Is containment of Iraq a viable option?

Having presided over the dismantling of the greatest economic boom in history...

Scenarios are interesting and can be somewhat useful to decision makers. The downside is that too often they are based more upon wishful thinking, either optimism or pessimism, than upon careful analysis. Scenarios projecting events with a narrow focus and small numbers of variables over very short time spans can be extremely accurate Scenarios involving human organizations tend to be much less accurate, especially when forecasting complex events arising from sets having many variables far into the future. Scenarios, such as the outcomes of a military operation in Southwest Asia, are even more difficult to get right. Not all data necessary to good analysis is available, even to insiders. The number of decision-points is overwhelming and they grow at a geometric rate as the time-line increases. The bottom-line is that all outcome scenarios presented for this set are flawed, and probability for accuracy is low. Normally, I like a confidence level of 90% before heartily endorsing a forecast. Here that level of confidence is not possible.

There have been several scenarios already presented here. One forecast is that WWIII seems to suggest mega-deaths and virtual victory for radical Islamic fundamentalism. Edgar's scenario is, I think, more probable. So here is an alternate, rosier scenario.

1. Evidence damning Saddam as a threat to world peace will be presented to the United Nations, and made public during the week of 05FEB. <Many were disappointed that Colin Powell's evidence was not more dramatic, and damning> The evidence will come from signals intercepts, surveillance photos, and from high-level Iraqi defectors. Some of the evidence presented will reveal materials (sources and means) that will compromise future intelligence gathering. <I don't think any sources and means were revealed> Another UN Resolution explicitly authorizing military action will be introduced, but may be vetoed <We're still waiting on that one>. The number of defectors will increase after 05FEB, though not all will be revealed to the public. The number of governments supporting military force will increase, though some will remain reluctant allies - especially in public. Saddam will deny everything, and there will be a number of executions of defector's families. Some agents for Allied forces will be discovered and executed. I expect some executions have already occurred, and the rate will increase right up to the fall of Saddam. <Nothing of the sort has been reported in non-classified sources>

2. Military operations will commence, probably before 09MAR. <Some believe that operations may now be delayed until closer to Mid-March. Maybe, but I still think early March is more likely.> The probable outcome of that has already been discussed in detail here. Items 1 and 2, I think are reasonably high probable outcomes, from here on the probabilities drop considerably because the number of decision-points and uncontrolled, even unknown, variables go way out there. The following are my best guesses, but they are strongly colored by my own biases and expectations. <The following projections are still below the horizon>

3. Many, perhaps most, Iraqi's will greet the United States as liberators, but some die-hard elements of the Ba'ath party will remain dangerous. There will be several efforts to divide Iraq so as to create an independent Kurdistan, and a Shia Kingdom in the south. The Kurds have a better chance of success, but I think their efforts for independence will fail again. The Kurdish independence movement may become more unified, and outbreaks of violence and Kurdish terrorism inside Iraq, Turkey and Syria might increase. I think that if the Kurds go that route they will be making a mistake. The world may well sympathize with the Kurds, especially if local political conditions deny them independence. To utilize terror tactics would cost the Kurds world sympathy and hurt their cause.

4. I expect that an American Military Governor will be appointed, and that Allied forces will deter any efforts by Syria or Iran to encroach upon Iraqi borders. The UN will be invited to participate in the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq into a more pluralistic State. Contingents from UN nations will supplement US occupation forces, hopefully sizable numbers of those forces will come from Iraq's neighbors having large Islamic populations. A new Iraqi Constitution will be drafted separating Church and State, and ratified by a plebiscite monitored by the UN. Oil revenues will be held in trust for Iraqi People and the rebuilding Iraq.

5. North Korea will continue to bluster, and demand direct talks with the United States. The North Korean nuclear arsenal will double according to Intelligence estimates. South Korean public opinion will become more pro-American as DPRK rhetoric and nuclear capabilities grow. American strength in theater will increase, and the American diplomatic position more deeply entrenched. The DPRK will back-down and publicly dismantle its nuclear program, while continuing its efforts in secret. The Korean stalemate will be allowed to continue. Kim will die, and his designated successor, his son will come to power. There will be a quiet period as the new Kim consolidates his power, and then he will begin talking peace and reunification. Some will believe him, but he will actually continue his father and grandfather's basic policies.

6. China will increase its efforts to exercise regional power. Chinese military forces will remain large, but there will be increased efforts to modernize. The Chinese nuclear arsenal will increase in size and capability. Chinese intelligence efforts will increase, especially targeting US military technology.

7. The ISI will lead a popular coupe in Pakistan. Incidents along the Pakistani/Indian lines will increase in frequency and seriousness. Open hostilities will breakout, and Indian forces will drive deep into Pakistan. A Pakistani commander will launch a tactical nuclear missile and India will respond immediately with a nuclear strike on the Pakistani capitol. The UN will finally awaken, and demand a cease-fire. Pakistan will immediately stand down, though India will be more resistant to "outside interference". The world will be horrified, and shocked. The international Peace Movement will be strengthened, and there will be a demand that all nuclear weapons be outlawed and destroyed. The Untied States and China will veto a UN resolution outlawing nuclear munitions.

