Utilitarianism

joefromchicago wrote:

djbt wrote:
I believe we have discussed, earlier in this thread, the hidden ought here. It is 'one ought to be concerned about those other than oneself'.

That isn't a hidden "ought," it isn't even there. There are no "ought" premises in Mill's utilitarianism. Mill was smart enough to know that relying on an "ought" premise would be begging the question.

Here how it looks to me:

The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible, is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible, is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience. In like manner, I apprehend, the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable, is that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so. No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. This, however, being a fact, we have not only all the proof which the case admits of, but all which it is possible to require, that happiness is a good: that each person's happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons. Happiness has made out its title as one of the ends of conduct, and consequently one of the criteria of morality.
Broken down this seems to say:
(1) People desire their own happiness
(2) For each person their own happiness is a good.
(3) General happiness is the aggregate of all people's happiness.
(4) For each person general happiness should be a good.

Now, it seems screamingly obvious to me, as it did to you earlier in the thread, that there is a logical leap to get to (4), and this logical leap must be bridged with
(5) Each person should be concerned about the good of other people.

joefromchicago wrote:

You have it completely backwards. Mill starts from the premise "happiness is good" to the conclusion "one ought to maximize happiness."

No, as the passage above clearly shows, Mill starts from the premise 'a person's own happiness is a good to them', to get to 'one ought to maximise happiness' he must assume that people ought to give a damn about what is good for other people.

(As a side point, in this context, 'happiness is good' is a statement of principle, presuming that 'good' is being used in the moral sense. The fact that the statement has the word 'is' in it does not make it an 'is' statement - 'good'=a thing one ought to maximise', so this is still an ought statement, and is just as question-begging, as I'm sure you would have pointed out if I had put it forward as a statement of fact)

joefromchicago wrote:

djbt wrote:
Now, in theory I can see no argument I can use to convince someone that they ought to be concerned about those other than themselves - hence Humean skepticism. In practice it happens that I am concerned about those other than myself - hence being a utilitarian.

If you can't convince someone else, then why are you convinced? If you are a utilitarian because it fits with your own concerns, even though you don't buy the theory itself, then you're not a utilitarian. It would be like saying that you don't believe in the divinity of Christ, but Christianity fits with your everyday practices so you consider yourself a Christian.

Or like saying I can't convince everyone to love cake, but since I do love cake, I am a cake-lover.

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To what extent can an asserted moral position be confused,deliberately or not,with a fear of punishment either in the here and now or the hereafter.

And can a moral precept change when circumstances change as "thou shalt not kill" can change for some people during wartime or in cases of revenge.

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joefromchicago wrote:

djbt wrote:
I believe we have discussed, earlier in this thread, the hidden ought here. It is 'one ought to be concerned about those other than oneself'.

That isn't a hidden "ought," it isn't even there. There are no "ought" premises in Mill's utilitarianism. Mill was smart enough to know that relying on an "ought" premise would be begging the question.

Maybe that's what Mill thought. If he did, I think he was wrong, and that he relied on an artifact of the English language to draw the analogy between "visible", "audible" and "desireable". This wouldn't work in the German language, where grouping "sichtbar" and "hörbar" with "wünschenswert" does not suggest an analogy. You could get an analogy by inventing the word"wünschbar". But this word would be understood by a German speaker to describe something that can be wished for, but not necessarily something that ought to be, which is what the word "desireable" suggests. Revisiting Mill's sentence with this in mind, I notice that on careful reading, the same logic applies to the English original too: "Audible" means you can hear it, not that you ought to. "Visible" means you can see it, not that you ought to. But "desireable" means you ought to wish for it, not that you can. There is no analogy here, it just sounds like there is one in English. So I agree with djbt, there is an "ought" hidden here; but the English language made it easy for Mill to hide it, and hard for the reader to find it in the middle of Mill's impressive rhetoric.

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djbt

I don't see any relation between 2) and 3).
Singular happiness of all men doesn't lead to general happiness. The premise only allows us to say:
For any man his own happiness is a good.
The happiness of 1.000 men is the happiness of each of those men, not a general happiness.
(We can conceive that the happiness of one man consists in the unhappiness of all other men).

Have you any criteria, within utilitarianism, to define individual happiness in a way that leads to general happiness?

