categories vs. intentions: the difference?

Try this
https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=KLoR4IPhwnoC&pg=PA165&lpg=PA165&dq=heidegger+intentions&source=bl&ots=_ztZevLgjM&sig=2rrq6YtQFQ4_z3yu7zZuuA7gEQQ&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiXrq6UptPJAhVGAxoKHTrBABcQ6AEIKDAB#v=onepage&q=heidegger%20intentions&f=false

Reading through this, I suggest that the difference rests on different views of 'whats going on in the mind'. Kant has a view of 'subjects contemplating objects, whereas for Heidegger this is not the primary mode of 'being'. Thus Kant might have a view of a 'hammer', say as representational of a stylized category of objects called 'hammers', whereas for Heidegger what matters is the action....the intention to hammer. So for H, what K might categororize as 'rock' could fulfil H's intention to hammer, in various contexts. For H 'a rock' can be 'a hammer' but not for Kant. This is not to say that H has no concept of stylized objects, but that contemplative mode is secondary to the primary mode of dealing with the world.

I got an error message on Google Books saying I had exceeded my viewing time for the book. Thanks, however, for the explanation.

However...
On re-reading this, I am coming round to your view that there is little to choose between K's 'categories' and H's 'intentions' because the latter seem to reside in the secondary contemplative mode with respect to objects 'present at hand'. The primary (action) mode of using objects 'ready to hand' includes 'rocks' being used as 'hammers' but no cognitive involvement is implied in that mode of 'being'. The differentiation of 'rocks' from 'hammers' can only happen in the secondary contemplative mode....say, if the hammering is interrupted and the agent consciously 'considers' what is being used.