McTag wrote:If I may simplify it, it is saying that he believes the militia
(modern equivalent, the police or the National Guard) should be armed,
and individuals should not be armed, (except when necessary for self-defence).
It should be noted here that your concept is rather too simple given the history of the United States, and of policing and the National Guard. One paragraph of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which deals with the powers of Congress, reads:
[Congress have the power:] To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions;
Executing the laws of the Union is quite a different matter than the function of the police, and the significant occasions upon which the militia were called out to execute the laws of the union--such as the Whiskey Rebellion--lead to a good deal of public discontent. The same can be said of the use of the militia to suppress insurrection. Shays' Rebellion before the Constitution was promulgated saw a rebellion in western Massachusetts suppressed by the militia from eastern Massachusetts, and left a good deal of discontent. In the late 18th century, there were no regularly organized police forces in the nation, and police officials (usually the county sheriff or a town marshal) relied upon the deputized citizens to enforce local and state laws where a need was seen. After the Civil War, and the "Reconstruction" period which followed, the Posse Comitatus Act (1878) was passed, which prohibited the Federal government from using the armed forces and/or the militia in the role of police.
That leaves the militia in the role of repelling invasions. Excepting a few cases of the militia standing in defense of their homes, the record of the militia in "repelling invasion" (which actually can only refer to the War of 1812, the Creek War [1813] and the Civil War) is abysmal. The militia of New England performed fairly well in the Revolution, but it is noteworthy that the New Englanders had had more than a century of bush warfare, and sometimes organized warfare on the European model, with the French and their Indian clients--they were not typical of American militias. In almost all other cases, it is embarrassing how quickly the militia would run away. Washington constantly complained about being forced to rely upon the militia, whom he considered to be pre-eminently unreliable.
At Bladensburg in Maryland, as a small English army marched on Washington in 1814, about 6,000 or 7,000 militiamen (the English claimed 9,000--but they were clearly polishing their own laurels with that estimate) from Maryland and Virginia were marched out with a few hundred sailors from the regular Navy, and somewhat less than 200 Marines. The militia got a good look at the redcoats, and threw down their arms and ran without firing a shot. The Navy hung onto the militia's artillery, and in the words of one English officer, " . . . served the guns even after we had shot down their offices and were among them with the bayonet." The Marines fought steadily until the sun went down, and then marched away carrying all of their dead and wounded.
Earlier, in late 1812, when the United States first attempted in invade Canada, the New York militia largely refused to cross the Niagara River, saying that this was not a case of repelling an invasion, but of conducting one. Most of those who did cross the river promptly re-crossed the river when the English began to gather for a counterattack, pushing the wounded aside so they could get in the boats. American forces did not begin to campaign effectively in the Niagara peninsula until their forces were made up of regular troops and volunteers, and they stopped relying upon the militia. At New Orleans in 1815, Jackson's defense on the left bank of the Mississippi River (the east side) was made up of the Crescent City militia (inhabitants of New Orleans marched out to defend their city) spread out among the Kentucky and Tennessee volunteers, many of whom were veterans of the recently concluded Creek War. Sailors and Marines from the fleet served the artillery in Jackson's line. They cut down the redcoats like wheat in a field at harvest, including the commander of the English force. On the right (west) bank of the river, the Kentucky militia threw down their guns and ran away, without firing a shot.
In the Civil War, local militias who were sent out to confront invading Federal or Confederate armies were brushed aside contemptuously, when they didn't actually simply run away. The concept of using the militia to repel invasions is ludicrous, and has been since before the constitution was ratified.
Which leads us to the National Guard. The first time that a law was passed which sought to create an efficient and reliable "militia" (all previously laws rather laughably assumed that the militia would be efficient and reliable, and dealt with how they would be incorporated into the regular forces when on national service) was when the Militia Act of 1903 was passed--it is commonly known as the Dick Act. This was the first effective overhaul of the militia system, and created the Army National Guard, setting standards for training and equipment--
and making a distinction between the National Guard and the "unorganized militia". This latter distinction was a nod to the provisions of the second amendment. The Rambo-style wannabe heroes we encounter here would be considered members of the unorganized militia.
Largely, no one with military experience and competence in our history has relied upon the militia for serious operations. At Hannah's Cowpens in 1781, Daniel Morgan actually planned for the known cowardice of the militia--he went around the night before and told them he just wanted them to give the redcoats " . . . two good fires, then you can skeeddadle." He placed his forces between two small rivers, so the militia could not run far, and could be rallied and reformed after they had run. The members of the Continental Line, no doubt unsurprised, were told to expect the militia to run after two volleys. Probably the only thing which surprised them was to see the militia hang around long enough to fire, re-load and fire again.
The Dick Act was the first time anyone attempted, diplomatically, to address the weaknesses and unreliability of the militia. It has largely been successful, and the Army National Guard, and the Air National Guard have proven to be a reliable support to the regular military on many occasions since 1903.
Beginning in 2006, the Shrub has gotten his Congressional supporters to hang riders on Defense appropriation bills to attempt to modify or nullify the provisions of the various bills which constitute what is known as "the Insurrection Act." There was never a single bill which constituted an insurrection act, and the term refers to the body of law, grouped around the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, which deal with the powers of the government to use the armed forces in policing roles. The Shrub has been attempting to gain for the executive branch the power to use the military in a police role.
