so i turn on the television news ... i open the newspaper ... i visit an on-line news site ... and what catches my eye : how important the upcoming election in afghanistan is for the western powers .
will the outcome of the election - which seems to be pretty well known already - really change much of the afghan situation , will afghans be safer in their own country ? i'm not really so sure ... ...
quite a number of retired commanders of western troops in afghanistan have expressed serious doubts about any real change in the afghan "war" - or whatever we want to call it .
might those former commanders know something we usually don't read in the headlines ?
as the taliban commanders say : "They have the watches, but we have the time,” - and the taliban seem to have plenty of recruits ready to join up .
so what will the endgame be : " a strategic withdrawel " - or what ?
http://www.straight.com/article-247609/gwynne-dyer-afghanistans-august-election-wont-change-anything
Quote:Gwynne Dyer: Afghanistan's August election won't change anything
By Gwynne Dyer
Publish Date: August 13, 2009
“They have the watches, but we have the time,” say the Taliban commanders in Afghanistan, and it’s perfectly true. The election on August 20, 2009 is not going to change that.
The foreign forces"U.S., Canadian, and European"are well-trained, well-equipped troops who can inflict casualties on amateur Taliban fighters at a ratio of 10-to-one or worse. But the Taliban have an endless flow of fresh fighters, and much popular support among the Pashtuns of the south and southeast"not to mention all the time in the world.
The Taliban were and are almost exclusively Pashtuns, so it was really the Pashtuns, 40 percent of the population and traditionally Afghanistan’s dominant ethnic group, who were driven from power by the U.S. invasion in 2001. They are fighting foreign, non-Muslim invaders, and the government the foreigners put in is corrupt, incompetent, and mostly non-Pashtun. Why wouldn’t the Taliban have support among the Pashtuns?
Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai, is a Pashtun, because the United States understood that it needed a Pashtun figurehead. The regime’s most powerful people, however, are non-Pashtun warlords from the various ethnic minorities of the north and centre: Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras.
Now we are asked to believe that an election will restore confidence in the government. It is nonsense: this election has no more relevance than the ones that the United States used to stage in Vietnam. Colonel David Haight, commanding the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the U.S. 10th Mountain Division in Logar and Wardak provinces near Kabul, was helpfully indiscreet about it in a recent interview.
“I think that apathy is going to turn into some anger when the administration doesn’t change, and I don’t think that anybody believes that Karzai is going to lose,” Haight told an embedded reporter from the Guardian. “There is going to be frustration from people who realise there is not going to be a change. The bottom line is they are going to be thinking: 'Four more years of this crap'?”
Unless bribery, blackmail, and threats no longer work in Afghanistan, Karzai is going to win. He isn’t even bothering to run a conventional campaign: he bailed out of a televised debate with the other presidential candidates at the last moment, and leaves it to them to hold election rallies in provincial towns. He has made his deals with the warlords and the traditional ethnic and tribal powerbrokers, and is counting on them to deliver victory.
Karzai and the United States are shackled to the warlords because those were the allies that the U.S. recruited to fight the Taliban on the ground when it invaded Afghanistan in 2001. The Taliban, being exclusively Pashtun, never controlled all of the country; Tajik, Hazara, and Uzbek militias continued to hold out all across the north. So the U.S. made deals with their leaders, showered them with weapons and money, and helped them into power instead.
It made good sense militarily, but it meant that the non-Pashtun warlords would dominate the post-Taliban government. They don’t live in the hills any more, but in the wealthy Kabul neighbourhood of Sherpar. Two of them, Mohammad Qasim Fahim, a key Tajik warlord, and Karim Khalili, a Hazara warlord, are Karzai’s choices as vice-presidents.
The West’s government in Kabul is not going to get any better"and it cannot, given its origins. There will be “four more years of crap,” and by the end of that the American, Canadian, and European voters whose governments sent their troops to Afghanistan will be ready to bring them home. What will happen then?
Nothing particularly dramatic. Afghanistan was invaded in revenge for 9/11, but the U.S. could have been played it differently from the start. Right after 9/11, a thousand-strong shura (congress) of Muslim clerics in Kabul declared its sympathy with the dead Americans and voted to expel Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda from the country.
The Taliban regime had just made a lucrative deal with the United States to eradicate poppy growing in the country, and most younger Taliban commanders wanted to maintain the deal and expel the Arab crazies. Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, barely managed to overrule them, and if the United States had spread some serious money around it could easily have gone the other way.
Washington wasn’t interested in that outcome because after 9/11 the American public wanted blood. Understandable enough, but invading Afghanistan is always a bad idea (although it is always temptingly easy). Once the invaders have left, however, the Afghans never follow them home. It won’t happen this time either.
Western rhetoric insists that the hills of Afghanistan are directly connected to the streets of Manhattan, London, and Toronto. But no Afghan, not even any member of the Taliban, was involved in the planning or execution of 9/11, nor in the later, lesser attacks elsewhere in the West. Nor would the Taliban sweep back into power if all Western troops left Afghanistan tomorrow; the other players are still in the game.
Everybody who dies in this conflict is dying for nothing, because it will not change what happens when the foreign troops finally go home. As they eventually will.