knowledge

Frank

Belief must be understood in a psychological context. It is a conviction about something.

If a belief can be supported by an acceptable criteria of validation, then your belief shows adequation to its object.

About knowledge. You don't know if there is a monitor or a keyboard in front of you. You can say that you see and touch a monitor or a keyboard. But in fact all you have is the optical and tactile sensations. Your eyes, your hands have feelings, due to your nervous system. But how can you demonstrate that those sensations are caused by an external stimulus?
So, you don't really know if there is a monitor.

But you can believe in the reality of the monitor. I do. And why? Because this belief is much more evident than the belief that only your sensations exist. According to the way our mind works, it is more acceptable the idea that your sensations are caused by an external factor than the idea that you are creating those sensations.

Joe I did include "retrodiction" in my definition. But a historian is essentially working "forwards" from perceptual state to perceptual state during "evidence gathering" in order to piece together the "relevant past". This "knowledge" is highly selective and relates to current decision making/social negotiations or establishment of paradigms such as evolutionary theory. Perhaps in the extreme "history is bunk" (Henry Ford).

agrote wrote:

No. I mean "Is justified true belief the same as knowledge?" Or, is the following true...

A knows that P if and only if
1. P is true
2. A believes that P
3. A's belief that P is justified (or has adequate evidence to support it, perhaps)

I am on record as having already accepted this definition of "knowledge" (at least as a working definition), and, despite some reservations, I see no reason to discard it now.

To examine this definition, let's look at some beliefs that would not constitute "knowledge." Take, for example, a person's belief in the existence of unicorns. Although the person may sincerely believe in their existence, there would be no indicia of truth that would allow the person to assert that his belief was either "true" or "justified." Likewise, a belief that one is possessed by demons would lack the necessary elements of truth and justification.

On the other hand, let's suppose that a person believes that she is the queen of Portugal, and further let's suppose that she actually is the queen of Portugal, but her belief is based upon messages that she has received from magic pixies. Now, her belief is true and it is a sincerely held belief, but, because her belief is not based upon the truth of the proposition (it is, instead, based upon a phantasm), it is not justified. In other words, although she believes something that is true, she can't be said to know that she is the queen of Portugal. The fact that her belief actually coincides with the truth is, in this respect, merely that: a coincidence.

In contrast, my belief that I am currently typing this text on a computer that is in front of me satisfies all three conditions: (1) I sincerely affirm that proposition (in that I believe it to be true); (2) the proposition is "true" (in that it satisfies the criteria of "trueness"); and (3) my affirmation is based upon the truth of the proposition (or, in other words, it is "justified"). I can, therefore, affirm that I know (insofar as it is possible to know anything) that I am currently typing this text on a computer in front of me.

George,

The problem I see with Joe's argument is that using that particular definition of "knowledge" essentially leads back to the notion that noone can ever claim to know anything.

The definition requires in its first postulate: "P"...has to be true.

In order to establish a claim that one knows P...P has to be established as true.

In his illustration...Joe simply asserts that his "P" (typing at a keyboard) is true...in order to meet one of the criteria he established for "P" being true.

I see the problem clearly...but I am no longer competent to put it into a coherent argument.

In our last few interactions, Joe, has made a point of calling attention to these intellectual shortcomings of mine...so I am reluctant to discuss the issue directly with him. I understand that the explanation he has given here is pretty much what he was asking me to do...in order to be considered deserving of participating in these kinds of discussions...but I honestly see very little difference between what he just did with his keyboard...and some assertions I made regarding 2 + 2 = 4 and whether or not I knew what my name is...other than the fact that I will never claim that I "firmly believe" (whatever the hell that means) that 2 + 2 = 4 or that my name is Frank Apisa.

If he is right, however, and "believing" is something essential to knowledge...you can understand my consternations, because in that event, I am shyt out of luck in the knowing department.

Perhaps you see where I am heading with my observations and comment. In the meantime, I will attempt to get Fresco over here to take a look at the issue. He's pretty much as sharp as Joe in these areas...and he may be able to help me.

Frankly, most of the time, I pass right by stuff that is offered as "belief"...becuase I understand the people doing it are mostly saying "I estimate..." "I think..." or something of that sort.

Frank Apisa wrote:

Frankly, most of the time, I pass right by stuff that is offered as "belief"...becuase I understand the people doing it are mostly saying "I estimate..." "I think..." or something of that sort.

I can hear your conception of belief being an estimation - but estimations have evidence to them. I think you want to equate - or reduce - estimation to guessing.

Estimations have evidence - it is weighed and measured and then used for a conclusion. This is very different from a guess.

Estimations are not a guess.

However, I think you are right - and I think your frustration comes from those believers that call thier belief knowledge. I concur that those believers are stating thier Dogma - not thier faith.

TTF

I agree there seems to be an infinite regress relative to the assertion of "truth" of the first postulate, but he does qualify his argument with phrases like "in as much as it is possible to know anything" which is an appeal to the common sense notion that we "do" think it is possible to "know", and it is also an appeal to the concept that if the two separate words exist (believe and know) they imply different things.

I apologise if I appear to be dismissive of these "logical dances" but as I have said before
I lean towards "knowledge" from a position of "pragmatism", not semantics restricted by binary logic. I put it to you that if I make the (Russell's Paradoxical) statement ...

..."The only certainty about knowledge is that we know nothing for certain"...

....you understand what I "mean" to the extent of agreeing or disagreeing with it, even though it is "logically contradictory."

I agree that you base your arguments on "pragmatism" of sorts and I was to some extent defending your position from the point of view of "common sense" as opposed to "philosophy". Your backlash about infinite regresses was therefore misplaced since I made the point of rejecting the utility of"traditional logic".

Perhaps if you scan Google using "Knowledge Pragmatism Truth" you will agree with me that we are only scratching the surface in this thread.