Truth and Language

Re: Truth and Language
Truth is a concept. Concepts are expressed in language. But truth means adequation between a statement and a fact. And facts are empirical experiences. If I say: it's raining, that statement can be true or false according to empirical experience. There is nothing in language that can make that statement true or false.
If we use a common language with previous semantic definitions, like english language, the truth of any statements depends on empirical verification. You go to the window and see if it is raining or not.
Even in the case of analytical propositions -"the queen of England is a woman" - the fact that they are necessarily true without any verification is due to his logical structure. And that kind of logic can be expressed in different languages.
So, truth is not a property of language.

As val pointed out, concepts transcend language. But I tend to disagree that truth is a concept. Words, language, concepts are all constructs of intellect, truth is probably beyond the intellect and cannot be fully grasped by any concepts.

blueSky, what kind of Truth are you talking about? I didn't understand

Perhaps something so subtle that in its domain there are no kinds and categories. It just is. The moment you try to put it in gross intellectual structure of words, ideas and concepts, something pure is already lost.

Since all is in a state of flux, both "empirical verification" and "truth" are matters of negotiation or agreement between interlocuters with respect to "relevance" i.e. the spatio-temporal boundaries of the perceptual window. So in as much as this agreement is based on "language" then "truth is indeed a property of language.

Note also that the fundamental concept of "factuality" is "membership of a class" ...or "naming". Philosophers who assume that "facts" exist independently of the modus of particular observers are "naive realists".

Good point, fresco. I'm currently tackling this quibble as we speak--I have yet to recieve an intrepid response.

--Ibn

fresco:
Yes, facts do not exist independently of the modus of the observers. I agree with you, but I don't understand the relevance of that statement. When I define truth as an adequation between a proposition and a verification, this verification is about phenomena.
But agreement is not only based on language. It is expressed in language.
But if you say: the fire burns the flesh, and then put your hands in the fire you have a verification (a painful one) that is not only a question of negotiation between interlocuters, but an empirical experience.
So, I believe that truth is nothing more that adequation between a statement and an empirical verification.

Val,

Your example raises the issue that language is an acquired social construct which "works" by statistical consenus between interlocuters. Your "philosophy seminar"example which is never actually tested in real life only becomes interesting when fakirs walk across hot coals etc and here we move towards the murky waters where religion, truth and epistemology intermingle.
As Wittgenstein said "meaning is usage"..and by this I think he implied that much vacuous discussion goes on in philosophy with "fragments" out of context. ( E.g The issue of how do I know if "Peter is in pain" is pragmatically irrelevant. All that matters in real life is the function of such a statement in a particular social interaction).
The "phenomenon" is the the interaction of observer and observed, and in as much that believe observers to be "similar" with common sociolinguistic roots there will be concurrence about "external events".
This discussion has been significantly broadened elsewhere to include the so-called metalanguage of mathematics and its role in directing observation in physics. Some workers even believe that ALL that CAN be postulated WILL be observed!

LATER EDIT

I am implying here that "verification" is always functional, It is merely another form of social interaction in which "prediction and control" are covert principles. The very status of "words" themselves such as "flesh" and "burn" implies prediction of persistent properties, and re-classification takes place if counter examples arise. (Consider "alchemy" and its reliance on the "four elements - earth, air fire and water"....to be replaced the more useful (predictive) "chemistry"....to be replaced by.... )

(JLN et al might like to come in on this)

'Truth' and 'language' are totally independent entities.

The idea of 'truth' is, at best, a subjective concept emerging from the mind of the individual, sometimes overt, linked mindlessly to the pronouncements of an external source, sometimes camouflaged by layers and layers of psychological ballast, making a clear understanding of it's implications impossible.

Language is a tool, by which 'truth' is manipulated by those who would 'control' truth, with an effectiveness dependent on their skills with language, and their understanding of the thought processes of others, for reasons which are occasionally obvious, but more frequently, buried deep within the mysteries of their psyches.

[In the best case, 'truth is the product of 'language', and liberated by it;
in the worst case 'truth' is the 'victim' of 'language'!]

BGW

I am having difficulty reconciling your opening sentence with your last paragraph.

I suppose i was indicating that the purpose of specific language can be in support of, or bent on undermining the 'truth'!

