The town clerks raised a different challenge to the civil unions law, asserting that their obligation under the law to issue a civil union license, or to appoint an assistant to do so, violates their sincerely held religious beliefs under Article 3 of the Vermont Constitution. The parties dispute, at the threshold, the standard to be applied in evaluating this claim. Plaintiffs note that we have traditionally applied a balancing test drawn from a long line of United States Supreme Court decisions, which asks whether an interference with a sincerely held religious belief serves a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 447, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988); State v. DeLaBruere, 154 Vt. 237, 249, 577 A.2d 254, 261 (1990). Defendants urge that we apply the modified test adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), under which a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.
We need not resolve this particular issue. For even under the more stringent pre-Smith test urged by plaintiffs, "we must first make the threshold determination of whether [the law] substantially burdens [their] sincerely held beliefs." Hunt *434• v. Hunt, 162 Vt. 423, 432, 648 A.2d 843, 850 (1994); see also Hernandez v. Comm'r of I.R.S., 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989) (to trigger analysis of state's justification of law, interference with free exercise must at least rise to level of "substantial burden"). An accommodation of plaintiffs' beliefs is not required if the burden on religion is not considered substantial. See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 384-92, 110 S.Ct. 688, 107 L.Ed.2d 796 (1990); Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136; see also L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 14-12, at 1248 (2d ed.1988) ("sincerity and centrality do not always suffice to meet a claimant's required showing; the claimant must also demonstrate a significant burden"). We believe that plaintiffs in this case have failed to make this threshold showing.
In deciding this issue, we accept for purposes of analysis the highly questionable proposition that a public official here a town clerk can retain public office while refusing to perform a generally applicable duty of that office on religious grounds. We observe, however, that this proposition which means that the personal religious beliefs of a public officer may in some circumstances trump the public's right to have that officer's duties performed is neither self-evident nor supported by any of the cases cited by plaintiffs.
We also accept at face value plaintiffs' allegation that the act of issuing a civil union license, or even of appointing a substitute for that purpose, offends their sincerely held religious beliefs. See Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714-16, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981) (all that is necessary to establish the required sincerity is "an honest conviction" that one's religion prohibits the conduct required by law); Hunt, 162 Vt. at 432-33, 648 A.2d at 851 ("matters of faith `need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection'") (quoting Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714, 101 S.Ct. 1425). We also recognize that courts must be cautious in judging the "centrality" or relative importance of a particular religious practice to a particular faith. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887, 110 S.Ct. 1595. It is well settled, nevertheless, that "some inquiry" into the threshold requirement of a substantial burden, i.e., the extent to which the government's requirement will make the believer's religious duties "more difficult or more costly," Tribe, supra, at 1247-48, is essential to ensure that the neutral laws do not become virtually captive to any declaration of a sincerely held religious belief, however slight the burden. "[T]he very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests." Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972).
In this regard, numerous decisions have indicated that a burden on religion is not substantial if, as one court observed, "one can avoid it without violating one's religious beliefs." Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 12 Cal.4th 1143, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 700, 913 P.2d 909, 926 (1996); see also Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 303, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985) ("It is virtually self-evident that the Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption from a governmental program unless, at a minimum, inclusion in the program actually burdens the claimant's freedom to exercise religious rights."). Here, the civil union law itself provides the means of avoiding any potential free exercise burden on town clerks, by expressly *435• providing that "[a]n assistant town clerk may perform the duties of a town clerk under this chapter." 18 V.S.A. § 5161(b). Thus, the law itself offers an "accommodation" for town clerks with religious reservations about issuing a civil union license. Plaintiffs assert that even the act of appointing an assistant clerk to issue a license violates their sincerely held religious beliefs. We do not believe, however, that such an indirect and attenuated connection to the subject of the law substantially burdens plaintiffs' rights to freely exercise their religion in any degree approaching constitutional significance. See, e.g., Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth, 420 Mass. 749, 652 N.E.2d 580, 587-89 (1995) (availability of, or exposure to, condom distribution program in public schools did not substantially burden objecting parents' or students' free exercise rights "to any degree approaching constitutional dimensions"). Therefore, we hold the trial court correctly concluded that plaintiff town clerks failed to allege facts sufficient to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
Really ? I thought you did very well of exaggerating the plight of poor pitiful homosexuals and comparing it to black slaves who had it so easy . Your whole argument revolved around your opinion that marriage between a man and a woman should be bulldozed to make way for homosexuals . Why would anyone support Marriage Theft and the loss of rights to the mainstream family ?