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val wrote:

djbt

I don't see any relation between 2) and 3).
Singular happiness of all men doesn't lead to general happiness. The premise only allows us to say:
For any man his own happiness is a good.
The happiness of 1.000 men is the happiness of each of those men, not a general happiness.
(We can conceive that the happiness of one man consists in the unhappiness of all other men).

Have you any criteria, within utilitarianism, to define individual happiness in a way that leads to general happiness?

I'm sorry, I'm not sure I can see your point, but I'll try to respond.

What is the difference between saying: here is a group of 1000 men, all of whom are happy, and saying: here is a completely happy group of 1000 men?

You say 'Singular happiness of all men doesn't lead to general happiness', but it seems to me very clear that if all men are happy, there is general happiness.

Your point seems to be that the things that make one particular person happy (not their happiness in and of itself) might be irreconcilable with the things that make another person happy. In this case, the utilitarian is obliged to make both as happy as possible. How this is done depends on the specifics of the situation.

With your hypothetical man who can only be happy if everyone else is unhappy, perhaps we could encourage all the people who live near him to take part in an amusing and entertaining jape where they all do their upmost to pretend to be miserable whenever they walk past him. Or if he really is an incredibly hateful person, who only feels happy when witnessing extreme suffering, perhaps we could slip him into some kind of VR world, where he can rule on high and torture VR people til his heart's content?

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Thomas wrote:

I don't understand your logic here. Say I'm in a restaurant and order a medium steak, which I prefer over both well-done and rare. The waiter serves me my steak well-done. I like well-done good enough to not bother returning it, so I eat it instead. Does that mean my preferences were inconsistent and I shouldn't have ordered a medium steak in the first place? Replace "well done" with hedonism and "medium" with utilitarianism, and you pretty much have my my preferences between those two tasty moral philosophies. While I prefer utilitarianism over its alternatives, I also find some of the alternatives good enough that getting rid of them wouldn't be worth fighting a religious war over it. Remember, again, that all this is assuming that a society produces lots of hedonists if it excuses people for whom helping is truly extremely bothersome. You have not yet convinced me that this premise is true.

Let's say that you are an observant Jew. You order a medium steak, but the waiter brings you a pork chop. Will you be satisfied that the pork chop is "good enough?"

Your analogy is flawed because it treats different types of moral theories as essentially different flavors of the same philosophic meal. To a genuine utilitarian, however, utilitarianism and hedonism are not simply different ways to prepare the same dish, they're different foods altogether -- and one is completely unpalatable.

Utilitarianism isn't a faute de mieux type of morality: it doesn't enjoin its adherents to maximize utility "unless there's something else that you think is just as good." Maximizing utility, in other words, isn't one path to morality, it's the only path. And if you think differently, then you're not a utilitarian.

Thomas wrote:

Maybe that's what Mill thought. If he did, I think he was wrong, and that he relied on an artifact of the English language to draw the analogy between "visible", "audible" and "desireable". This wouldn't work in the German language, where grouping "sichtbar" and "hörbar" with "wünschenswert" does not suggest an analogy. You could get an analogy by inventing the word"wünschbar". But this word would be understood by a German speaker to describe something that can be wished for, but not necessarily something that ought to be, which is what the word "desireable" suggests. Revisiting Mill's sentence with this in mind, I notice that on careful reading, the same logic applies to the English original too: "Audible" means you can hear it, not that you ought to. "Visible" means you can see it, not that you ought to. But "desireable" means you ought to wish for it, not that you can. There is no analogy here, it just sounds like there is one in English. So I agree with djbt, there is an "ought" hidden here; but the English language made it easy for Mill to hide it, and hard for the reader to find it in the middle of Mill's impressive rhetoric.

Interesting notion, but, in the end, largely unpersuasive. Mill doesn't suggest that something ought to be desired because it is desirable, he merely notes that the best evidence for the claim that something is desirable is that it is desired. And that fits with the English denotation of "desirable" as describing something that is desired rather than something that ought to be desired (the latter would be more accurately described as "desireworthy," just as something that is "blameworthy" or "praiseworthy" ought to be blamed or praised). There is, in short, no hidden "ought" in Mill's formulation of the "desirable."

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djbt wrote:

Broken down this seems to say:
(1) People desire their own happiness
(2) For each person their own happiness is a good.
(3) General happiness is the aggregate of all people's happiness.
(4) For each person general happiness should be a good.

