a mix of helicopters in each Bn. Avn must rely on the new RAH-66 that will be available to units in 2006. Authors note: Avn branch looked @ this as a helicopter distribution problem & did most of its planning on how to allocate the new Comanche helicopter. The problem is with leadership & tactics.
Army Aviation was much more professional & safe when it came under the transportation corps. Aviators were from all branches of the service & brought with them the leadership styles of Armor, Art & Infantry. When Avn became a branch it lost its soul & tried to become the new Army Air Corps, long hair & all.

2000-0209, Accident, SGT Killed at Training Range
SGT Richard M Robak Jr., 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Div shot and killed during a night blank-ammunition training range. An unnamed PFC accidentally loaded a 30-round magazine with live rounds in his M16.
The first round blew the blank adapter off. The second round penetrated the SGTs flak jacket and killed him instantly.

2000-0215, Leadership, Study Blasts Army Officer Culture.
An Army study by the Leader Development Panel, established by ACOS GEN Eric Shinseki into officer leadership development indicates officers are "out of balance with Army beliefs" and beset by micromanagement. Officers are leaving the Army due to overwork and micromanagement by leaders especially at the Bn Commander level. Micromanagement has become the norm. Officers are not adequately prepared for leadership positions. The new OER is a source of mistrust and anxiety, the report found. The report also showed trust between officers and Soldiers has disappeared. "Our officer corps is the most untrained, micromanaged and downright terrible that I have ever seen.
The only thing junior officers are taught is how to keep their OER raters off their backs," said 17-year veteran SSG Steven Ford. Most officers would not release their names for this interview. A senior LTC Bn Commander said the report was dead on correct. A CPT at Ft Hood said, "Jr officers are not allowed to learn, and that Jr leader’s mistakes reflect on senior leaders OERs. No LTC can say 'well, we tried, but we had a 1LT drop the ball. It has become a zero-defect Army'"
It only takes one bad boss or bad OER to end your career, the Army has lost many good officers due to this system, nobody wants to live under that pressure. MAJ Keith Hawk from the 18th Airborne Corps said, "senior officers have substituted micromanagement for leadership.” One senior CPT wrote, "Officers routinely spend 12-hours a day at work.” One COL said, “The widespread perception is that the Army's GENs are out of touch with the real Army, they have traded everything for their star, and they will do anything for the next star."

2000-0220, Military, 3,000 6th Cavalry Regimental Coins Misspelled.
United is spelled “Untied.” 3,000 6th Cavalry coins were misspelled. The Regimental Commanders driver was hung over from letting these Korean guys buy him drinks all night and he misspelled united. He ordered 3,000 coins at $6 (10-2022) each. As soon as I heard about the scandal, I grabbed a handful from under the Regimental Commander’s desk.
SGT X came running into my office, “SGM I need that coin back I gave you.” I looked at him funny. What coin? He became flustered I had that coin in my desk. I handed it to him, and he ran out of my office. He never found out about the pocket full I stole. I felt like a pirate stealing loot from the captain’s silver chest under his desk. I still have four of the rarest of 6th Cavalry, Regimental Coins

2000-0227, UCMJ, Rocks Thrown, Germans Killed in Darmstadt.
Three boys, Jesse McGriff 14, Deo Bissessar 17, and James Wise 18, confessed to throwing rocks at vehicles moving along the B3 motorway, saying that they had been "meeting regularly" for the past four to six weeks to throw rocks at cars. A fourth teenager (age 15) was questioned and released.
The teenagers left a bowling alley near their homes in a base housing complex called Lincoln Village at about 9 p.m. They carried a snow shovel and some rocks to a pedestrian bridge over the B3 motorway, where they climbed a 6' wall and began throwing rocks at passing cars. Finding that the rocks were not heavy enough to cause the cars to crash, they returned to an area near their school, where they found larger rocks, up to 18 lbs. in weight, and carried them back to the highway where two of the boys handed the rocks to the third, who had climbed onto the wall.
They threw a 10-pound rock at a Mercedes-Benz driven by Karin Rothermel, 41. It hit her in the chest, killing her instantly. Rothermel's 75-year-old grandmother was critically injured.
At this point they moved to the other side of the bridge and began hurling rocks at cars moving in the opposite direction, causing one car to crash as it swerved to avoid the rocks. The three then dropped an 18-pound stone onto a BMW driven by Sandra Ottmann, 20, who was driving her grandparents’ home from a meal celebrating her grandfather's birthday. The rock hit Ottman in the head, killing her.
The 17- and 18-year-old rock-throwers were convicted of murder and given terms of 8-and-a-half years each in juvenile facilities; the 14-year-old was given seven years.
The three men were released early for good behavior and returned to the US after serving half of their sentences.

2000-0414, SF, 18-hour, No-Notice Alert:
In 18-Hours, the 82D Airborne can wheels up on their way to combat with:
One Division Command Post, 150-paratroopers.
One Brigade Command Post, 100-paratroopers.
Three Battalions of Infantry, 1,908-paratroopers.
One Battalion of Artillery, with 440-paratroopers.
One Air Defense Artillery Battery, with 136-paratroopers.
One Air Cavalry Troop, 26-paratroopers.
One Engineer Company, 94-paratroopers.
One Ranger Battalion from the 75th Ranger Regiment, 600-Rangers.
In 96-Hours, the US Army can have the following units on their way to the fight:
Three Infantry Brigades from the 82D.
101st Airborne Division.
10th Mountain Division.
3d Mechanized Infantry Division.
3d Armored Cavalry Regiment.