8. Another terrorist attack comparable to 911 will be made on American soil. I expect the attack to be focused on a seaport, and that considerable damage will occur. The casualty count will depend upon the type, location and timing of the attack. Casualties could be very high, perhaps larger than at the Twin Towers. American sentiment for retaliation in kind will be very high, but it will be difficult to find a culprit. Syria, Iran, and other Islamic countries will be highly suspect, but they will deny it and proof of their culpability will be weak. Anti-Muslim sentiment will harden within the United States, and the Bush administration will be hard pressed between trying to protect our Muslim citizens and the demands that they be expelled from the country. It is possible that Bush will suspend Habeas Corpus, but that is a two edged sword. Internal security will continue and will generally be accepted and approved of by most citizens. The danger to individual liberty from security efforts to protect the nation from terrorist acts will continue to exist, but most people will not object strongly to measures that in the past would have set off a fire-storm of protest.

Items 3 and 8 could be wildly wrong, but I assess the probability three out of the six items will occur substantially as forecast is somewhere around 60:40, perhaps as high as 70:30. These are not hard numbers, only estimates and are arrived at by making best guesses at what I believe will be the most likely decision-points.

9. Bush will not be re-elected. Historically Presidents who come into office under disputed circumstances are unable to be elected to a second term. Cheney will not be on the re-election ticket. Rice will continue as the Shrubs closest intimate, and Rumsfeld will continue as Secretary of Defense. Powell may step down to pursue other interests, and could conceivably challenge Bush for the Presidency. The nation's economy will continue to be problematical. I expect the DOW to continue to swing drastically from a high around 8900 to a low of around 7600. The cost of the Iraqi campaign, its follow-on occupation and reconstruction, and the build-up in East Asia will be staggering. The National Debt will return to unacceptable levels, and the Democrats will focus their efforts on the domestic economy. The left will continue to argue that the Bush administration is/was imperial in nature. I don't think the Democratic candidate has yet emerged. Bush, categorically, will not suspend elections.

10. Bush will appoint at least one more member to the Supreme Court, but the Court will not agree with many of the Shrub's initiatives. The Congress will sink most other Bush plans. I'm rather confident of Items 9 and 10. Perhaps as much as 80:20.

11. Governments that have previously supported terrorists and provided sanctuary, will distance themselves from terrorist organizations. Iran may support Pakistan if a Pakistani/Indian war breaks out. Israel will continue to be a sore point in Middle-eastern affairs, but the number of terrorist attacks on Israel may decrease as material support for Palestinian groups dries up. I don't expect real peace in the region during our lifetime, but the size and seriousness of the conflict might be significantly reduced.

I feel the need to reiterate here that this sort of analysis is very hard to quantify, and must rest far too much on the analysts seat-of-the-pants art.

I see little merit in the French desire to prolong a situation that ultimately will have to be resolved by military force. The comparison between Sadam and Hitler isn't really all that far fetched. Chamberlain and the international pacifist movement of the time were willing to believe the most outrageous lies and promises of Hitler to avoid armed conflict. The reaped the whirlwind. Saddam, another megalomaniac, marched into Kuwait and the world ejected him, but failed to finish the job.

The suggestion that inspectors and an occupying force to insure inspected areas remain sanitary would not work. First, Saddam would never agree to the occupation of Iraq in slow motion. Second, even if he did the cost in resources would probably be greater than war. If the intent is to force Saddam into making the initial attack in a new round of fighting, that surrenders the initiative to him. Maintaining the initiative is an important consideration in conducting military operations.

There appears to be no way around the coming conflict. These are the alternatives as I see them:

1. Saddam disarms in compliance with UN resolutions and his obligations.

2. Saddam departs the scene and a new Iraqi government divests itself of the objectionable arms.

3. The UN can pass another resolution specifically authorizing military force followed by items 1, 2, or commencement of hostilities.

4. The UN can pass a resolution forbidding military force against Saddam's Iraq. This alternative would be the practical result if the UN were to extend inspections into some indefinite future.

5. The UN can stand mute, and let the US led military disarm Saddam.

6. The US can stand-down it's military.

Only alternative 5 has a very high probability of actually happening.
Alternative 3 is second most likely. Alternatives 1 and 6 are equally improbable, except as a product of one of the other alternatives. If the UN chooses alternative 4, Saddam wins -- at least in the short term.

Who will contain Saddam and prevent him from doing all the ill he's shown himself willing to do, if our military forces were withdrawn? Who will pay the cost of containment? If our military forces are needed in East Asia, who will replace them in Southwest Asia? How do you propose to easy the burden on Iraq's neighbors who must host the containment forces? How do you expect to maintain an effective fighting force under "containment" conditions for another twelve years, or more?

The "what if" rational is admittedly based upon probabilities. The level of probability that Saddam would do all the bad things he's capable of if not forcibly disarmed and removed approaches certainty. There isn't a single shred of evidence that Saddam, left to his own devices, will not continue to foment terrorism and seek to dominate Middle Eastern politics by force and threats.