[there is an independence of 'intent']

If anyone has seen the independent film Waking Life, then they're familiar with its views on language. As a recap for those who haven't: This woman talks about how language originated as a means of communicating basic facts like: 'water over there' or 'sabretooth tiger right behind you!' These modes of language are valid due to empirical verification and a common experience, but when one tries to express abstractions, language breaks down, since people's experiences of these events/concepts are different. For example, the word 'love' can mean many different things, and when a person says 'love', the listener might have different experiences with love, and therefore have a different definition, leading to misunderstanding. This is hard to do with words like 'green' or 'apple', but in abstractions, it's problematic.
My interpretation: language is a social construct, but one that can, if used delicately, express these abstractions via elaboration. And as far as 'truth' goes: Val, what is your position on 'truths' we have yet to understand, such as the origin of the universe? Do you feel that they aren't truths until we as humans know them, or do you feel that truth is one of the abstractions that, since everyone has a different perspective of reality (e.g. schizophrenics) nothing is actually 'true', just agreed upon?

Fresco
About Wittgenstein, I think his theory has nothing to do with truthbut only with definitions.

I'll try to clarify my position about language.
Languages are organised systems whose rules define terms and relation between them. The meaning of those terms depends on previous convention.
In the case of words or propositions, in colloquial language, we can observe three levels:
Firts, the word (or proposition) has its reality within the system, is an entity only meaningful within the system. If I pronounce the sounds that in Chinese mean "sun", not knowing Chinese language, I am only making meaningless sounds (except, obviously, for someone who knows Chinese language).
Second, the word (or proposition) is a concept within an human conscience, and here we must consider the multiple conditions of human experience - historical, social, psychological ...
Third, the word (or proposition) has a correspondence in the empirical experience. That's why a proposition includes "accidents" - in the Aristotelian sense. For example, when I say "this tree is green".
"This tree is green" has a meaning only within the system. In this case, the English language.
But that is different from the truth of the proposition.
The proposition can only be true if, within the limits of my empirical experience, I perceive that the thing I named tree appears with the property I named green.

I don't accept the pragmatic theory that the truth of a proposition depends on general consensus, as I think you do. Although that could be valid in a different level, I mean, if applied to the entire system.

Taliesin, your question is essential, but I don't think it has nothing to do with the topic. I think your question leads us to another direction, the problem of knowledge. I will not answer it - excuse me. But I think you should create a new topic about nature and limits of knowledge.

val: Just did. See my new thread: Truth: Objctive or Subjective?

Val,

I don't believe in "propositions" (period). (i.e. they are not independent of context anymore than a leaf is independent from the plant which bore it).
On reflection, statements like "this tree is green" never occur ! (except in philosophy seminars). However it is certainly the case that we utilise language within cognition in order to predict or retrodict events by means of the propositional calculus we call "logic" (at least in part). Logic uses "truth values" but cannot of itself obtain those values. "Truth" could therefore be merely equivalent to "a successful prediction" but this simply moves the focus of the consensus onto the term "success".

I agree that we rapidly move from "truth" to epistemology and this is not surprising since for scientists "verification" has been displaced by "falsification in principle". Thomas Kuhn's "paradigms" come into play here as microcosms of the socio-cultural networks which underpin and delimit observation, ...how these structures collapse and reformulate ...and how these tend to suppress counter examples to the current "truth"(..and we've not even touched on non-binary logic and Heisenbergs uncertainty principle yet!).

The way Wittgenstein used his words reveals the way in which he sees the truth, i.e., mutually assured reality.

One describes it with language, mostly; more importantly through symbolism. Yet “truth” can be applied in at least three ways.

Sometimes it is treated as a synonym for “fact.” At other times it is used to assert that verbal symbolism corresponds to the facts it refers.

But a third way, and one that Wittgenstein leaves in the air unmentioned but alluded to is, “truth” signifying direct apprehension of spiritual fact.

There is no effective symbolism for this truth, no correspondence that “truly” hits the mark, and any such “mutually assured reality” is merely illusion.

I've been very hesitant to enter this discussion because of its paradoxical character, i.e., we are asked to uncover the nature of truth and language by means of truthful language acts.
I do not have the necessary control of Wittgenstien to make technically competent statements, but I do feel it would be helpful to add another variable to the discussion: reality.
As I see it, our philosopshical efforts are to use language to make "truth statements" (philosophical propositions) about the nature of reality. In our attempts we all too often implicitly conflate reality with truth, forgetting that the former is given and the latter refers to constructions ABOUT reality. As an exotic example, let me note that when zen masters examine monks on their 'mastery' of koans (assigned puzzles), the master will often ask "SHOW me MU (the sound of one hand, or your original face before the birth of your parents, etc. etc.). He does not ask for a truthful statement ABOUT the objective nature of MU (or whatever the koan may be). He is asking the monk to show him reality, to point to it immediately or directly, not to make indirect verbal assertions about its nature by means of intermediary symbols. I hope this is relevant--this contrast between truth and reality, and pointing/showing and telling--to the discussion.