Now, it seems screamingly obvious to me, as it did to you earlier in the thread, that there is a logical leap to get to (4), and this logical leap must be bridged with
(5) Each person should be concerned about the good of other people.

But that's not what you said. You said "this all rests, as you illustrated well with your hedonist example, on the assumption that one ought to be concerned about those other that oneself." In your formulation above, 1, 2, and 3 are premises, while 4 and 5 are conclusions based on those premises (actually, 2 and 5 are mixed premises and conclusions, but 5 is only a premise for 4, not a general premise).

djbt wrote:

No, as the passage above clearly shows, Mill starts from the premise 'a person's own happiness is a good to them', to get to 'one ought to maximise happiness' he must assume that people ought to give a damn about what is good for other people.

He doesn't assume that, he establishes it by means of a logical inference.

djbt wrote:

(As a side point, in this context, 'happiness is good' is a statement of principle, presuming that 'good' is being used in the moral sense. The fact that the statement has the word 'is' in it does not make it an 'is' statement - 'good'=a thing one ought to maximise', so this is still an ought statement, and is just as question-begging, as I'm sure you would have pointed out if I had put it forward as a statement of fact)

If "good=a thing one ought to maximize," then you'd be right. But it isn't. So you're not.

djbt wrote:

Or like saying I can't convince everyone to love cake, but since I do love cake, I am a cake-lover.

You don't even think the cake exists.

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joefromchicago wrote:

Let's say that you are an observant Jew. You order a medium steak, but the waiter brings you a pork chop. Will you be satisfied that the pork chop is "good enough?"

No, in this case, the trouble of eating pork would exceed the benefit of not complaining to the waiter and not waiting another 15 minutes for my dinner. Just as in case of a Stalinist society, I would go through the trouble of either resisting it or emigrating. But medium steaks and hedonist societies don't raise my displeasure to the level of compelling me to take action.

joefromchicago wrote:

Utilitarianism isn't a faute de mieux type of morality: it doesn't enjoin its adherents to maximize utility "unless there's something else that you think is just as good." Maximizing utility, in other words, isn't one path to morality, it's the only path. And if you think differently, then you're not a utilitarian.

Says who?

joefromchicago wrote:

Mill doesn't suggest that something ought to be desired because it is desirable, he merely notes that the best evidence for the claim that something is desirable is that it is desired. And that fits with the English denotation of "desirable" as describing something that is desired rather than something that ought to be desired (the latter would be more accurately described as "desireworthy," just as something that is "blameworthy" or "praiseworthy" ought to be blamed or praised). There is, in short, no hidden "ought" in Mill's formulation of the "desirable."

He seems to assume implicitly that desires ought to be satisfied. It's a pretty minimal assumption, which is one reason I find utilitarianism attractive. But if the assumption was wrong, evidence that people desire something would not tell us that they ought to receive it. I don't see how Mill could get from here to there without implying this assumption as an "ought".

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Thomas wrote:

joefromchicago wrote:
Utilitarianism isn't a faute de mieux type of morality: it doesn't enjoin its adherents to maximize utility "unless there's something else that you think is just as good." Maximizing utility, in other words, isn't one path to morality, it's the only path. And if you think differently, then you're not a utilitarian.

Says who?

Not Bentham:

Jeremy Bentham, in 'Principles of Morals and Legislation', chapter 1: 'Of the Principle of Utility', wrote:

II. The principle of utility is the foundation of the present work: it will be proper therefore at the outset to give an explicit and determinate account of what is meant by it. By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever, and therefore not only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government. (Emphasis added, T.)

Source

Not Mill:

John Stuart Mill, in 'Utilitarianism', chapter 2: 'What Utilitarianism Is', wrote:

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. (Emphasis added, T.)

Source

Bentham and Mill both seem to make it very clear that they think of this as a matter of degree. I see nothing in their writing which suggests that only the one, utility-maximizing alternative is good, and everything else is bad. Thus, if a natural-rights approach to morality makes humanity as happy as utilitarianism, it is as good as utilitarianism. If hedonism gets us 80% of the way, it's 80% as good as utilitarianism. If Stalinism gets us 0% of the way, it's no good at all. As a utilitarian, I have no problem at all saying these things -- and it seems I have Bentham's and Mill's blessing. Which utilitarian did you have in mind whose blessing I don't have?