This action is not to save President Bush's face, it is to deny our enemies a victory that would have terrible consequences in the future. We have gotten a bad reputation internationally for not sticking to our guns. We encouraged the Shia and Kurds to overthrow Saddam and then abandoned them to his torture squads. Iraqi military forces were ready to stage a coup against Saddam, but the lack of resolve in Washington led to failure and the murder of more anti-Saddam people. We can not cut and run every time the going promises to get rough. It is that unwillingness to risk casualties, that has continually encouraged our enemies. The Kim Dynasty has survived fifty years on threats.

* Our forces in theater are at near optimal preparedness to engage Iraqi forces, that "cutting edge" can not be maintained indefinitely and will begin to dull quickly. It is important that our forces be at "the top of their game" at the moment hostilities open. That will reduce casualties among our own troops, which is our first responsibility. Sending our troops into battle after their edge is worn away will also increase the likelihood of civilian and fratricidal casualties, as the number of accidents will probably be larger. Overwhelming force, lethality, and speed are essential to bringing the matter to a rapid conclusion. The longer the firing goes on, the greater the casualties and costs all around. Acting soon is our best chance at keeping the costs in lives to the minimum.

* An extended stay will exacerbate relations with host countries. It is neither cheap, nor particularly fun to have an army sitting around waiting to move. Our older British friends might recall the stresses they encountered under far better circumstances back in 1943-44. Kuwait, Oman, and Turkey are already under considerable pressure, and those pressures will only rise as time goes by. Having non-muslim soldiers living for an extended period may well become intolerable. If our forces are "fixed" in place for an extended period, the probabilty of terrorist attacks on them and their host countries would be very much higher.

* A substantial part of our fighting capability should not be tied up in Southwest Asia at a time when North Korea might break out into open hostilities again. Kim Jong-Il is taking advantage of the Iraqi situation to enlarge his nuclear arsenal. Threats from the DPRK have been increasing in number and tone for sometime. The Korean situation is going to have to be faced sooner or later, and Kim's actions may force a military showdown at anytime. The DPRK is without question a danger to world peace, security, and stability. The UN is going to be challenged again, and it could come at any time. Shifting our center of gravity from one theater to another takes time, and of course money.

* The cost in treasure and disruption of national resources in maintaining forces in theater would be ruinous. Logistics for such a large force is not cheap, and as time wears on the costs will rise. The society pay hidden costs by having part-time soldiers deployed for lengthy periods. The uncertainty of the situation is disruptive to the economy and keeps the stock market (an economic indicator) from stabilizing. The cost of fuel from the Gulf isn't going to become any cheaper by waiting. The cost of putting these forces into the field is already very expensive, and it would double the cost to reassemble them seven months from now. These and other costs argue for a swift conclusion.

To remove the troops would entail a similar cost to putting them there in the first place. That amounts to doubling the cost, with no return on the investment. Once the credible threat of military force was removed, Saddam would claim victory and resume the same sort of tactics he used for 12 years.

At the height of UN inspection Saddam continued to produce chemical/biological and nerve agents without detection. During that same period Saddam's efforts to obtain components needed to produce nuclear weapons remained secret. After defectors blew the whistle on Saddam's secret weapons programs, he threw the inspectors our of country. He has had four years to rebuild all that was destroyed, and to refine his means of concealment. Now a small contingent of UN Inspectors are back in country, but Saddam continues to obstruct and conceal his prohibited arsenal. Periodically, usually after being caught in another lie, Saddam grudgingly tosses a few crumbs of hope on the table that things will change. This is only been made possible by the presence of our troops and the threat of imminent hostilities. Once the troops are gone, what will happen?

Saddam will lead the Inspectors a merry chase for perhaps a month, and then they will be kicked out of country again. Saddam will continue to build and stockpile weapons whose sole purpose is the murder of innocent civilians. At least some of those within Iraq who have secretly supported the overthrow of Saddam will be discovered, tortured and murdered. In a year the conditions will be worse than they are now, and the difficulties of reassembling the forces will be greater. It might not be politically possible for Bush to recommit the necessary forces to the area during an election year after failing to follow through now. Without resolving the problems now, the uncertainties would just drag out over a longer period. The dollar costs themselves would almost certainly be greater in a year than they are now. Even if the decision was made to reassemble the military on Iraq's borders, what would prevent a replay of the current situation?

The following effects can be expected, though assessing the probabilities are more difficult. Kuwait will be left defenseless, and open to Iraqi retaliation -- most probably by terrorist acts not easily traced back to Saddam's door. palestinian terrorism will increase in tempo and intensity. Iran will claim that it needs a nuclear weapon to defend itself against Iraq, and will increase its efforts to build it's own bomb. Kim Jong-Il will note that the UN has failed to act against Saddam even though victory was certain, and he will be encouraged to further threaten all-out nuclear war if anyone objects to his greatly enlarging his nuclear arsenal. Countries who rely on the American military to shield them from aggression will have less confidence that they will be protected, and hence will be more easily intimidated by threats.