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joefromchicago wrote:

djbt wrote:
Broken down this seems to say:
(1) People desire their own happiness
(2) For each person their own happiness is a good.
(3) General happiness is the aggregate of all people's happiness.
(4) For each person general happiness should be a good.

Now, it seems screamingly obvious to me, as it did to you earlier in the thread, that there is a logical leap to get to (4), and this logical leap must be bridged with
(5) Each person should be concerned about the good of other people.

But that's not what you said. You said "this all rests, as you illustrated well with your hedonist example, on the assumption that one ought to be concerned about those other that oneself." In your formulation above, 1, 2, and 3 are premises, while 4 and 5 are conclusions based on those premises (actually, 2 and 5 are mixed premises and conclusions, but 5 is only a premise for 4, not a general premise).

I can see no way that 5 can be inferred from either 1, 2, or 3. Therefore it is not a conclusion. Since it is not a conclusion, it must be a premise. And since it is a statement of principle, it is at ought-premise. The fact that I happened to number it 5 for clarity's sake does not change the fact that it is needed before 4. Perhaps I should call it 0 or 3.5. In any case, it is clearly an ought premise, and it is clear required for Mills' argument.

Equally clear is that Mills is using 'desirable' as synonymous with 'desire-worthy'. If he were not, then he could only conclude that people do desire maximised utility, not that they should.

And how did we come to this, anyway? Why are you defending a logical leap in Mills' reasoning which you were so keen to point out in mine and Thomas' earlier? Have we switched sides...?

joefromchicago wrote:

djbt wrote:
Or like saying I can't convince everyone to love cake, but since I do love cake, I am a cake-lover.

You don't even think the cake exists.

All this talk of food is making me hungry... though I think our metaphors are getting so mixed they are beyond meaning...

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spendius wrote:

To what extent can an asserted moral position be confused,deliberately or not,with a fear of punishment either in the here and now or the hereafter.

Well, I don't think utilitarianism can be the result of such a fear - evidence suggests that God is most certainly not a utilitarian.

spendius wrote:

And can a moral precept change when circumstances change as "thou shalt not kill" can change for some people during wartime or in cases of revenge.

Under utilitarianism no act is a priori wrong, and exactly how utility is maximised will depend on the circumstances. This flexibility is one of the (many) benefits of utilitarian morality.

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Thomas wrote:

No, in this case, the trouble of eating pork would exceed the benefit of not complaining to the waiter and not waiting another 15 minutes for my dinner. Just as in case of a Stalinist society, I would go through the trouble of either resisting it or emigrating. But medium steaks and hedonist societies don't raise my displeasure to the level of compelling me to take action.

Rather than extending this food analogy any further, I'm content with saying that we disagree on this point. You see utilitarianism and hedonism as two acceptable alternatives; I see them as fundamentally and irreconicilably opposed.

Thomas wrote:

He seems to assume implicitly that desires ought to be satisfied. It's a pretty minimal assumption, which is one reason I find utilitarianism attractive. But if the assumption was wrong, evidence that people desire something would not tell us that they ought to receive it. I don't see how Mill could get from here to there without implying this assumption as an "ought".

But the fact remains that Mill does go from "is" to "ought." If you think that is objectionable in itself (like djbt), then you should be more hesitant about your support for utilitarianism. If you want to find out how Mill goes from saying that people desire pleasure to saying that people ought to maximize utility, I suggest you read Mill.

Thomas wrote:

joefromchicago wrote:
Utilitarianism isn't a faute de mieux type of morality: it doesn't enjoin its adherents to maximize utility "unless there's something else that you think is just as good." Maximizing utility, in other words, isn't one path to morality, it's the only path. And if you think differently, then you're not a utilitarian.

Says who?
[snip]
Bentham and Mill both seem to make it very clear that they think of this as a matter of degree. I see nothing in their writing which suggests that only the one, utility-maximizing alternative is good, and everything else is bad. Thus, if a natural-rights approach to morality makes humanity as happy as utilitarianism, it is as good as utilitarianism. If hedonism gets us 80% of the way, it's 80% as good as utilitarianism. If Stalinism gets us 0% of the way, it's no good at all. As a utilitarian, I have no problem at all saying these things -- and it seems I have Bentham's and Mill's blessing. Which utilitarian did you have in mind whose blessing I don't have?

Despite being constantly wrong, Thomas, I nevertheless respect your intellect. I'm going to be very charitable, therefore, and assume that your bewildering error here is the result of some sort of misunderstanding or Uebersetzungsfehler rather than an inability to understand what are, in fact, some very simple texts.

Bentham and Mill do not say that hedonism (or any other system of morality) is "just as good" as utilitarianism. Indeed, your quotation from Bentham states: "the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever." Just because they both identify utility as a "tendency" does not mean that utility is not itself an absolute measure of morality. Neither Bentham nor Mill would have suggested that there is something else out there (like, for instance, hedonistic pleasure) that could act as a substitute for the principle of utility.

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djbt wrote:

I can see no way that 5 can be inferred from either 1, 2, or 3. Therefore it is not a conclusion.

Fortunately for Mill, he was not bounded by the limits of your imagination.

djbt wrote:

Since it is not a conclusion, it must be a premise.

You compound your error. There is a tertium quid here: it may be completely irrelevant.

djbt wrote:

And since it is a statement of principle, it is at ought-premise. The fact that I happened to number it 5 for clarity's sake does not change the fact that it is needed before 4. Perhaps I should call it 0 or 3.5. In any case, it is clearly an ought premise, and it is clear required for Mills' argument.

Rather than go around the metaphorical mulberry bush one more time with you on this point, I think I will content myself with saying that I think, for the reasons stated before, that you are profoundly wrong. Furthermore, the fact that you think Mill used an "ought" premise calls into question your philosophical position, not mine, so I really have no reason to cure you of your error.

djbt wrote:

Equally clear is that Mills is using 'desirable' as synonymous with 'desire-worthy'. If he were not, then he could only conclude that people do desire maximised utility, not that they should.

I enjoin you to read Mill.

djbt wrote:

And how did we come to this, anyway? Why are you defending a logical leap in Mills' reasoning which you were so keen to point out in mine and Thomas' earlier? Have we switched sides...?

Certainly not. Unlike you, I won't attempt to defend a position whose principles I deny.

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Quote:

spendius wrote:
To what extent can an asserted moral position be confused,deliberately or not,with a fear of punishment either in the here and now or the hereafter.

Well, I don't think utilitarianism can be the result of such a fear - evidence suggests that God is most certainly not a utilitarian.

djbt-How would you know whether utilitarianism was a cover up of such a fear or not?

Quote:

spendius wrote:
And can a moral precept change when circumstances change as "thou shalt not kill" can change for some people during wartime or in cases of revenge.

Under utilitarianism no act is a priori wrong, and exactly how utility is maximised will depend on the circumstances. This flexibility is one of the (many) benefits of utilitarian morality.

Doesn't that make utilitarianism all things to all men and therefore meaningless?

Quote:

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joefromchigago, one final comment before we move on from your inability to see Mills' subtle ought:

I accept 'one ought to care about those other than oneself' as a working assumption which, although unprovable, is, I think, a reasonable assumption (I also hold, as working assumptions, other unprovable beliefs, such as belief in the existence of an external reality, and belief that entities other than myself are conscious), and it is an assumption demanded by my conscious. In case you think my conscience is too weak a foundation for a moral system, let me turn to Mills to argue my corner:

[b]Mills wrote:[/b] The internal sanction of duty, whatever our standard of duty may be, is one and the same -- a feeling in our own mind; a pain, more or less intense, attendant on violation of duty, which in properly cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility. This feeling, when disinterested, and connecting itself with the pure idea of duty, and not with some particular form of it, or with any of the merely accessory circumstances, is the essence of Conscience; though in that complex phenomenon as it actually exists, the simple fact is in general all encrusted over with collateral associations, derived from sympathy, from love, and still more from fear; from all the forms of religious feeling; from the recollections of childhood and of all our past life; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem of others, and occasionally even self-abasement. This extreme complication is, I apprehend, the origin of the sort of mystical character which, by a tendency of the human mind of which there are many other examples, is apt to be attributed to the idea of moral obligation, and which leads people to believe that the idea cannot possibly attach itself to any other objects than those which, by a supposed mysterious law, are found in our present experience to excite it. Its binding force, however, consists in the existence of a mass of feeling which must be broken through in order to do what violates our standard of right, and which, if we do nevertheless violate that standard, will probably have to be encountered afterwards in the form of remorse. Whatever theory we have of the nature or origin of conscience, this is what essentially constitutes it. The ultimate sanction, therefore, of all morality (external motives apart) being a subjective feeling in our own minds, I see nothing embarrassing to those whose standard is utility, in the question, what is the sanction of that particular standard? We may answer, the same as of all other moral standards- the conscientious feelings of mankind. Undoubtedly this sanction has no binding efficacy on those who do not possess the feelings it appeals to; but neither will these persons be more obedient to any other moral principle than to the utilitarian one. On them morality of any kind has no hold but through the external sanctions. Meanwhile the feelings exist, a fact in human nature, the reality of which, and the great power with which they are capable of acting on those in whom they have been duly cultivated, are proved by experience. No reason has ever been shown why they may not be cultivated to as great intensity in connection with the utilitarian, as with any other rule of morals. [URL=http://www.msu.org/ethics/content_ethics/texts/mill/milltxt2.html#1]Utilitarianism, Chapter Three[/URL]

Now, moving on, getting back on right sides: If you are not a utilitarian, where do you find fault with Mills' reasoning? Do you disagree that happiness is desirable? Or do you agree that it is desirable, but hold that there are other things that are equally, or more, desirable?

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spendius wrote:

djbt wrote:
spendius wrote:

To what extent can an asserted moral position be confused,deliberately or not,with a fear of punishment either in the here and now or the hereafter.

Well, I don't think utilitarianism can be the result of such a fear - evidence suggests that God is most certainly not a utilitarian.

djbt-How would you know whether utilitarianism was a cover up of such a fear or not?

Well, I guess it could be such a cover-up, certainly Mills puts forward the fear/love of God as one reason why people feel a moral sense of duty at all, but it is one among many reasons and, I suspect, not a particularly important one for utilitarians, if it is a reason at all. In any case, this is a question of psychology, not philosophy.

spendius wrote:

djbt wrote:
spendius wrote:
And can a moral precept change when circumstances change as "thou shalt not kill" can change for some people during wartime or in cases of revenge.

Under utilitarianism no act is a priori wrong, and exactly how utility is maximised will depend on the circumstances. This flexibility is one of the (many) benefits of utilitarian morality.

Doesn't that make utilitarianism all things to all men and therefore meaningless?

No. The duty of the utilitarian is always to maximise happiness, how this is best done changes with the context in which a person finds themselves, not with the person.

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djbt-

That seems to me to render the utilitarian catatonic or at best a hermit.He would be frozen with indecision in any circumstances presenting a choice.
He would seek an outlet in his own happiness.

And I'm not sure you are allowing for mind manipulation.That is-what could people be made to think was maximizing happiness.

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spendius wrote:

djbt-

That seems to me to render the utilitarian catatonic or at best a hermit.He would be frozen with indecision in any circumstances presenting a choice.

This is where what is called rule utilitarianism comes in useful.

spendius wrote:

And I'm not sure you are allowing for mind manipulation.That is-what could people be made to think was maximizing happiness.

Well, I guess it is possible people could be deceived in this way, people can be persuade to do all sorts of crazy things. But as it is part of a utilitarian's duty to think carefully about the consequences of their actions, I would not say a utilitarian is more susceptible to this kind of manipulation than adherents of any other, or no, moral philosophy.

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djbt-

Isn't one of the war aims to free the Iraqi people from the evil dictator i.e.maximise their happiness.

In the first answer above why couldn't "syrup" be substituted for "rule utilitarianism"?

In the second answer why can't catatonia or hermitism be substituted for "think carefully"?

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spendius wrote:

djbt-

Isn't one of the war aims to free the Iraqi people from the evil dictator i.e. maximise their happiness.

The court's out on that...

spendius wrote:

In the first answer above why couldn't "syrup" be substituted for "rule utilitarianism"?

Er... because then the sentence would mean something totally different... and as far as I can see, utterly irrelevant to the discussion. For a utilitarian, there are good arguments for adopting rules of thumb, such as laws, because they tend to maximise happiness - as long as the consequences of such rules of thumb are judged for their effectiveness by utilitarian standards. I'm not sure what arguments can be used to support the use of syrup....

spendius wrote:

In the second answer why can't catatonia or hermitism be substituted for "think carefully"?

Because it is not part of a utilitarian's duty to be catatonic or hermitic. What you are saying is a bit like 'when you say 2 + 2 = 4, why couldn't one of those '2's be '3's?

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